Dynamic Decision Problems with Cooperative and Strategic Agents and Asymmetric Information. by Vasal, Deepanshu
Dynamic decision problems with cooperative and strategic
agents and asymmetric information
by
Deepanshu Vasal
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Electrical Engineering: Systems)
in the University of Michigan
2016
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Achilleas Anastasopoulos, Chair
Professor Mingyan Liu
Assistant Professor Grant Schoenebeck
Associate Professor Vijay G. Subramanian
Professor Rakesh V. Vohra, University of Pennsylvania
©Deepanshu Vasal
2016
To my parents and grandparents
ii
Acknowledgments
Foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Prof. Achilleas Anas-
tasopoulos for his invaluable guidance, patience and support during my graduate studies.
Over the years, I have learned a lot from him, in problem solving and conducting meaning-
ful research, writing good papers and giving clear presentations. It is absolutely amazing
how closely he has worked with me on problems, allowing me time to make mistakes and
learn from them. He has always been approachable, friendly, responsive and enthusiastic
towards working on problems, which kept me motivated through the years. I feel very
fortunate to have been given an opportunity to work on hard, conceptual problems that are
also relevant.
I would then like to thank my committee members for their participation in my defense
presentations. I would especially like to thank Prof. Vijay Subramanian for his guidance in
research and constructive feedback on my dissertation, which helped me greatly, in improv-
ing the content and presentation of my thesis. I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude
to many professors whom I have interacted with through courses or otherwise, and have
enriched my experience in graduate school, including Prof. Sandeep Pradhan, Prof. De-
mosthenis Teneketzis and Prof. Kim Winick. I consider myself fortunate to attend a great
institution like Michigan, where I learnt immensely from excellent courses in EECS and
Math.
I want to thank my friends for their support, without whom I may have graduated earlier,
but may not have been this fun. I would especially like to thank Arun for being a great
friend and a mentor. He pulled me into studying topics in math on fine summer days, and
on the way, instilled in me a deep appreciation for the same. Over the years, he exposed
me to many beautiful mathematical ideas, and I learnt a lot from him about working on
hard probability problems, and life in general. I also want to thank Farhad, Mohsen, Mike
and James for fun discussions. I would like to deeply thank Mich Haus and its inhabitants,
including Chelsea, Ryan, Swiz, David and Mikhail, for the whacky times, and for providing
open, cooperative environment, helping me grow personally. Bike rides with Julien, Aniket,
Pallavi and Bafna would be one of the sweet, memorable times for me. As will be the fun
times with Kartiki and gang.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family, for providing uncon-
ditional support to pursue my academic goals. Their support and values, helped me go
through some tough times. Their insistence on sincerity and dedication has been instru-
mental in helping me achieve my goals.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Chapter
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problems considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Stochastic control of relay channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Cooperative users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 Centralized control problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Decentralized control problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.3 Numerical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Strategic users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 2.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 2.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 2.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.9 Appendix D (Proof of Lemma 2.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.10 Appendix E (Proof of Theorem 2.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Structured perfect Bayesian equilibria in dynamic games with asymmetric
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
iv
3.3 Motivation for structured equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Algorithm for SPBE computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4.2 Backward recursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.3 Forward recursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.4 Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Illustrative example: A two stage public goods game . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.7 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 3.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.8 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 3.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.9 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 3.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.10 Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.11 Appendix E (Proof of Lemma 3.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information . . 72
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Structured perfect Bayesian equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4 SPBE of the dynamic LQG game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.1 Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.2 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 4.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.8 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 4.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5 Decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Incentive design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.2 Team problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2.3 Game problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 General framework for decentralized Bayesian learning . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.2 PBE of the game D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.3 Informational cascades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.4 Specific learning model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 5.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.6 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 5.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.7 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 5.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.8 Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
v
5.9 Appendix E (Proof of Lemma 5.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.10 Appendix F (Proof of Theorem 5.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 A simple relay channel model with simultaneous incoming traffic to source
and relay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Control by the fictitious coordinator: (a) original control action generation; (b)
equivalent control action generation through intermediate coordinator actions. 20
2.3 Numerical and simulation results for the decentralized policy, TDMA, and
RA. The baseline case (centralized solution) is also shown for comparison. . . 26
3.1 Solutions of fixed point equation in (3.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 θ2[pi2] described in (3.23 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 Decentralized team optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2 Strategic optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Strategic optimal policy with incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.4 Expected time average cost comparison for different policies . . . . . . . . . 99
vii
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Costs for subgame at time t. Parameters are E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 =
10, λ = 0.99, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, cd = 5, N = 10. States are (x, y) = (3, 3). . . 32
2.2 Costs for subgame at time t. Parameters are E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 =
10, λ = 0.99, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, cd = 5, N = 10. States are (x, y) = (3, 3). . . 33
5.1 Learning vs. Non-learning γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
viii
ABSTRACT
Dynamic decision problems with cooperative and strategic agents and asymmetric
information
by
Deepanshu Vasal
Chair: Achilleas Anastasopoulos
There exist many real world situations involving multiple decision makers with asymmet-
ric information, such as communication systems, social networks, economic markets and
many others. Through this dissertation, we attempt to enhance the conceptual understand-
ing of such systems and provide analytical tools to characterize the optimum or equilibrium
behavior.
Specifically, we study four discrete time, decentralized decision problems in stochastic
dynamical systems with cooperative and strategic agents. The first problem we consider is
a relay channel where nodes’ queue lengths, modeled as conditionally independent Markov
chains, are nodes’ private information, whereas nodes’ actions are publicly observed. This
results in non-classical information pattern. Energy-delay tradeoff is studied for this chan-
nel through stochastic control techniques for cooperative agents. Extending this model for
strategic users, in the second problem we study a general model with N strategic players
having conditionally independent, Markovian types and publicly observed actions. This re-
sults in a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present a forward/backward se-
quential decomposition algorithm to find a class of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game.
Using this methodology, in the third problem, we study a general two player dynamic LQG
ix
game with asymmetric information, where players’ types evolve as independent, controlled
linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. We show that
under certain conditions, players’ strategies that are linear in their private types, together
with Gaussian beliefs, form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Finally, we
consider two sub problems in decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games. In the
first part, we consider an ergodic version of a sequential buyers game where strategic users
sequentially make a decision to buy or not buy a product. In this problem, we design in-
centives to align players’ individual objectives with the team objective. In the second part,
we present a framework to study learning dynamics and especially informational cascades
for decentralized dynamic games. We first generalize our methodology to find PBE to the
case when players do not perfectly observe their types; rather they make independent, noisy
observations. Based on this, we characterize informational cascades for a specific learning
model.
x
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Dynamic decision problems are ubiquitous in real life situations and are studied in many
academic disciplines such as communication systems, industrial engineering, computer
science, economics, and many many more. Some examples include inventory control, it-
erative decoding, resource allocation, finding minimum spanning tree, traffic management,
shortest path algorithms, computing equilibria for markets, control of queues, sequential
hypothesis testing, and the list is unending. Such problems involve a single or multiple
decision makers (also referred to as players, agents, users or controllers) who make obser-
vations and take actions throughout the duration of the process and also receive rewards
(or incur costs). Each player wants to maximize its total reward, which may or may not
align with other players rewards. If the players’ rewards are aligned i.e. when all players
have the same objective, then we refer to such problems as team problems. If the play-
ers have different objectives, we refer to such problems as game problems. In this thesis,
we study scenarios of decision makers with different information sets in a dynamic setting
and provide tools to analyze such systems, and present structural results for optimum or
equilibrium strategies.
We start by describing a simple, canonical example on inventory control to highlight
some key ideas from stochastic control theory for a problem with classical information
structure i.e. with a single controller and with perfect recall. Suppose there is a gasoline
seller who makes a decision everyday on the quantity of gasoline she buys to maintain a
stock, based on the demand and her stock capacity. Let xt ∈ X be the stock of gasoline she
has at the starting of the day t, ut ∈ U be the amount she buys and wt ∈ W is the random
demand she receives during the day, whose statistics she knows. Then, the next day, her
stock is given by
xt+1 = xt + ut − wt
1
Her everyday reward depends on the amount of gasoline she sells that day, which ismin(xt+
ut, wt), and she wants to maximize her cumulative rewards over the duration of T days. Till
day t, she has made the observations x1, x2, . . . xt, and thus, her decision action on that day,
ut, is some function of this information available, i.e. ut = gt(x1, . . . xt), where gt is her
strategy. Thus, she wants to find the best set of strategies (g1, g2 . . . , gT ) that maximizes
her total reward for T days.
Assuming the action and space of stock, U and X , are finite, then there exist |U||X |t
possible strategies gt, at time t. For any finite duration T , the complexity of the last day
dominates and thus the space of optimization for the problem is of the order of |U||X |T .
Since the space of optimization increases double exponentially in T , it renders the prob-
lem practically intractable for any reasonable time duration. This curse of dimensionality,
as presented in this canonical example, represents a fundamental issue in dynamical op-
timization problems. However, many a times there exists more structure to the problem,
for example a concept of ‘state’ of system, which could be exploited to mitigate this issue.
For example, in the problem described before, if it were known that wt are i.i.d. random
variables, then (Xt, Ut)t can be shown to be a controlled Markov process and results from
classical stochastic control theory provide structural results for the optimal policies. Specif-
ically, these results show that there exist an optimal strategy at time t, which depends only
on the current state xt, i.e. ut = g∗t (xt), and thus the optimal strategy g
∗
t could be found
in the space of |U||X | functions. Moreover, there exists a backward recursive, dynamic
programming methodology to find optimal strategies, which further reduces the space of
optimization at time t to |X ||U|. Thus, for a problem with a finite horizon T , this method-
ology reduces the complexity of the optimization from double exponential in T to linear in
T , which highlights the power and usefulness of this technique.
Such problems, for which the state of the system is perfectly observed, are called
Markov decision problems (MDPs). If the state is not observed perfectly, rather indepen-
dent, noisy observations are made, then such problems are called partially observed Markov
decision problems (POMDPs), which are also MDPs with posterior beliefs as perfectly ob-
served state (for a precise and elaborate description, see a standard text on stochastic control
e.g. [31]).
These problems consists of
• State update function: xt+1 = f(xt, ut, wt)
• Observation function (for POMDP): yt = h(xt, vt)
• Actions as function of information (MDP or POMDP) : ut = gt(x1, . . . , xt) or ut =
gt(y1, . . . , yt)
2
• Instantaneous reward (or cost): Rt(xt, ut)
• All basic random variables (x1, w1, w2, . . . , v1, v2, . . .) are mutually independent
• Objective: maxg( or ming) Eg{
∑T
t=1Rt(Xt, Ut)}
Dynamic programming is used profusely in many dynamic optimization problems to
find analytical and numerical, optimal or near-optimal solutions. One such case that has
been extensively considered in literature, for its virtue of being analytical and for the appeal
for its ease of implementation, is linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control. In the LQG
model for perfectly observed states, the state update is linear, the instantaneous cost is
quadratic in state and control, and all basic random variables are i.i.d. Gaussian. The
optimal strategies are linear function of the state with coefficients as Kalman gains. If the
state is not observed perfectly, but through a linear, independent observation kernel, then
it is shown that strategies that are linear function of estimate of the state are optimal, with
same coefficients as in the case of perfectly observable state. This substitution of estimate
of state for the state itself, in the optimal control policies, is also referred to as certainty
equivalence [31] or separation of estimation and control [60].
The problem described above with a single controller with perfect recall (i.e. with
access to all past observations) is called a stochastic control problem with classical infor-
mation pattern. The problem becomes considerably more difficult for non-classical infor-
mation pattern i.e. when there are multiple controllers with different information sets, or
without perfect recall, or both. For example, it is shown in Witsenhausen’s counterexam-
ple [60] that even for a very simple two-stage LQG system without perfect recall, linear
strategies are not optimal, and moreover, the optimization problem is non-convex.
In this thesis, we always assume perfect recall and refer to problems with multiple
controllers with different information but same objective, as decentralized team problems.
There are specifically two key line of thoughts in the literature to find structural proper-
ties of the optimal control policies (which we discuss more in chapter 2, where we deal
with a decentralized team problem). The first approach, which is called agent-by-agent
approach [18], works as follows. It is shown that for any fixed strategy of the other players,
player i faces an MDP with an appropriately defined state, and thus can restrict its search
over Markov policies that are function of that state. Since each player can do the same,
using this approach, one can show that there exist optimal policies for the players that are
functions of a considerably smaller set of players’ available information. The second ap-
proach, which is referred to as common-agent approach [43], works as follows. It assumes
that there is a fictitious common agent who, at each time t, observes the common infor-
mation of the players at that time, and take actions that are prescription functions for the
3
players. Each player uses that prescription function on its private information to generate
its action. Using this approach, the decentralized problem is shown to be equivalent to a
centralized problem with only one decision maker, the common agent1. Then it is shown
that common agent’s problem is a POMDP, thus there exists a dynamic programming equa-
tion to find its optimal policies. Its optimal policies are Markov in nature and are functions
of the posterior belief on the state of the system and players’ private information condi-
tioned on the common information. The optimal policies of the common agent can easily
be translated to decentralized optimal policies of the players.
When players are strategic and information is perfect and complete, the appropriate no-
tions of equilibria are sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) and Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) [38, 45]. These equilibria can be found through backward induction by computing
Nash equilibria for every subgame, for every history or every state, respectively. When
players are strategic and information is asymmetric (although complete), such games are
called dynamic games with asymmetric information and appropriate notions of equilibria
include perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium (SE), trembling hand
equilibrium (THE). In such games, for every time t, for every history of the game ht, player
i observes only part of it, say hit. For the part that it does not observe i.e. ht\hit, it puts a
belief on it, in order to calculate its future reward from that time on. Thus the equilibrium
notion consists of a strategy and a belief profile for the players for all private histories.
The strategies satisfy sequential rationality conditions (i.e. no player gains by unilateral
deviation in strategies, for every subgame) using equilibrium beliefs and the beliefs are
found using equilibrium strategies and Bayes’ rule (with some other refinements). Thus
there is a circular argument for finding equilibrium strategy and belief profiles, and there
does not exist any dynamic programming like backward recursive methodology to find such
equilibria for such games in general. This remains a bottleneck in studying many real-life
situations that involve strategic agents in a dynamical system with different information
sets, for instance social networks, markets etc.
1.2 Problems considered
In this thesis, we consider four problems of stochastic systems with asymmetric informa-
tion pattern. A common thread in these problems is that they involve multiple decision
makers with different information sets with common and private components. There is an
1These problems are equivalent for total reward in expectation but not for every realization. This point
becomes crucial and hinders this approach from being utilized directly for decentralized dynamic games, as
discussed in chapter 3 in section 3.4.2.
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underlying discrete time dynamical system that obeys controlled Markov dynamics. Play-
ers are cooperative or strategic, and incur cost or rewards in each period that are additive
over a time horizon.
In the first problem, described in chapter 2, we study node cooperation in a wireless
network from the multiple access control (MAC) layer perspective. A simple relay chan-
nel with a source, a relay and a destination node is considered, where the source and the
relay nodes have packets arriving as Bernoulli arrival processes. The source can transmit
a packet directly to the destination or transmit through the relay. The tradeoff between
average energy and delay is studied by posing the problem as a stochastic dynamical opti-
mization problem. The following two cases are considered: (a) nodes are cooperative and
information is decentralized; (b) nodes are strategic and information is centralized.
With decentralized information and cooperative nodes, a structural result is proven that
the optimal policy is the solution of a Bellman-type fixed-point equation over a time in-
variant state space. For specific cost functions reflecting transmission energy consumption
and average delay, numerical results are presented showing that a policy found by solving
this fixed-point equation outperforms conventionally used time-division multiple access
(TDMA) and random access (RA) policies.
When nodes are strategic and information is common knowledge, it is shown that co-
operation can be induced by exchange of payments between the nodes, imposed by the
network designer such that the socially optimal Markov policy corresponding to the cen-
tralized solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game.
Taking motivation from the previous model, we then consider in chapter 3, a finite
horizon dynamic game with N selfish players, who observe their types privately and take
actions, which are publicly observed. Players’ types evolve as conditionally independent
Markov processes, conditioned on their current actions. Their actions and types jointly
determine their instantaneous rewards. Since each player has a different information set,
this is a dynamic game with asymmetric information, and in general, there is no known
methodology to find perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) for such games. In this chapter,
for a specific class of such games with independent types, we develop a methodology to
obtain a class of PBE using a belief state based on players’ common information. We first
show that any expected reward profile that can be achieved by any general strategy profile
can also be achieved by a policy based on players’ private information and this belief state.
With this structural result as our motivation, we develop our main result that provides a
two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to find a class of PBE of this game that
are based on this belief state. We refer to such equilibria as structured Bayesian perfect
equilibria (SPBE). The backward recursive part of this algorithm defines an equilibrium
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generating function. Each period in the backward recursion involves solving a fixed point
equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible belief on types. Using
this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are generated through a forward recursion.
In chapter 4, we then consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who
observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players’ types
evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic
instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) game with
asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions, players’ strategies that
are linear in their private types, together with Gaussian beliefs form an SPBE of the game.
Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact that future be-
liefs on players’ types are affected by the equilibrium strategies. We provide a backward-
forward algorithm to find SPBEs. Each step of the backward algorithm reduces to solving
an algebraic matrix equation for every possible realization of the state estimate covariance
matrix. The forward algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate
covariance matrices depend on equilibrium strategies. As a result, unlike the case of classi-
cal stochastic control or LQG games with non-signaling equilibria, the beliefs are strategy
dependent.
In Chapter 5, we study two problems that relate to decentralized Bayesian learning in
dynamical systems with strategic agents. In the first problem, we consider the problem of
how strategic users with asymmetric information can learn an underlying time-varying state
in a sequential buyers game. The exogenously selected strategic users sequentially make a
decision to buy or not to buy a product, which is either good or bad, based on their private
observation and publicly available information about decision of the past users. There
is interesting literature on this problem, on occurrence of informational cascades under
certain conditions where a user would discard its private information and base its decision
on previous users’ actions. This leads to its actions being uninformative for future users,
and learning stops for the team as a whole. Every future player repeats the same action
and users are said to be in a cascade. For a social objective, it is desirable to avoid to bad
cascades. We consider an ergodic version of this problem where users who observe private
signals about the state, sequentially make a decision about buying a product whose value
varies with time via an ergodic process. We formulate the team problem as an instance of
decentralized stochastic control and characterize its optimal policies. With strategic users,
we design incentives such that users reveal their true private signals, so that the gap between
the strategic and team objective is small, and the overall expected incentive payments are
also small.
In the second part, we study a more general model for decentralized Bayesian learn-
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ing in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information, where
players participate (take actions and receive rewards) for the whole duration of the game,
and cases where an internal process selects which subset of players will act at each time
instance. The proposed methodology hinges on a sequential decomposition for finding
perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric
information, where users’ types evolve as conditionally independent Markov process and
users make independent noisy observations of their types. Based on this methodology, we
study a specific scenario of Bayesian learning where we characterize informational cas-
cades for the truly dynamic game considered.
1.2.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we make contributions to the theory of dynamic games with asymmetric
information and provide insights into specific decentralized problems considered.
In chapter 2, we utilize two keys ideas in the literature of decentralized team problems
to provide structural results of the optimum policies in energy-delay tradeoff in a relay
channel. Based on these structural results, we find two, potentially suboptimal policies and
show that they perform better than standard TDMA (time division multiple access) and RA
(random access) policies. Furthermore, for strategic users with complete and perfect infor-
mation, we show existence of incentives to align the team objective with the social goal.
This is one of the very few works that considers the stochastic arrival nature of the packets
in a relay channel, and studies the problem from the stochastic control perspective. In gen-
eral, the structural results presented motivate design or redesign of optimal and suboptimal
policies for cooperative communication in decentralized network systems.
In chapter 3, we consider a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information
with conditionally independent Markovian types. We provide a sequential decomposition
methodology to find a class of PBE of the game, based on common belief state, where there
does not exist such a methodology for such games in general. We illustrate this method-
ology for a public goods example in this chapter and for models considered in chapter 4
and chapter 5. Before this, a common approach to find a PBE was to guess the solution,
if possible, and prove that it satisfies the equilibrium conditions. This, of course ,could be
done for simpler systems, and in general, PBE remained an elusive concept mainly for the-
oretical understanding and interest. This methodology provides a fundamental result in the
theory of dynamic games, which opens up the door to study many problems in economic
markets, social networks, auctions and more, and to provide analytical and numerical solu-
tions that were not tractable before. The existence of a solution of the fixed point equation
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in the backward recursion remains an open problem. In general, this work inspires new
research directions such as
(a) Proving existence of solution for the fixed point equation for general or a class of
games;
(b) Finding such decomposition for other classes of dynamic games with asymmetric
information;
(c) Finding structural properties of equilibria in specific games;
(d) Extension of the methodology for infinite time horizon games;
(e) Dynamic mechanism design for dynamic games with asymmetric information.
In chapter 4, we study dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information, where we
use the methodology developed in chapter 3 to show that under certain conditions, signal-
ing strategies that are linear in players’ private information, in conjunction with Gaussian
beliefs, form a PBE of the game. This result is an important result in the theory of the
dynamic LQG games and extends the models considered in the literature thus far. We also
provide algorithmic sufficient conditions for a solution to exist for scalar actions. However,
there remains a possibility of finding more general conditions.
In chapter 5, we consider the problem of decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic
games through two specific models. In the first problem, we highlight the significance of
certain infrequent histories of the game that play a very crucial role for the learning of the
players as a whole. Specifically, we show that by incentivizing players to report their ob-
servations at these histories, and thus contributing to the learning of the team, the resulting
game objective is close to the social objective. And since such histories are infrequent, the
expected payout is small. In the second problem, we consider a more general model than
the one considered in the informational cascades literature for the Bayesian learning with
strategic agents, where players participate in the game for the whole duration. We first ex-
tend the methodology developed in chapter 3 to find PBE for the case where users’ do not
observe their types, but make independent, noisy observations. We propose this as a frame-
work to study informational cascades for a more dynamic set-up than the one studied in the
literature. Based on this methodology, for a specific learning model, we characterize sets
of common beliefs as “cascades”, such that if these beliefs occur at any point in the game,
then players repeat the cascading actions for the rest of the game. In general this frame-
work presents a vast unexplored landscape to study learning dynamics and informational
cascades. Some important research directions include
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(a) Characterization of cascades for specific classes of models;
(b) Studying convergent learning behavior in such games including the probability and
the rate of “falling” into a cascade;
(c) Incentive or mechanism design to avoid bad cascades.
1.3 Notation
We use the following notation throughout this thesis, however, some chapter specific no-
tation is provided in at the end of introductions of the respective chapters. A random
variable is denoted by an upper case letter and its realization by the corresponding lower
case letter. Subscripts denote time indices, such that Xa:b is a short hand for the vector
(Xa, Xa+1, . . . , Xb), if a > b, then Xa:b is empty. Superscripts denote agents’ identities,
such that U it , is a quantity relevant to agent i. We use notation −i to represent all play-
ers other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N}. We use A−it to mean
(A1t , A
2
t , . . . , A
i−1
t , A
i+1
t . . . , A
N
t ) . We remove superscripts or subscripts if we want to rep-
resent the whole vector, for example At represents (A1t , . . . , A
N
t ). In a similar vein, for
any collection of sets (X i)i∈N , we denote ×i∈NX i by X . We denote the indicator func-
tion of any set A by IA(·). For any finite set S, P(S) represents the space of probability
measures on S and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P g (or Eg) the probability
measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g. We denote the set
of real numbers by R. All equalities and inequalities involving random variables are to be
interpreted in the a.s. sense, unless otherwise specified.
The proofs of theorems, lemmas and claims in each chapter, are provided in the appen-
dices at the end of that chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Stochastic control of relay channel
2.1 Introduction
In a wireless network, energy efficiency is an important criterion due to battery constraints.
Traditionally in a network, nodes communicate directly to the base station. However, the
presence of other nodes in the network can lead to more energy efficient systems through
node cooperation. This is because the presence of other nodes in the network can provide
alternate routes with possibly less transmission energy costs. On the other hand, this also
increases the delay in the system as such cooperation requires successful transmission from
the source to the relay node, and then from the relay node to the destination node. Thus
there is a tradeoff between the energy cost for successfully routing a packet and the cor-
responding delay cost. The study of this tradeoff in the case of cooperative or strategic
users with decentralized information can lead to interesting insights for the design of future
cooperative communication systems.
The relay channel is the simplest model and a building block for user cooperation in
a network. It has been and is currently being studied extensively from the perspective of
information theory (see for instance [10,12,54] and references therein), where theoretically
achievable rates and practically implementable codes are investigated. Since information
theory is an asymptotic theory, it does not capture directly the delay requirements that
are important for many communication applications. In addition, information theoretic
formulations cannot capture the dynamical aspect of a relay network that may be crucial
when studying the behavior of higher layers in the network hierarchy. Finally, since in
practice wireless devices are operated by humans, selfish behavior needs to be taken into
account for cooperation to be successful.
Recently game theory has been used as a tool to study strategic behavior of nodes
participating in a communication network (see [20, 22, 29, 36, 37, 39, 47, 48, 53, 61] and
references therein). The work in [61] studies a source-relay channel with non-cooperative
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nodes in fading and non-fading channel as finite and infinite repeated games, respectively.
The works in [37, 47] propose schemes for multi-hop routing based on a reputation system
to punish non-cooperative nodes in wireless ad hoc networks. Evolutionary game theory is
used in [29] to punish selfish nodes that do not cooperate to forward packets. The works
in [20, 22, 36, 48] adopt pricing mechanisms in wireless ad hoc networks to foster coop-
eration among non-cooperative nodes. Two auction mechanisms for a relay network are
proposed in [20] (SNR auction and power auction) that determine relay selection and re-
lay power allocation in a distributed fashion. The research reported in [22] introduces a
“bribery” mechanism that fosters cooperation using a microeconomic framework based on
game theory that encourages forwarding among selfish nodes by reimbursing forwarding.
Finally, [53] proposes a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm for nodes to decide
whether to accept or reject a relay request. Their algorithm results in a Nash equilibrium,
and it is proven that the system converges to the rational and optimal operating point.
Most of the works [20, 22, 29, 36, 48, 53, 61] assume that sources always have data
to send, and thus do not consider random traffic arrival processes at a node as may be
the case in a network. Others [29, 53, 61] model the communication as repeated games
(for example iterative prisoner’s dilemma where Tit-for-Tat strategy induces cooperative
behavior), whereas [20,22,36,48] use prices to incentivize nodes to cooperate. This chapter
considers independent random arrival processes at the source and the relay node which
results in a dynamic system (either a dynamic team for cooperative nodes, or a dynamic
game [45] for strategic users).
In this chapter the MAC layer of the relay channel is studied as a stochastic control
problem of optimally routing packets to the destination. The model assumes a half duplex
relay channel with a source, a relay and a destination node with incoming traffic at both the
source and the relay node. Also it assumes generic cost functions at time t reflecting packet
delay (through the backlog in each agent’s queue) and transmission energy. Among other
possible formulations, stochastic control of a relay channel can be studied as a static or a
dynamic optimization problem, or when information (such as queue backlog) is centralized
or decentralized, or when users are non-strategic (cooperative) or strategic, or with com-
plete or incomplete information (of utilities and system parameters). This chapter focuses
on complete-information of utilities and system parameters and studies two cases:
(a) dynamic, non-strategic (cooperative) players with decentralized information (Sec-
tion 2.3);
(b) dynamic, strategic players with centralized information (Section 2.4).
In Section 2.3 the relay channel is studied in the case of cooperative users. The case
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where information such as the backlog of each user is known to everybody (the centralized
problem) is well known, and can be formulated and solved as a standard Markov Deci-
sion Process (MDP) problem. The case is more interesting when information about agents’
backlogs is not available to everyone. This problem is studied in Section 2.3.2, where it is
formulated as a decentralized dynamic team problem, where users cooperate to minimize
expected energy and average delay of the entire network. The key feature of the model is
the non-classical information structure, that is, the source and the relay nodes do not ob-
serve each other’s queue lengths, but through feedback, learn each other’s previous actions.
Since there is no single controller, rather both source and relay nodes are controllers with
linked stochastic control problems, this set-up does not fit into the standard framework of
MDP theory [6, 31]. Similar decentralized control problems were studied in [35, 42, 44].
Utilizing an approach similar to [42] of viewing the decentralized system from the point
of view of a fictitious coordinator, a structural result is proven which shows that there ex-
ists an optimal policy that is the solution of a Bellman-type fixed point equation where
the optimization is done over a fixed state space as opposed to an ever-increasing state-
space in general. The contribution in this part is to show that the optimal decentralized
control strategies are based on the pair of marginal distributions of the queue lengths that
the source and relay agents are storing and updating in real time. Inspired by the optimal
solution found above, suboptimal decentralized strategies are investigated and their per-
formance is compared (using numerical analysis and simulation) to standard transmission
strategies such as time-division multiple access (TDMA) and other random access (RA)
protocols.
In Section 2.4 this communication setup is studied with the assumption that users are
strategic in nature and the following question is asked: can the socially optimal policy
(obtained by a centralized controller) be implemented by strategic users. The relay chan-
nel was also studied for strategic users in [49]. In that paper, authors pose the problem
as a static game, cooperation is induced using a reward mechanism, and strategies are an-
alyzed in Nash equilibrium. The present work takes into account the dynamic aspect of
the problem and poses it as a sequential game of complete information and simultaneous
moves [45]. The starting point here is the observation that when users are strategic, there
are more than one equilibria that may not coincide with the socially optimum solution. The
contribution in this part is to show (through an explicit construction) that the network de-
signer can impose payments to be exchanged between source and relay nodes, such that
the resulting dynamic game has the social optimal policy as the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium.
The two parts of the chapter broadly address the issue of stochastic control of the relay
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channel, and have a dynamic flavor due to the random incoming traffic model. This in-
duces the solution concept for both cases to be within the sequential framework: dynamic
programming for the former and subgame perfect equilibrium for the latter.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model.
In Section 2.3, the team problem is studied when users are cooperative and minimize a
common cost criterion. The centralized and decentralized problems are posed and struc-
tural results are given for the decentralized problem in Section 2.3.2. In Section 2.3.3,
numerical results are presented comparing the performance of a suboptimal decentralized
policy with TDMA and RA. In Section 2.4, the case when users are strategic is discussed.
Section 2.5 presents the conclusion.
2.2 Model
Source
Relay
Destination
p
p
1
2
E13
E12 E23
Figure 2.1: A simple relay channel model with simultaneous incoming traffic to source and
relay.
The model of the system studied in this chapter, as shown in Fig. 2.1, consists of a
source node (node 1), a relay node (node 2) and a destination node (node 3). The time is
discretized into slots and Bernoulli1 packet arrival processes {P it }∞t=1, i = 1, 2 are assumed
at node i, with the probability of arrival of a packet in any slot being pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2.
This model can be considered as a prototype for a larger network, where each source node
can also act as a relay for other source nodes, thereby potentially minimizing total cost in
the network. This view justifies the above assumption of independent arrival processes.
Both nodes 1 and 2 have queues of size N . The number of packets at time t in the queue
of node i is denoted by xit, i = 1, 2. The source has to send the packets in its queue to the
destination, and it has a choice to either transmit them directly to the destination or transmit
1In Section 2.3.2 we discuss extensions for the case of first-order Markov arrival processes.
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them through the relay or not transmit at all. At time t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, node i, i = 1, 2 takes
action uit, as a function of all the information gathered till time t. In subsequent sections
we will study different scenarios with different available information to the agents at time
t. The possible actions for node 1 are wait (W ), transmit to node 2 (T12) and transmit to
node 3 (T13); and possible actions for node 2 are wait (W ) and transmit to node 3 (T23),
thus having
u1t ∈ U1 = {W,T12, T13}, (2.1a)
u2t ∈ U2 = {W,T23}. (2.1b)
It is assumed that simultaneous transmissions from both node 1 and node 2 lead to unsuc-
cessful reception (collision) at the receiver. It is further assumed that even at the event of a
collision the packet headers can be decoded at node 32. Under these assumptions, the sys-
tem evolution can be described by the following set of equations, where the queue length
of a node at time t is given by the minimum of (a) its queue size N and (b) its queue length
at time t−1 plus 1 if there was an arrival in time slot t, minus 1 if a packet was successfully
transmitted in t− 1 slot
x1t = min
{
x1t−1 + p
1
t − 1{T12,T13}(u1t−1)1{W}(u2t−1), N
}
, (2.2a)
x2t = min
{
x2t−1 + p
2
t − 1{T23}(u2t−1)1{W}(u1t−1)
+1{T12}(u
1
t−1)1{W}(u
2
t−1), N
}
, (2.2b)
for t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, where 1A(·) is the indicator function of the set A.
At the end of time slot t, nodes 1 and 2 receive noiseless feedback wt ∈ {0, 1, 2, e1, e2}
from the destination node stating if the destination node successfully received the transmis-
sion from node 1 (wt = 1); if the destination node successfully received the transmission
from node 2 (wt = 2); if the destination node didn’t receive any transmission destined to
it (wt = 0); if there was a collision with two packets destined to it (wt = e1); or, finally,
if there was a collision at node 3 due to a simultaneous transmission from node 1 to 2 and
node 2 to 3 (wt = e2). Thus each node i = 1, 2 at time t can determine ut−1 = (u1t−1, u
2
t−1)
from the feedback wt and it own action uit. This implies that part of the system information
(in this case the agents’ actions) is shared between the agents with unit delay, while infor-
mation about the queue lengths is not shared (please refer to [42] for a general discussion
on delay-shared patterns). Throughout this chapter, it is also assumed that all controllers
have perfect recall.
2This is possible with sufficiently strong error correction coding of the headers.
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Generic instantaneous cost functions git(xt, ut) are defined for node i = 1, 2 as func-
tions of queue lengths xt = (x1t , x
2
t ) and actions ut of both the nodes. To quantify the
energy-delay tradeoff the following costs are assumed. The energy cost of transmissions
are defined by functions e1 : U1 → {0, E12, E13}, e2 : U2 → {0, E23} such that energy cost
for transmission from node 1 to node 3, e1(T13) = E13, node 1 to node 2 is e1(T12) = E12,
and that for node 2 to node 3 is e2(T23) = E23. The energy cost for waiting is 0, i.e.
e1(W ) = e2(W ) = 0. The instantaneous delay cost at time t for node i = 1, 2 is assumed
to be equal to the total number of packets waiting in the queue of node i plus cost cd for
each dropped packet. One instance of such cost function that captures both energy and av-
erage delay is git(xt, ut) = x
i
t + e
i(uit) + p
icd1Ai(xt, ut), where A1, A2 represent the events
that the next arrived packet is dropped for node 1 and 2 respectively,
A1 = {x1t = N, ut ∈ {WW,WT23, T12T23, T13T23}}⋃
{x1t = N, x2t = N, ut = T12W},
A2 = {x2t = N − 1, ut = T12W}⋃
{x2t = N, ut ∈ {WW,T12W,T12T23, T13W,T13T23}}.
All costs are additive and costs for future slots (or epochs) are discounted by a discount
factor λ, (0 < λ < 1). The tuple (p1, p2, E13, E23, E12, λ,N, cd) summarizes the basic
parameters of the system.
2.3 Cooperative users
In this section the team problem is studied, under the assumption that both nodes act coop-
eratively i.e. have the same objective. In particular, in Section 2.3.1 the centralized problem
is defined, where there is a single controller observing all relevant information and has per-
fect recall. The solution of this problem is not studied in this chapter, since it is well-known
and can be found as the solution of a dynamic program, either analytically or numerically.
The result is briefly stated for completeness, and since it serves as the baseline solution
with which all other solutions will be compared. In Section 2.3.2 the decentralized prob-
lem is discussed, where there are two controllers with different information sets, though
with perfect recall. In this case, the nodes cannot observe each other’s queues. Their own
queue history is their private information, and feedback history is the common information.
Decentralized problems with non-classical information structure are notoriously hard [59].
One of the contributions of this work is to show that the optimum strategy can be found as
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solution of a dynamic program over a large but time-invariant state space. Finally, numer-
ical results are presented in Section 2.3.3 that compare the performance of a suboptimal
decentralized policy (inspired by the optimal one found in Section 2.3.2) with TDMA and
RA policies.
2.3.1 Centralized control problem
At time t, the common knowledge of nodes 1 and 2 (or centralized controller) is u1:t−1, x1:t.
Thus the control action at time t, ut ∈ U1 × U2, can (in general) be a function of all the
information available till that time
ut = ψˆt(x1:t, u1:t−1) = ψt(x1:t). (2.3)
A given policy ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, . . .) induces a total discounted cost over the horizon T
equal to
Jψ := Eψ
[
T∑
t=1
λt−1
{
g1t (Xt, Ut) + g
2
t (Xt, Ut)
}]
. (2.4)
The centralized problem is defined as follows
Problem 2.1. Find the centralized policy ψ∗ that achieves the optimum cost,
J∗ := min
ψ
Jψ, (2.5)
with Jψ defined in (2.4), system update equation given by (2.2) and control actions ut as in
(2.3).
The solution of this problem is well-known and hinges on the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. The process {(Xt, Ut); t = 0, 1, . . .} is a controlled Markov process with
state Xt, control Ut, and instantaneous cost g1t (Xt, Ut) + g
2
t (Xt, Ut), i.e.,
P (xt+1|x1:t, u1:t) = P (xt+1|xt, ut) (2.6)
Proof. This is trivially true due to the system evolution given in (2.2), the independence of
the basic random variables (X11 , X
2
1 , P
1
1 , P
2
1 , P
1
2 , P
2
2 , . . .) and the instantaneous cost being
a function of only the current state and action pair (Xt, Ut).
Thus by the theory of MDPs [6, 31], there exists a Markov policy of the form ut =
(u1t , u
2
t ) = ψ
∗
t (xt) that achieves the optimum cost J
∗ in (2.5). Moreover this optimal cost
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can be found using dynamic programming. The reader is referred to the authors’ report [55]
for more details about this centralized problem and its solution.
2.3.2 Decentralized control problem
In this section, a more practical case is considered whereby users cannot observe each
other’s queues. This is an instance of decentralized information as the information sets of
the two nodes are not the same.
At time t, information available to node k is (xk1:t, u
k
1:t−1, w1:t−1) which is equivalent to
(xk1:t, u1:t−1), since as mentioned earlier, knowledge of one’s own actions and the feedback
reveals the actions of the other node. If φkt is a decentralized action policy of node k at time
t, then control actions can be defined as follows
ukt = φˆ
k
t (x
k
1:t, u
k
1:t−1, w1:t−1) = φ
k
t (x
k
1:t, u1:t−1), k = 1, 2. (2.7)
In the remaining of this section, the infinite horizon problem is considered for expositional
simplicity (the proposed solution also applies to the finite-horizon case). The instantaneous
cost functions are assumed time invariant, i.e., gkt = g
k. Let the combined cost be defined
as g(xt, ut) := g1(xt, ut)+g2(xt, ut). If φk is any strategy of node k i.e., φk = (φk1, φ
k
2, . . .)
where k ∈ {1, 2} then φ = (φ1, φ2) is the combined strategy of both the nodes and the
corresponding discounted cost Jφ is given by
Jφ = Eφ{
∞∑
t=1
λt−1g(Xt, Ut)}. (2.8)
The decentralized control problem can now be stated as
Problem 2.2. Find the optimal decentralized policy φ∗ that achieves the optimal cost
J∗ := inf
φ
Jφ (2.9)
with Jφ defined in (2.8), system update equation given by (2.2), and control actions ut as
in (2.7).
The controls actions, as given in (2.7), are functions of an ever increasing space. In this
section, we seek to simplify the domain of these functions to a succinct, fixed space. To
that effect, a structural result is proved for the optimal decentralized policy, and shown that
it can be found as a solution of a Bellman-type fixed-point equation. It is first proven that
there exist optimal control actions of a node that depend only on its current queue length and
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the entire control history of both the nodes i.e., (xkt , u1:t−1). In the second simplification
step, it is shown that there exists an optimal policy that depends on the current queue
length xkt and the posterior on xt conditioned on the control history u1:t−1. In the final
simplification step it is shown that the aforementioned posterior distribution on xt can be
substituted by the pair of marginal distributions over xkt for k = 1, 2.
In this decentralized case, at time t, xk1:t is the private information of node k and u1:t−1
is the common information available to both nodes. The following lemma proves that given
the common information, the private information of the two nodes is independent.
Lemma 2.2. For any fixed strategy φ, random variables X11:t and X21:t are conditionally
independent given the control history till time t, U1:t−1 i.e.,
Pφ(x1:t|u1:t−1) = Pφ1(x11:t|u1:t−1)Pφ
2
(x21:t|u1:t−1) (2.10)
Proof. The causal decomposition of Pφ(x1:t, u1:t−1) gives,
Pφ(x1:t, u1:t−1) =P (x11)
t−1∏
i=1
P (x1i+1|x1i , ui)Pφ
1
(u1i |x11:i, u1:i−1)
× P (x21)
t−1∏
j=1
P (x2j+1|x2j , uj)Pφ
2
(u2j |x21:j, u1:j−1) (2.11a)
Thus,
Pφ(x1:t|u1:t−1) = P (x
1
1)
∏t−1
i=1 P (x
1
i+1|x1i , ui)Pφ1(u1i |x11:i, u1:i−1)∑
x11:t
P (x11)
∏t−1
i=1 P (x
1
i+1|x1i , ui)Pφ1(u1i |x11:i, u1:i−1)
× P (x
2
1)
∏t−1
j=1 P (x
2
j+1|x2j , uj)Pφ2(u2j |x21:j, u1:j−1)∑
x21:t
P (x21)
∏t−1
j=1 P (x
2
j+1|x2j , uj)Pφ2(u2j |x21:j, u1:j−1)
(2.11b)
=Pφ
1
(x11:t|u1:t−1)Pφ
2
(x21:t|u1:t−1). (2.11c)
We now proceed to show that each node can summarize its private information to only
the current queue state without loss of optimality. For this the following lemma is required.
Lemma 2.3. For any given fixed strategy φ2 of node 2, the process {(X1t , U1:t−1, U1t ); t =
1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process with state (X1t , U1:t−1) and control input U1t i.e.,
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Pφ
2
(x1t+1, u1:t|x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t) = Pφ
2
(x1t+1, u1:t|x1t , u1:t−1, u1t ) (2.12)
Eφ2{g(x1t , x2t , u1t , u2t )|x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t} = Eφ
2{g(x1t , x2t , u1t , u2t )|x1t , u1:t−1, u1t}
= gˆ(x1t , u1:t−1, u
1
t ) (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix A
As a consequence of the MDP structure of the problem (given a fixed strategy φ2 of
node 2), the optimal policy by node 1 can be a Markov policy [31]. Since this is true for any
fixed strategy of node 2, it is also true for the optimal strategy of the node 2. A similar result
can be obtained by interchanging the roles of node 1 and 2, thus the optimal decentralized
policy can be of the form below without loss of optimality
ukt = φ
k
t (x
k
t , u1:t−1), k = 1, 2. (2.14)
Even with the above simplification, Problem 2.2 reduces to two linked stochastic con-
trol problems for which a solution is not readily available. We proceed to the second sim-
plification step by reexamining this problem from the perspective of a fictitious coordina-
tor [42], who observes, at time t, the feedback wt or equivalently ut−1 (common informa-
tion) but does not observe xkt , k ∈ {1, 2} (private information). This fictitious coordinator
(which can be replicated at both nodes) generates partial functions γt = γ1:2t = (γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) as
its control output, where γkt : N → Uk, k ∈ {1, 2}. Based upon these coordinator control
outputs, node k, k ∈ {1, 2} computes its action by operating these partial functions on its
private information xkt , as shown in Fig. 2.2. In particular, denoting the coordinator strategy
at time t by Ψt = (Ψ1t ,Ψ
2
t ) we can write
(γ1t , γ
2
t ) = Ψt(u1:t−1) = (Ψ
1
t (u1:t−1),Ψ
2
t (u1:t−1)), (2.15)
and node k action will be given by
ukt = γ
k
t (x
k
t ) (2.16a)
= Ψkt (u1:t−1)(x
k
t ) (2.16b)
= φkt (x
k
t , u1:t−1). (2.16c)
In the following we show that the coordinator strategy can be simplified by summarizing
the history of the common information into a sufficient statistic with time-invariant domain.
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Figure 2.2: Control by the fictitious coordinator: (a) original control action generation; (b)
equivalent control action generation through intermediate coordinator actions.
In particular we show that belief on xt given the observation history u1:t−1 and control
history γ1:t−1 till time t, forms a sufficient state for the coordinator’s problem. We define
the random variable Πt ∈ P(N 2) as the posterior pmf ofXt conditioned on U1:t,Γ1:t−1 i.e.,
Πt(xt) = P (Xt = xt|U1:t−1,Γ1:t−1). (2.17)
The next lemma shows that this quantity can be recursively updated by the coordinator in
a deterministic fashion.
Lemma 2.4. There exists a deterministic update function F , independent of the coordina-
tor’s policy Ψ , that updates the state pit given control γt and variable ut .
pit+1 = F (pit, γt, ut) (2.18)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following theorem establishes that the coordinator’s problem is an MDP.
Theorem 2.1. The process {(Πt,Γt); t = 1, 2, ...} is a controlled Markov process with
state Πt and control Γt, i.e.,
P (pit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) = P (pit+1|pit, γt) (2.19)
E(g(xt, ut)|pi1:t, γ1:t) = E(g(xt, ut)|pit, γt) (2.20)
=: gˆ(pit, γt) (2.21)
Proof. See Appendix C
Since {(Πt,Γt); t = 1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process the optimal output func-
tions can be given by Markov policies [31] (γ1t , γ
2
t ) = ψt(pit). Thus optimal action by node
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k can be written (with some notational abuse) as
ukt = γ
k
t (xt) = ψ
k
t (pit)(xt) = φ
k
t (x
k
t , pit). (2.22)
Furthermore, the optimal actions for the coordinator are minimizers of the fixed-point equa-
tion
V (pi) = inf
γ
[gˆ(pi, γ) + λE{V (pi′)|pi, γ}], (2.23)
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional probability induced by the update
function F and ut as random variable (noise), in accordance with [42].
Finally, in the remaining of this section we proceed with the last simplification step and
show that, due to the specific nature of our problem, instead of the joint probability Πt on
the queue length of the two nodes, individual marginals form a sufficient state. To that
effect, we define the random variable Ξkt ∈ P(N ) as the posterior pmf of Xkt conditioned
on U1:t−1,Γ1:t−1 i.e.,
Ξkt (x
k
t ) = P (X
k
t = x
k
t |U1:t−1,Γ1:t−1), k = 1, 2 (2.24)
and show that {(Ξt,Γt); t = 1, 2, ...} is controlled Markov process (where Ξt = Ξ1:2t =
(Ξ1t ,Ξ
2
t )). This gives a significant reduction in the size of the state space over which the
optimal policies are defined, since pi is defined over a space of P(N 2) while ξ is defined
over P(N )×P(N ). For a finite queue length N , P(N 2) has dimensionality N2, and thus
grows super exponentially in N as RN2 , whereas P(N ) × P(N ) has dimensionality 2N ,
and grows exponentially in N as R2N .
The above statement is made precise in the following lemma and subsequent theorem.
Lemma 2.5. There exist deterministic update functions Gk, k ∈ {1, 2}, independent of
the policy Ψ, that update the state ξkt given control γ
k
t and actions ut as
ξkt+1 = G
k(ξkt , γ
k
t , ut), k ∈ {1, 2}. (2.25)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 2.2. The process {(Ξt,Γt); t = 1, 2, ...} is a controlled Markov process with
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state Ξt and controls Γt, i.e.,
Pφ(ξt+1|ξ1:t, γ1:t) = P (ξt+1|ξt, γt) (2.26)
E(g(xt, ut)|ξ1:t, γ1:t) = E(g(xt, ut)|ξt, γ1:t)
:= g˜(ξt, γt) (2.27)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Since {(Ξt,Γt); t = 1, 2, ...} is a controlled Markov process, the optimal output func-
tions can be given by Markov policies γt = ψt(ξt), and can be derived as minimizers of the
fixed-point equation
V (ξ) = inf
γ
[g˜(ξ, γ) + λE{V (ξ¯)|ξ, γ}], (2.28)
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional probability induced by the update
functions (G1, G2) and ut as random variable (noise). In summary, the optimal control
actions are of the form
ukt = φ
k
t (x
k
t , ξt), k = 1, 2, (2.29)
and in the on-line operation of the system are generated as follows: at time t, each node
(source and relay) first updates the quantities ξt−1 as dictated by the recursion (2.25), and
based upon ξt they find the corresponding action γt as dictated by the (off-line) solution of
(2.28). Finally they generate their action ukt by evaluating γ
k
t on their private information
xkt i.e., u
k
t = γ
k
t (x
k
t ).
We conclude this section by observing that in this model we assumed two independent
Bernoulli arrival processes for ease of exposition. The analysis can be easily extended
to the case of independent first-order Markov arrival processes. This can be achieved by
defining Zkt = (X
k
t , P
k
t ), k = 1, 2, where {P kt }t, k = 1, 2 are independent Markov arrival
processes of node 1 and 2 respectively. Since in our model both Xkt , P
k
t are observable,
so is Zkt ; thus similar results can be easily derived for Z
k
t in place of X
k
t , k ∈ {1, 2}.
When arrival processes (P 1t , P
2
t ) follow joint Markov process, the analysis can be extended
in a similar way as for two independent Markov processes, till equation (2.23) but the
simplification in Theorem 2.2 does not follow.
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2.3.3 Numerical results
In this section, we compare the performance of a suboptimal decentralized policy obtained
from our analysis in the previous section, with standard TDMA and RA policies (which
themselves are decentralized policies). We assume the cost function of the form g(xt, ut) =
x1t + x
2
t + e
1(u1t ) + e
2(u2t ).
Regarding the decentralized policy, we chose to solve the fixed-point equation (2.23)
instead of the simpler one in (2.28). Although (28) is an important theoretic simplification
of the state space, the reason for this choice is that equation (2.23) resembles a Bellman-
type fixed-point equation for a POMDP (partially observed MDP), and thus can be solved
using standard POMDP solvers if the underlying state and action space is finite. However,
although equation (2.28) has significantly smaller space of optimization, it cannot be solved
using standard POMDP solvers as it does not have the linear structure required by standard
POMDP solvers.
For a finite maximum queue length N , there are |U1|N · |U2|N possible γ functions.
We expect the optimum γ1:2,∗ functions to be of “threshold-type” [17, 51], i.e. the domain
{0, 1, . . . , N} of each γi to be partitioned into contiguous regions, one corresponding to
each action in U i. The threshold nature of policies is proved for queueing and other prob-
lems in [7, 17] and generally requires proving properties like concavity, supermodularity,
superconcavity etc. of the cost-to-go function. It is usually hard to show that some set of
properties of the cost-to-go function propagate through the dynamic programming equa-
tion, more so for POMDPs where state space is a connected simplex. We do not prove the
optimality of threshold policies, however, inspired by the solution of centralized policies,
we find a suboptimal decentralized policy by solving (2.23) over threshold policies defined
as all possible policies of the following form parametrized by (α, β, θ). We call this policy
ψ∗.
γ1(x1) =

W, x1 < α
T12, α ≤ x1 < β
T13, β ≤ x1
(2.30a)
γ2(x2) =
{
W, x2 < θ
T23, θ ≤ x2.
(2.30b)
For the numerical analysis, we choose N = 2, which is a compromise between ac-
curacy of results and complexity of solving the fixed-point equation. For a given policy
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that results in a system where queues are expected to get empty frequently (i.e., (0, 0) is
expected to be a recurrent state), the stationary distribution of the system is expected to
have significant weight around the queue sizes (0, 0) and negligible weight for larger queue
lengths. Thus such a small value for N is a justified approximation for lightly loaded
systems. We numerically solve equation (2.23) over the set of threshold policies using
a POMDP solver for E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 = 10 and p1,∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}, p2 ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6}, N = 2, cd = 5, λ = 0.99. Figures 2.3 compare their costs for
different traffic parameters.
Both TDMA and RA policies prescribe allocation of slots to users. In each allocated
slot, a user chooses the optimal action that minimizes the cost to go. For example when
the slot is allocated to the source, it takes one of the following actions {W,T12, T13} that is
optimal for the current state. The numerical results are obtained by numerically analyzing
the steady state distribution of the Markov process induced by implementing the optimal
policy, which is found by enumerating all threshold policies. The TDMA policy assumes
that users access the channel as dictated by a commonly observed binary random variable,
the distribution of which is optimized for each pair of (p1, p2). As a result the channel is not
allocated equally to source and relay, but optimally as dictated by their traffic loads. The RA
policy assumes that users access the channel as dictated by private random back-off times
whose distribution is geometric and optimized for their traffic loads. The corresponding
results are obtained by numerically analyzing the steady state distribution of the induced
Markov process. In both TDMA and RA, when a slot is available to a node, that node plays
its optimal action. Thus for e.g. in TDMA, relaying is achieved as follows: when node 1
is given a slot, node 1 sends a packet to node 2, and when node 2 is given a slot, node 2 it
sends its packet to the receiver. Finally, the solution of the centralized problem mentioned
in Section 2.3.1 is shown, which serves as a lower bound for all decentralized policies.
We make the following observations regarding the results shown in Fig. 2.3. The de-
centralized policy ψ∗ outperforms both RA and TDMA policies for all given p1, p2. To
take an instance, for p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, the costs obtained for policies ψ∗, RA, TDMA
and optimum centralized are 0.4230, 0.6241, 0.5307, 0.3845, respectively.
2.4 Strategic users
This section considers the case when users are strategic i.e., when they have potentially
different cost criteria, and the information is perfect and complete3. For problems with
3This is a preliminary analysis of the system with strategic agents. We develop tools in the next chapter to
relax the condition of perfect information and study dynamic games with asymmetric information; however,
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Figure 2.3: Numerical and simulation results for the decentralized policy, TDMA, and RA.
The baseline case (centralized solution) is also shown for comparison.
multiple agents as decision makers, having their individual objective functions, equilib-
rium is an appropriate solution concept [45], where equilibrium is loosely defined as set of
policies for each agent such that no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its
policy.
With strategic nodes in our previous model, both nodes have linked stochastic processes
such that their actions affect each other’s current and future costs, so they determine their
actions in order to minimize their own average total cost over the given time horizon. In
this section we consider a centralized information model where all system variables are
perfectly observed by both agents (as was the case in Section 2.3.1). It is also assumed
that cost functions and system parameters are common knowledge. In this case, the system
evolves as a dynamic game of perfect information and simultaneous moves [45]. In such
a case, the relay node may not want to accept packets from the source node as that will
result in larger delay (longer backlog for his own queue) as well as extra transmission
energy. Thus, the socially optimal solution may not be implementable in an equilibrium
concept. One possible way to induce relay cooperation is for the source to pay the relay
node for relaying the packet (and similarly, for the relay to pay the source for backing
we do not do mechanism or incentive design. The problem with imperfect or incomplete information, is an
interesting problem that comes under the purview of dynamic mechanism design for games with asymmetric
information, and is not considered in this thesis.
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off from transmission so that it can transmit its own packets). This entails the question
of whether, through such payments, an equilibrium solution would lead to the socially
optimum solution.
The main result in this section is that there exist payment transfers to be imposed by
the network designer such that the optimum Markov policy of the centralized problem (as
discussed in Section 2.3.1) is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game.
The model for the dynamic game with finite horizon T is now formalized. When nodes
are strategic, it is intuitive to think that the relay node would not want to accept source’s
packets since that increases it’s queue length. Thus the strategic users may never achieve
socially optimal cost when (T12,W ) is an optimum action. To capture this behavior of node
2, we enhance its available actions as
u2t ∈ U2 = {Wa,Wr, T23}, (2.31)
where possible actions for node 2 are wait while accepting the packet from node 1 (Wa),
wait while rejecting the packet (Wr), or transmit to node 3 (T23). The queue length of a
node at time t is given by the minimum of (a) its queue size N and (b) its queue length at
time t− 1 plus 1 if there was an arrival in time slot t , minus 1 if a packet was successfully
transmitted in t− 1 slot, i.e.,
x1t = min
{
p1t + [x
1
t−1 − 1{T12,T13}(u1t−1)1{Wa}(u2t−1)
−1{T13}(u1t−1)1{Wr}(u2t−1)]+, N
}
, (2.32a)
x2t = min
{
p2t + [x
2
t−1 − 1{T23}(u2t−1)1{W}(u1t−1)
+1{T12}(u
1
t−1)1{Wa}(u
2
t−1)]
+, N
}
, (2.32b)
with the meaning of these variables being exactly the same as in (2.2). Let H denote the
set of all histories that are all possible sequences of actions taken by the nodes and nature
(arrival processes pt = (p1t , p
2
t ) ∈ {0, 1}2 are viewed as actions by nature) i.e.,
H := {ht = (p1:t, u1:t−1, x1:t)| ∀t ∈ {0, 1, . . . T}}, (2.33)
where state sequences have also been added to the histories since they can be determined
through (2.32) by the action and arrival histories. With N = 2 users, set of histories H,
generic instantaneous cost functions git(xt, ut), i = 1, 2, and simultaneous actions taken at
each time t based on the history ht, a dynamic game of perfect information with simultane-
ous moves is defined [4, 45], henceforth referred to as G. The goal is to design a payment
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exchange mechanism4 such that the optimal solution of the centralized problem discussed
in Section 2.3.1 is achieved as the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. To
that effect functions Ct : H×U1×U2 → R are defined as the payment made5 by node 1 to
node 2 at time t. With these payment exchanges, let the new game G˜, be defined as before
with instantaneous cost functions
gˆ1t (h, ut) = g
1
t (xt, ut) + Ct(h, ut), (2.34a)
gˆ2t (h, ut) = g
2
t (xt, ut)− Ct(h, ut), (2.34b)
for node 1 and 2 respectively. Note that although the payment functions are history depen-
dent, and thus their domain is time-varyting, it will be shown that due to the structure of
this problem, they need only be state dependent.
It is easy to see that with so many degrees of freedom, a game can be constructed such
that socially optimum solution is a (not necessarily unique) subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game as shown by the following construction. Indeed, for α ∈ (0, 1), let payments
be designed as
Ct(h, u) = Ct(xt, u) = αg
2
t (xt, u)− (1− α)g1t (xt, u).
Then the instantaneous costs of user 1 and 2 are
gˆ1t (h, ut) = α
(
g1t (xt, u) + g
2
t (xt, u)
)
(2.35a)
gˆ2t (h, ut) = (1− α)
(
g1t (xt, u) + g
2
t (xt, u)
)
. (2.35b)
In this case, the objectives of both users are aligned with the social objective and the socially
optimal solution is also a Nash Equilibrium. The problem with this construction is that, in
general, there may exist additional Nash equilibria that may not achieve socially optimal
solution.
In the remaining part of this section, a new construction of payment function is pro-
vided and sufficient conditions are found for the socially optimal strategy to be the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of game G˜. In the following lemma, payments are con-
structed for a static game, and later this idea is extended to dynamic games.
Lemma 2.6. Consider a strategic game of two players with finite action sets (U i)i=1,2 and
costs (gi)i=1,2. Fix an action profile (a, b) ∈ U1 × U2 (not necessarilly an equillibrium).
4Note that this is not a “mechanism” in the sense of Implementation Theory [9] since utilities and system
parameters are common knowledge.
5This payment can be positive or negative, as considered in many other problems [15, 21, 23, 27, 28, 50].
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There exists a payment function C : U1 × U2 → R such that (a, b) is the unique strictly
dominant strategy equilibrium of the new strategic game with the updated costs.
Proof. For (a, b) to be the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, the following conditions
need to be satisfied
g1(a, u2) + C(a, u2) < g1(u1, u2) + C(u1, u2) (2.36a)
∀u1 ∈ U1\{a}, u2 ∈ U2
g2(u1, b)− C(u1, b) < g2(u1, u2)− C(u1, u2) (2.36b)
∀u1 ∈ U1, u2 ∈ U2\{b}.
Let
r1(u1, u2) := g1(u1, u2)− g1(a, u2) (2.37a)
r2(u1, u2) := g2(u1, u2)− g2(u1, b) (2.37b)
Equations (2.36) for u2 = b, u1 = a are equivalent to, respectively,
C(a, b) < r1(u1, b) + C(u1, b) ∀u1 ∈ U1\{a} (2.38a)
C(a, u2) < r2(a, u2) + C(a, b) ∀u2 ∈ U2\{b} (2.38b)
and for u1 6= a, u2 6= b, are equivalent to
C(a, u2)− r1(u1, u2) < C(u1, u2) < C(u1, b) + r2(u1, u2)
∀u1 ∈ U1\{a}, u2 ∈ U2\{b}. (2.39)
Since action sets are finite, there exists payments C(u1, u2) with C(u1, b) large enough and
C(a, u2) small enough such that inequalities (2.38)-(2.39) are satisfied.
The above lemma shows that the cost variables {C(u1, u2), (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2} need
to satisfy linear inequalities (2.38)-(2.39), i.e. can be chosen from a polytope that is al-
ways non-empty. A feasible solution can be found by first applying a vertex enumeration
algorithm [2] which finds the vertices, rays and linearities of the polytope described by the
linear inequalities (2.38)-(2.39), and then an arbitrary point is selected as the sum of a con-
vex combination of the vertices, a conic combination of the rays and a linear combination
of the linearities.
Note that the above lemma provides a very strong type of equilibrium design, i.e.,
strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Also, the above construction of the game allows for
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negative payments by either user. Even though negative payments are commonly used to
induce users to behave in a way desired by the designer (see for e.g. [15,21,26,27,50]), the
above construction can be proved with positive payments only6.
This idea is now extended to dynamic games in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3. Fix a Markov policy ψ∗ = (ψ∗t )Tt=1 for the original centralized stochastic
control problem (not necessarily the optimal one). Consider the dynamic game G defined
above. There exists payments Ct : N ×N ×U1 ×U2 → R which are exchanged between
nodes 1 and 2 at each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . T − 1} such that ψ∗ is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game G˜.
Proof. For game G˜ at any time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . T}, after history h ∈ H and action profile
u ∈ U1 × U2, the cost-to-go functions for both nodes are
V 1t (h, u) := g
1
t (xt, u) + Ct(h, u) + λE
[
V 1t+1(h
′)|h, u] (2.40a)
V 2t (h, u) := g
2
t (xt, u)− Ct(h, u) + λE
[
V 2t+1(h
′)|h, u] , (2.40b)
where V iT+1(·, ·) = 0 and xt = (x1t , x2t ) are queue lengths of user 1 and 2 corresponding to
history h.
Let σ = (σt)Tt=1 be a Markov policy of the dynamic game G˜ such that for all histories
h ∈ H of length t, σ(h) = ψ∗t (x1t , x2t ). The payments Ct(h, u1, u2) are constructed back-
ward recursively as follows. Let V i,σT (x
1
T , x
2
T ) = g
i
T (x
1
T , x
2
T ) for user i, i = 1, 2. Then
for any t ∈ {T − 1, T − 2 . . . 1}, let Ct(h, u1, u2) be constructed as in Lemma 2.6 for the
game with instantaneous costs being the cost-to-go functions git(xt, u) + λE[V
i,σ
t+1(h
′)|h, u]
for each user i, such that action profile σ(h) is the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium.
Then,
V 1,σt (h) = g
1
t (xt, σ(h)) + Ct(h, σ(h)) + λE[V
1,σ
t+1(h
′)|h, σ(h)] (2.41)
V 2,σt (h) = g
2
t (xt, σ(h))− Ct(h, σ(h)) + λE[V 2,σt+1(h′)|h, σ(h)]. (2.42)
The above implies that for each subgame G˜(h), the policy σ|h strictly dominates every
other policy σ′ in G˜(h) that differs from σ|h only in the action it prescribes after the initial
history of G˜(h). By the one-shot deviation property [45, Lemma 98.2] and strict dominance,
the policy σ is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. By construction, it
6 Due to the finiteness of the action sets, there always exists a c > 0 such that rk(u1, u2) ≥
−c ∀u1, u2, k = 1, 2, then choosing C(u1, b) = 4c ∀u1 6= a,C(a, u2) = c ∀u2 6= b, C(a, b) =
2c, C(u1, u2) = 2.5c ∀u1 6= a, u2 6= b will satisfy inequalities of Lemma 5 with all payments being positive.
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achieves a socially optimal solution.
Since σ(h) is a Markov policy, Ct(·, ·) and V i,σt (·, ·) can be reduced to functions of
queue lengths x1t , x
2
t corresponding to history h, instead of h. This follows from induction.
For t = T,CT (h, σ(h)) = 0 and V
i,σ
T (x
1
T , x
2
T ) = g
i
T (x
1
T , x
2
T ) which establishes the base
case. Now since V i,σt+1(·, ·) depends on history h only through the queue lengths xt+1, and
since σ(h) = ψ∗t (x
1
t , x
2
t ) depends on xt, it follows that Ct(h, u
1, u2) constructed as in
Lemma 2.6 for the game with costs git(xt, σ(h))+λE[V
i,σ
t+1(h
′)|h, u] for user i also depends
on history h through queue lengths xt. Thus from equations (2.41)-(2.42), V
i,σ
t (·, ·) also
depends only on xt. This completes the induction step.
The above result gives a constructive proof of existence of payment transfers such that
any Markov policy can be implemented, and thus the socially optimum Markov policy can
also be implemented as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show examples of construction of payments based on Proposition 2.3
for arbitrary payments and positive payments respectively. The system with parameters
E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 = 10, λ = 0.99, p
1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, cd = 5, N = 10 is
considered, and an arbitrary state (x1t , x
2
t ) = (3, 3) is chosen for demonstrating the resulting
cost-to-go functions and payments. Tables 2.1(a) and 2.2(a) give the cost-to-go functions
V 1,σt (xt) for the game at time t obtained using policy iteration such that the socially optimal
Markov policy (for the centralized problem) is implemented (i.e. is the dominant strategy)
for all times after t. Due to the time-invariance of costs, policy iteration converges to a
stationary solution, which, for this set of parameters is the policy (W,T23) when at the
chosen state (x1t , x
2
t ) = (3, 3). Note that from the values of the cost-to-go functions in
Tables 2.1(a), 2.2(a) it can be deduced that both actions (W,T23) and (T13,Wr) are Nash
equilibria, which is not desired. Tables 2.1(b), 2.2(b) give the cost-to-go functions V 1,σt (xt)
for the corresponding game G˜ (i.e., with payment transfers), where transfers for this instant
t are calculated according to Lemma 2.6. Note that with the introduction of payments,
action (W,T23) is the dominant strategy equilibrium.
In this game, the total expected cost for a user by participating in the game should be
less than the expected cost they incur by not participating in the game. It is assumed that
by non-participation, the users are not able to transmit their packets, and thus their queues
increase to capacity, whereas by participating in the game they do strictly better. Thus for
reasonable cost functions (for e.g. gi(x, u) ∼ xi) which are monotonously increasing and
unbounded with the queue length, and for large enough N and λ close to 1, the users will
always have an incentive to participate in the game.
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Table 2.1: Costs for subgame at time t. Parameters are E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 =
10, λ = 0.99, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, cd = 5, N = 10. States are (x, y) = (3, 3).
(a) Without payments
Wa Wr T23
W
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.4586
0.3970
0.4586
0.3970
0.4103
0.3616
T13
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.4484
0.3842
0.4484
0.3842
0.5693
0.3992
T12
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.3743
0.4337
0.4597
0.3970
0.4597
0.3992
(b) With real-valued payments
Wa Wr T23
W
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.4129
0.4427
−0.0438
0.4462
0.4094
−0.0124
0.4103
0.3616
0
T13
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.4472
0.3854
−0.0012
0.4472
0.3854
−0.0012
0.5841
0.3844
0.0148
T12
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.4139
0.3941
0.0397
0.4597
0.3970
0
0.4658
0.3931
0.0061
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Table 2.2: Costs for subgame at time t. Parameters are E12 = 0.1, E23 = 0.2, E13 =
10, λ = 0.99, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.1, cd = 5, N = 10. States are (x, y) = (3, 3).
(a) Without payments
Wa Wr T23
W
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.6258
0.2298
0.6258
0.2298
0.5782
0.1938
T13
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.6028
0.2298
0.6028
0.2298
0.7364
0.2320
T12
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
0.5282
0.2798
0.6269
0.2298
0.6269
0.2320
(b) With positive payments
Wa Wr T23
W
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.6258
0.2298
0
0.6258
0.2298
0
0.5782
0.1938
0
T13
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.6258
0.2068
0.0230
0.6258
0.2068
0.0230
0.7617
0.2068
0.0252
T12
V 1t (x, y)
V 2t (x, y)
Ct(x, y)
0.6258
0.1822
0.0977
0.6269
0.2298
0
0.6768
0.1822
0.0499
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies energy and delay tradeoff in cooperative communication through a
simple relay channel, when the source and the destination node are cooperative and when
they are strategic. When users are cooperative, by posing it as a decentralized, infinite
horizon decentralized stochastic control problem, a structural result is proven stating that
the optimal policy can be found by solving a Bellman-type fixed-point equation and optimal
control can be given as ukt = g
k
t (x
k
t , ξ
1
t , ξ
2
t ). The domain of optimization is the space of
the pair of marginal probability mass functions on the integers P(N )×P(N ). Numerical
results are presented to compare the performance of a suboptimal policy from our analysis
with standard TDMA and RA policies. Future research directions include the unveiling of
additional structural properties of the optimal strategy (e.g., threshold strategies), as well
as designing optimal and efficient suboptimal strategies. This problem can be extended to
the case of multiple source/relay nodes. For this, the model needs to be enriched so that
each collision also contains the information regarding which nodes transmitted. This can
be achieved if each node transmits a “signature” waveform along with the data waveform
such that the signature waveforms of all users are mutually orthogonal and orthogonal to
the data (e.g., in frequency). The optimal decentralized solution scales exponentially with
the number of nodes i, since, as shown in this work, a sufficient state for control is the set
of marginal distributions {ξk(xkt ); k ∈ {1, 2, . . . i}} on the queue of size N , which grows
as RiN instead of the joint distribution pi(x1t , . . . xit) which grows double exponentially in i
as RN i .
The second part of this chapter studies the relay channel with strategic source and re-
lay nodes that minimize their individual expected energy and average delay. It is shown
that there exist transfer payment functions Ct(·, ·) such that implementing socially optimal
Markov policy is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. In
this work an important assumption is made that all information including states and utility
functions are known to everybody. The decentralized setup for strategic users i.e. when
states are not known, would be a challenging and interesting problem to consider and to the
best knowledge of the authors, dynamic games with decentralized information are not well
studied [25, 41]. If the assumption of known utilities is relaxed, then the problem becomes
significantly harder and comes under the purview of mechanism design and Implementa-
tion Theory for dynamic games [5, 24].
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2.6 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 2.3)
Proof.
Pφ
2
(x1t+1, u1:t|x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t) =Pφ
2
(x1t+1|x11:t, u1:t)Pφ
2
(u1:t|x11:t, u1:t−1, u1t ) (2.43a)
=P (x1t+1|x1t , ut)Pφ
2
(u2t |x11:t, u1:t−1, u1t ) (2.43b)
=P (x1t+1|x1t , ut)Pφ
2
(u2t |u1:t−1) (2.43c)
=Pφ
2
(x1t+1, u1:t|x1t , u1:t−1, u1t ) (2.43d)
where (2.43b) follows since x1t+1 = ft(x
1
t , p
1
t+1, ut) where ft is as defined in (2.2) and by
independence of basic random variables, and (2.43c) follows since U2t is a function of X
2
1:t,
U1t is a function of X
1
1:t and X
1
1:t, X
2
1:t are conditionally independent given U1:t−1 (Lemma
2.2).
For the second part,
Eφ2{g(xt, ut)|x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t} =
∑
xt,ut
g(xt, ut)P
φ2(xt, ut|x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t) (2.44a)
=
∑
x2t ,u
2
t
g(xt, ut)P
φ2(x2t , u
2
t |x11:t, u1:t−1, u11:t) (2.44b)
=
∑
x2t ,u
2
t
g(xt, ut)P
φ2(x2t , u
2
t |u1:t−1) (2.44c)
=Eφ2{g(xt, ut)|x1t , u1:t−1, u1t} (2.44d)
=gˆ(x1t , u1:t−1, u
1
t ) (2.44e)
where (2.44c) follows from Lemma 2.2.
2.7 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 2.4)
Proof. Fix ψ
pit+1(xt+1) =P
ψ(Xt+1 = xt+1|u1:t, γ1:t) (2.45a)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt+1, xt|u1:t, γ1:t) (2.45b)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt|u1:t, γ1:t).P (xt+1|xt, ut) (2.45c)
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where (2.45c) is true by Markov property and the fact that γ1:t is a function of u1:t. Now,
Pψ(xt|u1:t, γ1:t) = P
ψ(xt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t) (2.46a)
=
Pψ(xt|u1:t−1, γ1:t)Pψ(ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t, xt)∑
xˆt
P (xˆt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t) (2.46b)
=
Pψ(xt|u1:t−1, γ1:t−1)1{γt(xt)}(ut)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt|u1:t−1, γ1:t−1)1{γt(xˆt)}(ut)
(2.46c)
where first part in numerator in (2.46c) is true since given policy ψ, γt can be computed as
γt = ψt(u1:t−1).
We conclude that
P (xt|u1:t, γ1:t) = pit(xt)1{γt(xt)}(ut)∑
xˆt
pit(xˆt)1{γt(xˆt)}(ut)
, (2.47)
thus,
pit+1 = F (pit, γt, ut) (2.48)
where F is independent of policy ψ.
2.8 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 2.1)
Proof.
P (pit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
ut
P (pit+1, ut|pi1:t, γ1:t) (2.49a)
=
∑
ut
1{F (pit,γt,ut)}(pit+1)P (ut|pi1:t, γ1:t) (2.49b)
=
∑
ut,xt
1{F (pit,γt,ut)}(pit+1)1{γt(xt)}(ut)P (xt|pi1:t, γ1:t) (2.49c)
=
∑
ut,xt
pit(xt)1{F (pit,γt,ut)}(pit+1)1{γt(xt)}(ut) (2.49d)
= P (pit+1|pit, γt) (2.49e)
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E(g(xt, ut)|pi1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
xt,ut
g(xt, ut)P (xt, ut|pi1:t, γ1:t) (2.50a)
=
∑
xt,ut
g(xt, ut)P (xt|pi1:t, γ1:t)1{γt(xt)}(ut) (2.50b)
=
∑
xt,ut
g(xt, ut)pit(xt)1{γt(xt)}(ut) (2.50c)
= gˆ(pit, γt) (2.50d)
2.9 Appendix D (Proof of Lemma 2.5)
Proof. For any fixed coordinator strategy ψ,
ξ1t+1(x
1
t+1) =P
ψ(x1t+1|u1:t, γ1:t) (2.51a)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(x1t+1, xt|u1:t, γ1:t) (2.51b)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt|u1:t, γ1:t).P (x1t+1|x1t , ut) (2.51c)
Now,
Pψ(xt|u1:t, γ1:t) = P
ψ(xt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t) (2.52a)
=
Pψ(xt|u1:t−1, γ1:t)Pψ(ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t, xt)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt, ut|u1:t−1, γ1:t) (2.52b)
=
Pψ(xt|u1:t−1, γ1:t−1)1{γt(xt)}(ut)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt|u1:t−1, γ1:t−1)1{γt(xˆt)}(ut)
(2.52c)
=
ξ1t (x
1
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )1{γt(xt)}(ut)∑
xˆt
ξ1t (xˆ
1
t )ξ
2
t (xˆ
2
t )1{γt(xˆt)}(ut)
(2.52d)
where (2.52c) is true since given policy ψ, γt = ψt(u1:t−1) and (2.52d) is true since X1t and
X2t are conditionally independent given Ut−1 (Lemma 2.2). Thus,
ξ1t+1(x
1
t+1) =
∑
xt
P (x1t+1|x1t , ut)
ξ1t (x
1
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )1{γt(xt)}(ut)∑
xˆt
ξ1t (xˆ
1
t )ξ
2
t (xˆ
2
t )1{γt(xˆt)}(ut)
(2.53a)
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=
∑
x1t
P (x1t+1|x1t , ut)
ξ1t (x
1
t )1{γ1t (x1t )}(u
1
t )
∑
x2t
1{γ2t (x2t )}(u
2
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )∑
xˆ1t
ξ1t (xˆ
1
t )1{γ1t (xˆ1t )}(u
1
t )
∑
xˆ2t
1{γ2t (xˆ2t )}(u
2
t )ξ
2
t (xˆ
2
t )
(2.53b)
=
∑
x1t
P (x1t+1|x1t , ut)
ξ1t (x
1
t )1{γ1t (x1t )}(u
1
t )∑
xˆ1t
ξ1t (xˆ
1
t )1{γ1t (xˆ1t )}(u
1
t )
(2.53c)
=G1(ξ1t , γ
1
t , ut)(x
1
t+1) (2.53d)
Similarly ξ2t+1 = G
2(ξ2t , γ
2
t , ut) where G
1 and G2 are deterministic functions independent
of policy ψ.
2.10 Appendix E (Proof of Theorem 2.2)
Proof. In the following we use the notation G := (G1, G2)
Pφ(ξ1t+1, ξ
2
t+1|ξ11:t, ξ21:t, γ1:t) =
∑
ut
Pφ(ξ1t+1, ξ
2
t+1, ut|ξ11:t, ξ21:t, γ1:t) (2.54a)
=
∑
ut
1{G(ξ1t ,ξ2t ,γt,ut)}(ξ
1
t+1, ξ
2
t+1)P
φ(ut|ξ11:t, ξ21:t, γ1:t) (2.54b)
=
∑
ut,xt
1{G(ξ1t ,ξ2t ,γt,ut)}(ξ
1
t+1, ξ
2
t+1)1{γt(xt)}(ut)
Pφ(xt|ξ11:t, ξ21:t, γ1:t) (2.54c)
=
∑
ut,xt
ξ1t (x
1
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )1{G(ξ1t ,ξ2t ,γt,ut)}(ξ
1
t+1, ξ
2
t+1)1{γt(xt)}(ut)
(2.54d)
=
∑
xt
ξ1t (x
1
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )1{G(ξ1t ,ξ2t ,γt,ut)}(ξ
1
t+1, ξ
2
t+1) (2.54e)
=P (ξ1t+1, ξ
2
t+1|ξ1t , ξ2t , γt) (2.54f)
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E(g(xt, ut)|ξ1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
xt,ut
(g(xt, ut))P (xt, ut|ξ1:t, γ1:t) (2.55a)
=
∑
xt,ut
(g(xt, ut))P (xt|ξ1:t, γ1:t)1{γt(xt)}(ut) (2.55b)
=
∑
xt,ut
(g(xt, ut))ξ
1
t (x
1
t )ξ
2
t (x
2
t )1{γt(xt)}(ut) (2.55c)
=g˜(ξt, γt) (2.55d)
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CHAPTER 3
Structured perfect Bayesian equilibria in
dynamic games with asymmetric information
3.1 Introduction
There are many practical scenarios where strategic players with different sets of observa-
tions are involved in a time-evolving dynamical process such that their actions influence
each others’ payoffs. Such scenarios include repeated online advertisement auctions, wire-
less resource sharing, competing sellers and energy markets. In the case of repeated online
advertisement auctions, advertisers place bids for locations on a website to sell a product.
These bids are based on the value of that product, which is privately observed by an adver-
tiser, and past actions of everybody else, which are observed publicaly. Each advertiser’s
goal is to maximize its reward, which depends on the value of the products and on the ac-
tions taken by everybody else. A similar scenario can be considered for wireless resource
sharing where players are allocated channels that interfere with each other. Each player
privately observes its channel gain and takes actions, which may be the choice of modula-
tion and coding scheme and also the transmission power. The reward here is the rate each
player gets at time t, which is a function of everyone’s channel gain and actions. Consider
another scenario where different sellers compete to sell different but related goods which
are complementary, substitutable or in general, with externalities. The true value of the
goods is private information of a seller who, at each stage, takes an action to stock some
amount of goods for sale. Her profit is based on some market mechanism (say through Wal-
rasian prices) based on the true value of all the goods and their availability in the market,
which depends on the actions of the other sellers. Each seller wants to maximize her own
profit. Finally, a similar scenario also exists for energy markets, where different suppliers
(to their different end consumers) bid their estimated power outputs to an independent sys-
tem operator (ISO) that forms the market mechanism to determine the prices assessed to
the different suppliers. Each supplier wants to maximize its returns, which depend on its
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cost of production of energy, which is their private information, and the market-determined
prices, which depend on all the bids.
Such dynamical systems with strategic players are modeled as dynamic games. In dy-
namic games with perfect and symmetric information, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
is an appropriate equilibrium concept [45], [4], [13] and there is a backward recursive al-
gorithm to find all subgame perfect equilibria of such games. Maskin and Tirole in [38]
introduced the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for dynamic games with per-
fect and symmetric information, where equilibrium strategies are dependent on some pay-
off relevant state of the system rather than on the entire history. However, for games with
asymmetric information, since players have different information sets in each period, they
need to form a belief on the information sets of other players, based upon which they pre-
dict their strategies. As a result, SPE or MPE are not appropriate equilibrium concepts
for such setting. There are several notions of equilibrium for such games, such as perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, trembling hand equilibrium [13, 45].
Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a strategy and a belief profile of all play-
ers. The equilibrium strategies are optimal given the beliefs and the beliefs are derived
from the equilibrium strategy profile and using Bayes’ rule (whenever possible), with some
equilibrium concepts requiring further refinements. Due to this circular argument of beliefs
being consistent with strategies, which are in turn optimal given the beliefs, finding such
equilibria is a difficult task. Moreover, strategies are function of histories, which belong to
an ever-expanding space, and thus the space of optimization also becomes computationally
intractable. There is no known methodology to find such equilibria for general dynamic
games with asymmetric information.
In this chapter, we consider a model where players observe their types privately and
publicly observe the actions taken by other players at the end of each period. Their instan-
taneous rewards depend on everyones’ types and actions. We provide a two-step algorithm
involving a backward recursion followed by a forward recursion to construct a class of
PBE for the dynamic game in consideration, which we call structured perfect Bayesian
equilibria (SPBE). In these equilibria, players’ strategies are based on their current type
and a set of beliefs on each type, which is common to all players and lie in a time-invariant
space. These beliefs on players’ types form independent controlled Markov processes that
together summarize the common information history, and are updated individually and se-
quentially, based on corresponding agents’ actions and (partial) strategies. The algorithm
works as follows. In a backward recursive way, for each stage, the algorithm finds an equi-
librium strategy function for all possible beliefs on types of the players, which involves
solving a fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes. Then, the equilibrium
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strategies and beliefs are obtained through forward recursion by operating on the function
obtained in the backward step. The SBPEs that are developed in this chapter are analogous
to the MPEs for dynamic games with perfect information in the sense that players choose
their actions based on beliefs that depend on common information and have Markovian dy-
namics, where actions of a players are now partial functions from their private information
to their action sets.
Related literature on this topic include [16, 41] and [46]. Nayyar et al. in [16, 41]
consider a model of dynamic games with asymmetric information. There is an underly-
ing controlled Markov process, where players jointly observe part of the process and also
make some observations privately. It is shown in [16, 41] that the considered game with
asymmetric information, under certain assumptions, can be transformed to another game
with symmetric information. Once this is established, a backward recursive algorithm is
provided to find MPE of the transformed game, which are equivalently Nash equilibria of
the transformed symmetric information game. For this strong equivalence to hold, authors
in [16, 41] make a critical assumption in their model: based on the common information,
a player’s posterior beliefs about the system state and about other players’ information are
independent of the strategies used by the players in the past. Our model is different from
the model considered in [16, 41]. We assume that the underlying state of the system has
independent components, each constituting the type of a player. However, we do not make
any assumption regarding update of beliefs and allow the common information based belief
state to depend on players’ strategies.
Ouyang et al. in [46] consider a dynamic oligopoly game with N strategic sellers of
different goods andM strategic buyers. Each seller privately observes the valuation of their
good, which is assumed to have independent Markovian dynamics, thus resulting in a dy-
namic game of asymmetric information. In each period, sellers post prices for their goods
and buyers make decisions regarding buying the goods. Then a public signal indicating
buyers experience is revealed, which depends on sellers’ valuation of the goods. Authors
in [46] consider a policy-dependent common information based belief state based on which
they define the concept of common information based equilibria. They show that for any
given update function of this belief state, which is consistent with strategies of the players,
if all other players play actions based on this common belief and their private informa-
tion, then player i faces a Markov decision process (MDP) with respect to its action with
state as common belief and its type. For every prior distribution, this defines a fixed point
equation on belief update functions and strategies of all players. They provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for common information based strategy profile and belief update
functions to constitute PBE of the game; however they do no provide a systematic way to
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find such equilibria. In addition, because of the special structure of the reward function, the
problem admits a degenerate solution where agents’ strategies do not depend on their pri-
vate information, and therefore no signaling takes place. This allows existence of myopic,
type-independent equilibrium policies (although other equilibria may also exist).
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present our model. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we present structural results that serve as motivation for SPBE. In Section 3.4 we
present the main result by providing a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to
construct a strategy profile and a sequence of beliefs and show that it is a PBE of the dy-
namic game considered. As an illustration, we apply this algorithm on a discrete version
of an example from [13] on repeated public good game in Section 3.5. We conclude in
Section 3.6. All proofs are presented in Appendices.
3.1.1 Notation
In this chapter, for an independent probabilistic strategy profile of players, (βit)i∈N , where
probability of action ait conditioned on a1:t−1, x
i
1:t is given by β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xi1:t), we use the
short hand notation β−it (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x−i1:t) to represent
∏
j 6=i β
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, xj1:t).
3.2 Model
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N strategic players in the set N 4=
{1, 2, . . . N}, over a time horizon T 4= {1, 2, . . . T}, and with perfect recall. There is a
dynamic state of the system Xt
4
= (X1t , X
2
t , . . . X
N
t ), where X
i
t ∈ X i is the type of player
i at time t, which is perfectly observed and is its private information. Types of the players
evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes such that
P (x1) =
N∏
i=1
Qi1(x
i
1) (3.1a)
P (xt|a1:t−1, x1:t−1) = P (xt|at−1, xt−1) (3.1b)
=
N∏
i=1
Qit(x
i
t|at−1, xit−1), (3.1c)
where Qit are known kernels. Player i at time t takes action a
i
t ∈ Ai on observing a1:t−1,
which is common information among players, and xi1:t, which it observes privately. The
sets Ai,X i are assumed to be finite. Let gi = (git)t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player
i where git : At−1 × (X i)t → P(Ai) such that player i plays action Ait according to
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Ait ∼ git(·|a1:t−1, xi1:t). Let g 4= (gi)i∈N be a strategy profile of all players. At the end of
interval t, player i receives an instantaneous reward Ri(xt, at). The objective of player i is
to maximize its total expected reward
J i,g
4
= Eg
{
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, At)
}
. (3.2)
With all players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic gameD with imper-
fect and asymmetric information, and with simultaneous moves.
3.3 Motivation for structured equilibria
In this section we present structural results for the considered dynamical process that serve
as a motivation for finding SPBE of the underlying game D. Specifically, we define a
belief state based on common information history, and show that any reward profile that
can be obtained through a general strategy profile can also be obtained through strategies
that depend on this belief state and player’s current type, which is its private information.
These structural results are inspired by the analysis of decentralized team problems, which
serve as guiding principles to design our equilibrium strategies. While these structural
results provide intuition and the required notation, they are not directly used in the proofs
for finding SPBEs, later, in Section 3.4.
At any time t, player i has information (a1:t−1, xi1:t) where a1:t−1 is the common infor-
mation among players, and xi1:t is the private information of player i. Since (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) in-
creases with time, any strategy of the form Ait ∼ git(·|a1:t−1, xi1:t) becomes unwieldy. Thus
it is desirable to have an information state in a time-invariant space that succinctly summa-
rizes (a1:t−1, xi1:t), and that can be sequentially updated. We first show in Lemma 3.1 that
given common information a1:t−1 and its current type xit, player i can discard its type his-
tory xi1:t−1 and play a strategy of the form s
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xit). Then in Lemma 3.2, we show
that a1:t−1 can be summarized through a belief pit, defined as follows. For any strategy
profile g, belief pit on Xt, pit ∈ P(X ), is defined as pit(xt) 4= P g(Xt = xt|a1:t−1) ∀xt ∈ X .
We also define the marginals piit(x
i
t)
4
= P g(xit = x
i
t|a1:t−1) ∀xit ∈ X i.
For player i, we use notation g to denote a general policy of type Ait ∼ git(·|a1:t−1, xi1:t),
notation s, where sit : (A)t−1×X i → P(Ai), to denote a policy of the form sit(ait|a1:t−1, xit),
and notation m, where mit : P(×i∈NX i) × X i → P(Ai), to denote a policy of the form
mit(a
i
t|pit, xit). It should be noted that since pit is a function of random variables a1:t−1, an
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m policy is a special type of an s policy, which in turn, is a special type of a g policy.
Using the agent-by-agent approach [18], we show in Lemma 3.1 that any expected
reward profile of the players that can be achieved by any general strategy profile g can also
be achieved by a strategy profile s.
Lemma 3.1. Given a fixed strategy g−i of all players other than player i and for any strategy
gi of player i, there exists a strategy si of player i such that
P s
ig−i(xt, at) = P
gig−i(xt, at) ∀t ∈ T , xt ∈ X , at ∈ A, (3.3)
which implies J i,sig−i = J i,gig−i .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since any si policy is also a gi type policy, the above lemma can be iterated over all
players, which implies that for any g policy profile there exists an s policy profile that
achieves the same reward profile i.e. (J i,s)i∈N = (J i,g)i∈N .
Policies of types s still have increasing domain due to increasing common information,
a1:t−1. In order to summarize this information, we take an equivalent view of the system
dynamics through a common agent, as taken by Nayyar et al. in [43]. The common agent
approach is a general approach that has been used extensively for dynamic team problems
[33,35,44,56]. Using this approach, the problem can be equivalently described as follows:
player i at time t observes a1:t−1 and takes action γit , where γ
i
t : X i → P(Ai) is a partial
(stochastic) function from its private information xit to a
i
t of the form γ
i
t(a
i
t|xit). These
actions are generated through some policy ψi = (ψit)t∈T , ψ
i
t : At−1 → {X i → P(Ai)},
that operates on the common information a1:t−1 so that γit = ψ
i
t[a1:t−1]. Then any policy of
the form Ait ∼ sit(·|a1:t−1, xit) is equivalent to Ait ∼ ψit[a1:t−1](·|xit) [43].
We call a player i’s policy through common agent to be of type ψi if its actions γit are
taken as γit = ψ
i
t[a1:t−1]. We call a player i’s policy through common agent to be of type θ
i
where θit : P(X ) → {X i → P(Ai)}, if its actions γit are taken as γit = θit[pit]. A policy of
type θi is also a policy of type ψi. There is a one-to-one correspondence between policies
of type si and of type ψi and between policies of type mi and of type θi.
In the following lemma, we show that the space of profiles of type s is outcome-
equivalent to the space of profiles of type m.
Lemma 3.2. For any given strategy profile s of all players, there exists a strategy profile m
such that
Pm(xt, at) = P
s(xt, at) ∀t ∈ T , xt ∈ X , at ∈ A, (3.4)
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which implies (J i,m)i∈N = (J i,s)i∈N . Furthermore pit can be factorized as pit(xt) =∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(x
i
t) where each pi
i
t can be updated through an update function
piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, at), (3.5)
where F¯ is independent of s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above two lemmas show that any reward profile that can be generated through
policy profile of type g can also be generated through policy profile of type m. It should
be noted that the construction of si, as in (3.31), depends only on gi, while the construction
of mi depends on the whole policy profile g and not just on gi, since construction of θi
depends on ψ in (3.43). Thus any unilateral deviation of player i in g policy profile does
not necessarily translate to unilateral deviation of player i in the corresponding m policy
profile. Therefore g being an equilibrium of the game (in some appropriate notion) does
not necessitate the corresponding m also being an equilibrium.
As shown in the previous lemmas, due to the independence of types and their evolution
as independent controlled Markov processes, for any strategy of the players, joint beliefs
on types can be factorized as product of their marginals i.e. pit(xt) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(x
i
t). Since
in this chapter, we only deal with such joint beliefs, to accentuate this independence struc-
ture, we define pit ∈ ×i∈NP(X i) as vector of marginal beliefs where pit := (piit)i∈N .
In the rest of the chapter, we will use pit instead of pit whenever appropriate, where,
of course, pit can be constructed from pit. Similarly, we define a vector of belief up-
dates as F (pi, γ, a) := (F¯ (pii, γi, a))i∈N . We also change the notation of policies of
type m as mit : ×i∈NP(X i) × X i → P(Ai) and common agent’s policies of type θ as
θit : ×i∈NP(X i)→ {X i → P(Ai)}.
We end this section by noting that finding general PBEs of type g of the gameD would
be a desirable goal, but due to the space of strategies growing exponentially with time, that
would be computationally intractable. However lemma 3.1 suggests that strategies of type
m form a class that is rich in the sense that they achieve every possible reward profile.
Since these strategies are functions of beliefs pit that lie in a time-invariant space and are
easily updatable, equilibria of this type are potential candidates for computation through
backward recursion. In this chapter our goal is to devise an algorithm to find structured
equilibria of type m of the dynamic game D.
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3.4 Algorithm for SPBE computation
3.4.1 Preliminaries
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t).
Let Ht be the set of such histories of the game at time t when players take action, H 4=
∪Tt=0Ht be the set of all possible such histories. At any time t player i observes hit =
(a1:t−1, xi1:t) and all players together have h
c
t = a1:t−1 as common history. Let Hit be the
set of observed histories of player i at time t andHct be the set of common histories at time
t. An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is PBE [13], which consists of a
pair (β∗, µ∗) of strategy profile β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i∈N where β
∗,i
t : Hit → P(Ai) and a belief
profile µ∗ = (iµ∗t )t∈T ,i∈N where
iµ∗t : Hit → P(Ht) that satisfy sequential rationality so
that ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , hit ∈ Hit, βi
Eβ∗,iβ∗,−i, µ∗[hit]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣hit
}
≥ Eβiβ∗,−i, µ∗[hit]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣hit
}
, (3.6)
and the beliefs satisfy some consistency conditions as described in [13, p. 331]. In general,
a belief for player i at time t, iµ∗t is defined on history ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t) given its private
history hit = (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t). Here player i’s private history h
i
t = (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) consists of a
public part hct = a1:t−1 and a private part x
i
1:t. At any time t, the relevant uncertainty player
i has is about other players’ type x−it . In our setting, due to independence of types, player
i’s current type xit does not provide any information about x
−i
t , as will be shown later. For
this reason we consider beliefs that are functions of each agent’s history hit only through
the common history hct . Hence, for each agent i, its belief for each history h
c
t = a1:t−1 is
derived from a common belief µ∗t [a1:t−1], which itself factorizes into a product of marginals∏
j∈N µ
∗,j
t [a1:t−1], as will be shown later. Thus we can sufficiently use the system of beliefs,
µ∗ = (µ∗t )t∈T with µ
∗
t : Hct → P(X ), with the understanding that agent i’s belief on x−it
is µ∗,−it [a1:t−1](x
−i
t ) =
∏
j 6=i µ
∗,j
t [a1:t−1](x
j
t). Under the above structure, all consistency
conditions that are required for PBEs [13, p. 331] are automatically satisfied.
Structural results from Section 3.3 provide us motivation to study equilibria of the form
(mit(a
i
t|pit, xit))i∈N , which are equivalent to policy profiles of the form (θit[pit](ait|xit))i∈N
and have the advantage of being defined on a time-invariant space.
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3.4.2 Backward recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈N ,t∈T , where θ
i
t :
×i∈NP(X i) → {X i → P(Ai)} and a sequence of functions (V it )i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where
V it : ×i∈NP(X i)×X i → R, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ ×i∈NP(X i), xiT+1 ∈ X i,
V iT+1(piT+1, x
i
T+1)
4
= 0. (3.7)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ ×i∈NP(X i), pit =
∏
i∈N pi
i
t, let θt[pit] be generated
as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[pit], where γ˜t is the solution, if it exists
1, of the following
equation, ∀i ∈ N , xit ∈ X i,
γ˜it(·|xit) ∈ arg max
γit(·|xit)
Eγit(·|xit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} ,
(3.8)
where expectation in (3.8) is with respect to random variables (X−it , At, X it+1) through
the measure pi−it (x
−i
t )γ
i
t(a
i
t|xit)γ˜−it (a−it |x−it )Qit+1(xit+1|xit, at), and F is defined in the
proof of Lemma 3.2 and in particular Claim 3.5.
Furthermore, set
V it (pit, x
i
t)
4
= Eγ˜it(·|xit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} . (3.9)
It should be noted that in (3.8), γ˜it is not the outcome of the maximization operation as
in a best response equation similar to that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Rather (3.8)
has characteristics of a fixed point equation. This is because the maximizer γ˜it appears in
both, the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation. This distinct construction
allows the maximization operation to be done with respect to the variable γit(·|xit) for every
xit separately as opposed to be done with respect to the whole function γ
i
t(·|·), and is pivotal
in the construction.
To highlight the significance of structure of (3.8), we contrast it with two alternate
incorrect constructions:
1Similar to the existence results shown in [46], in the special case of uncontrolled types and where agents’
instantaneous rewards do not depend on their own private types, the fixed point equation always has a type-
independent, myopic solution γ˜it(·), since it degenerates to a best-response-like equation.
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(a) Following the common information approach as in decentralized team problems [43],
instead of (3.8), suppose γit were constructed as equilibrium on common agents’
actions γt, i.e. for a fixed pit, pit =
∏
i∈N pi
i
t, ∀i ∈ N ,
γ˜it ∈ arg max
γit
Eγit γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ
i
t γ˜
−i
t , At), X
i
t+1)
}
. (3.10)
It should be noted that in (3.10), the argument of the maximization operation, γit ,
appears both, in generation of action Ait and in the update of the belief pit. Moreover,
(3.10) is not conditioned on xit, the private information of player i, similar to the case
in the corresponding team problem. This is because the common agent who does not
observe the private information of the player i, averages out that information. While
this averaging of private information works for the team problem whose objective is
to maximize the total expected reward, for the case with strategic players, it is incom-
patible with the sequential rationality condition in (3.6), which requires conditioning
on the entire history (a1:t−1, xit) and not just the common information a1:t−1.
If the private information is also conditioned on, the construction still remains invalid,
as discussed next.
(b) Instead of (3.8), suppose γit were constructed as best response of player i to other
players actions γ˜−it , similar to a standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For a fixed
pit, pit =
∏
i∈N pi
i
t, ∀i ∈ N , xit ∈ X i,
γ˜it ∈ arg max
γit
Eγit(·|xit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ
i
t γ˜
−i
t , At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} .
(3.11)
Then γ˜it would be a function of γ˜
−i
t and xit through a best response relation γ˜
i
t ∈
BRi
xit
(γ˜−it ), where BRixit is appropriately defined from (3.62). Consequently, every
component of the solution of the fixed point equation (γ˜it ∈ BRixit(γ˜
−i
t ))xit∈X i,i∈N , if
it existed, would be a function of the whole type profile xt, resulting in a mapping
γ˜it = θ
i
t[pit, xt]. Since player i only observes its own type x
i
t, it would not be able to
implement the corresponding γ˜it , and therefore the construction would be invalid.
3.4.3 Forward recursion
As discussed above, a pair of strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) is a PBE if it satisfies (3.6).
Based on θ defined above in (3.7)–(3.9), we now construct a set of strategies β∗ and beliefs
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µ∗ for the game D in a forward recursive way, as follows2. As before, we will use the
notation µ∗
t
[a1:t−1] := (µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1])i∈N where µ∗t [a1:t−1] can be constructed from µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]
as µ∗t [a1:t−1](xt) =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1](x
i
t) ∀a1:t−1 ∈ Hct where µ∗,it [a1:t−1] is a belief on xit.
1. Initialize at time t = 1,
µ∗1[φ](x1) :=
N∏
i=1
Qi1(x
i
1). (3.12)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T,∀i ∈ N , a1:t ∈ Hct+1, xi1:t ∈ (X i)t
β∗,it (a
i
t|a1:t−1, xi1:t) = β∗,it (ait|a1:t−1, xit) := θit[µ∗t [a1:t−1]](ait|xit) (3.13)
and
µ∗,it+1[a1:t] := F¯ (µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1], θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]], at) (3.14)
where F¯ is defined in the proof of Lemma 3.2 and in particular Claim 3.5.
We now state our main result.
Theorem 3.1. A strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗), constructed through backward/forward
recursion algorithm described in Section 3.4 is a PBE of the game, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈
T , a1:t−1 ∈ Hct , xi1:t ∈ (X i)t, βi,
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
≥ Eβit:T β∗,−it:T , µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
. (3.15)
Proof. See Appendix C.
An intuitive explanation for why all players are able to use a common belief is the
following. The sequence of beliefs defined above serve two purposes. First, for any player
i, it puts a belief on x−it to compute an expectation on the current and future rewards.
Secondly, it predicts the actions of the other players since their strategies are functions of
these beliefs. Since for any strategy profile, xit is conditionally independent of x
−i
t given
the common history a1:t−1, and since other players do not observe xit, knowledge of x
i
t does
2 As discussed in starting of Section 3.4, beliefs at time t are functions of each agent’s history hit only
through the common history hct , and are the same for all agents.
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not affect this belief and thus in our definition, all players can use the same belief µ∗ which
is independent of their private information.
Independence of types is a crucial assumption in proving the above result, which mani-
fests itself in Lemma 3.5 in Appendix D, used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. This is because,
at equilibrium, player i’s reward-to-go at time t, conditioned on its type xit, depends on its
strategy at time t, βit , only through its action a
i
t and is independent of the corresponding
partial function βit(·|a1:t−1, ·). In other words, given xit and ait, player i’s reward-to-go is
independent of βit . We discuss this in more detail below.
At equilibrium, all players observe past actions a1:t−1 and update their belief pit, which
is the same as µ∗t [a1:t−1], through the equilibrium strategy profile β
∗. Now suppose at time
t, player i decides to unilaterally deviate to βˆit at time t for some history a1:t−1, keeping
the rest of its strategy the same. Then other players still update their beliefs (pit)t∈{t+1,...T}
same as before and take their actions through equilibrium strategy β∗,−it operated on pit
and x−it , whereas player i forms a new belief pˆit+1 on xt which depends on strategy profile
β∗1:t−1βˆt, β
∗,−i
t . Thus, at time t, player i would need both the beliefs pit+1, pˆit+1 to compute
its expected future reward (as also discussed in [41]); pit+1 to predict other players’ actions
and pˆit+1 to form a true belief on xt based on its information. As it turns out, due to
independence of types, pˆit+1 does not provide additional information to player i to compute
its future expected reward, and thus it can be discarded. Intuitively, this is so because the
belief on type j, pijt+1 is a function of strategy and action of player j till time t (as shown
in Claim 3.5 in Appendix B); thus pi−it+1 = pˆi
−i
t+1. Now since player i already observes its
type xit, its belief pˆi
i
t on x
i
t does not provide any additional information to player i, and thus
pit (which is the same as µ∗t [a1:t−1]) sufficiently computes future expected reward for player
i. Also pit+1 is updated from pit, β∗t (·|a1:t−1, ·) and at, and is independent of βˆit given ait.
This implies player i can use the equilibrium strategy β∗t to update its future belief, as used
in (3.8). Then by construction of θ and specifically due to (3.8), player i does not gain by
unilaterally deviating at time t keeping the remainder of its strategy the same.
Finally, we note that in the two-step backward-forward algorithm described above, once
the equilibrium generating function θ is defined through backward recursion, the SPBEs
can be generated through forward recursion for any prior distribution Q on types X . Since,
in comparison to the backward recursion, the forward recursive part of the algorithm is
computationally insignificant, the algorithm computes SPBEs for different prior distribu-
tions at the same time.
In the following lemma we show that all SPBE can be found through the backward-
forward methodology described before. In general, an SPBE can be defined as a PBE
(β∗, µ∗) of the game that is generated through forward recursion in (3.12)–(3.14), us-
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ing an equilibrium generating function φ, where φ = (φit)i∈N ,t∈T , φ
i
t : ×i∈NP(X i) →
{X i → P(Ai)}, common belief update function F i and prior distributions Qi. As a conse-
quence, β∗,it only depends on current type xit of player i, and on the common information
a1:t−1 through the set of marginals µt[a1:t−1], and µ
∗,i depends only on common information
history a1:t−1.
Lemma 3.3. Let (β∗, µ∗) be an SPBE. Then there exists an equilibrium generating function
φ that satisfies (3.8) in backward recursion ∀ pit = µ∗t [a1:t−1], ∀ a1:t−1, such that (β∗, µ∗) is
defined through forward recursion using φ 3 .
Proof. See Appendix E.
3.4.4 Existence
While it is known that for any finite dynamic game with asymmetric information and per-
fect recall, there always exists a PBE [45, Prop. 249.1], existence of the fixed point equation
in (3.8) is an unresolved question. Generally, existence of a fixed point equation is shown
through Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, as is done in proving existence of a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium for any finite game [40, 45] by showing existence of fixed point of the
best-response correspondences of the game. Among other conditions, it requires closed
graph property of the correspondences, which is implied by the continuity property of the
utility functions involved. For (3.8), continuity of the term to be optimized, with respect
to actions γit , is not guaranteed. This is due to two reasons: (a) potential discontinuity of
the pit update function F when the denominator in the Bayesian update is 0, (b) as it is
observed in the numerical example in the next section, the value functions, V it , need not be
continuous. Thus the standard arguments for existence of the fixed point equation can not
be directly applied and existence of solution of (3.8) remains an open question.
In the next section, we discuss an example to illustrate the methodology described
above for the construction of SPBEs.
3.5 Illustrative example: A two stage public goods game
We consider a discrete version of Example 8.3 from [13, ch.8], which is an instance of a
repeated public good game. There are two players who play a two period game. In each
period t, they simultaneously decide whether to contribute to the period t public good,
3Note that for pit 6= µt[a1:t−1] for any a1:t−1, φ can be arbitrarily defined without affecting the definition
of (β∗, µ∗)
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which is a binary decision ait ∈ {0, 1} for player i = 1, 2. Before the start of period 2,
both players know the actions taken by them in period 1. For both periods, each player
gets reward 1 if at least one of them contributed and 0 if none does. Player i’s cost of
contributing is xi which is its private information. Both players believe that xis are drawn
independently and identically with probability distribution Q with support {xL, xH}; 0 <
xL < 1 < xH , such that PQ(X i = xH) = q where 0 < q < 1.
This example is similar to our model where N = 2, T = 2 and reward for player i in
period t is
Ri(x, at) =
{
a−it if ait = 0
1− xi if ait = 1.
(3.16)
We will use the backward recursive algorithm, defined in Section 3.4, to find an SPBE
of this game. For period t = 1, 2 and for i = 1, 2, the partial functions γit can equivalently
be defined through scalars piLt and p
iH
t such that γ
i
t(1|xL) = piLt , γit(0|xL) = 1 − piLt and
γit(1|xH) = piHt , γit(0|xH) = 1− piHt , where piLt , piHt ∈ [0, 1]. Henceforth, we will use piLt
and piHt interchangeably with the corresponding γ
i
t .
For t = 2 and for any fixed pi2 = (pi
1
2, pi
2
2), where pi
i
2 = pi
i
2(x
H) ∈ [0, 1] represents a
probability measure on the event {X i = xH}, player i’s reward is
Eγ2{Ri2(X,A2)|pi2, X i = xL} = (1− piL2 )
(
(1− pi−i2 )p−iL2 + pi−i2 p−iH2
)
+ piL2 (1− xL),
(3.17a)
Eγ2{Ri2(X,A2)|pi2, X i = xH} = (1− piH2 )
(
(1− pi−i2 )p−iL2 + pi−i2 p−iH2
)
+ piH2 (1− xH).
(3.17b)
Let γ˜2 = θ2[pi2] and equivalently (p˜
1L
2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = θ2[pi2] be defined through the
following fixed point equation, which is equivalent to (3.8). For i = 1, 2
p˜iL2 ∈ arg max
piL2
(1− piL2 )
(
(1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 + pi−i2 p˜−iH2
)
+ piL2 (1− xL), (3.18a)
p˜iH2 ∈ arg max
piH2
(1− piH2 )
(
(1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 + pi−i2 p˜−iH2
)
+ piH2 (1− xH). (3.18b)
Since 1 − xH < 0, p˜iH2 = 0 achieves the maximum in (3.18b). Thus (3.18a)–(3.18b) can
be reduced to, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
p˜iL2 ∈ arg max
piL2
(1− piL2 )(1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 + piL2 (1− xL). (3.19)
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This implies,
p˜iL2 =

0 if xL > 1− (1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 ,
1 if xL < 1− (1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 ,
arbitrary if xL = 1− (1− pi−i2 )p˜−iL2 .
(3.20)
The fixed point equation (3.20) has the following solutions,
1. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (0, 1, 0, 0) for pi
1
2 ∈ [0, 1], pi22 ≤ xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− pi22
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi22
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 0.
2. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (1, 0, 0, 0) for pi
1
2 ≤ xL, pi12 ∈ [0, 1]
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 0
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− pi12
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi12 .
3. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (1, 1, 0, 0) for pi
1
2 ≥ xL, pi22 ≥ xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi22
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi12 .
4. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (1, p˜
2L
2 , 0, 0) for pi
1
2 = x
L, pi22 ∈ [0, 1] where
p˜2L2 ∈
[
0,max
{
1, 1−x
L
1−pi22
}]
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi22.p˜2L2
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi12 .
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5. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (p˜
1L
2 , 1, 0, 0) for pi
1
2 ∈ [0, 1], pi22 = xL where
p˜1L2 ∈
[
0,max
{
1, 1−x
L
1−pi12
}]
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi22
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 1− pi12.p˜1L2 .
6. (p˜1L2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) = (
1−xL
1−pi12 ,
1−xL
1−pi22 , 0, 0) for pi
1
2 ≤ xL, pi22 ≤ xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 12 (pi2, x
H) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
L) = 1− xL
• V 22 (pi2, x
H) = 1− xL.
Figure 3.1 shows these solutions in the space of (pi12, pi
2
2).
0 1
1
0, 1−𝑥
𝐿
1−𝜋2
1 , 1,0,0
(1,0,0,0)
1, [0,1] , 0,0
[0,1] , 1,0,0
1, 0, 1−𝑥
𝐿
1−𝜋2
2 , 0,0
0,1,0,0
(1,0,0,0) (1,1,0,0)
1−𝑥𝐿
1−𝜋2
1,
1−𝑥𝐿
1−𝜋2
2, 0,0
0,1,0,0
(1,0,0,0)
(0,1,0,0)
𝜋2
2
𝜋2
1
𝑥𝐿
𝑥𝐿
Figure 3.1: Solutions of fixed point equation in (3.20)
Thus for any pi2, there can exist multiple equilibria and correspondingly multiple θ2[pi2]
can be defined. For any particular θ2, at t = 1, the fixed point equation that needs to be
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solved is of the form, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
p˜iL1 ∈ arg max
piL1
(1− piL1 )
(
(1− q)p˜−iL1 + qp˜−iH1 + Eγ˜1{V i2 (F (Q2, γ˜1, (0, A−i1 )), xL)}
)
+ piL1
(
1− xL + Eγ˜1{V i2 (F (Q2, γ˜1, (1, A−i1 )), xL)}
)
. (3.21a)
p˜iH1 ∈ arg max
piH1
(1− piH1 )
(
(1− q)p˜−iL1 + qp˜−iH1 + Eγ˜1{V i2 (F (Q2, γ˜1, (0, A−i1 )), xH)}
)
+ piH1
(
1− xH + Eγ˜1{V i2 (F (Q2, γ˜1, (1, A−i1 )), xH)}
)
. (3.21b)
where F (Q2, γ˜, (A1, A2)) = F¯ (Q, γ˜1, A1)F¯ (Q, γ˜2, A2) and
F¯ (Q, γ˜i1, 0) =
q(1− p˜iH1 )
q(1− p˜iH1 ) + (1− q)(1− p˜iL1 )
, (3.22a)
F¯ (Q, γ˜i1, 1) =
qp˜iH1
qp˜iH1 + (1− q)p˜iL1
, (3.22b)
if the denominators in (3.22a)–(3.22b) are strictly positive, else F¯ (Q, γ˜i1, A
i) = Q as in the
proof of Lemma 3.2, and in particular Claim 3.5. A solution of the fixed point equation in
(3.21a)-(3.21b) defines θ1[Q2].
Using one such θ defined as follows, we find an SPBE of the game for q = 0.1, xL =
0.2, xH = 1.2. We use θ2[pi2] as one possible set of solutions of (3.20), shown in Figure 3.2
and described below,
θ2[pi2] = (p˜
1L
2 , p˜
2L
2 , p˜
1H
2 , p˜
2H
2 ) =

(1−x
L
1−pi12 ,
1−xL
1−pi22 , 0, 0) pi
1
2 ∈ [0, xL), pi22 ∈ [0, xL)
(1, 0, 0, 0) pi12 ∈ [0, xL], pi22 ∈ [xL, 1]
(0, 1, 0, 0) pi12 ∈ [xL, 1], pi22 ∈ [0, xL]
(1, 1, 0, 0) pi12 ∈ (xL, 1], pi22 ∈ (xL, 1].
(3.23)
Then, through iteration on the fixed point equation (3.21a)-(3.21b) and using the afore-
mentioned θ2[pi2], we numerically find (and analytically verify) that θ1[Q
2] = (p˜1L1 , p˜
2L
1 ,
p˜1H1 , p˜
2H
1 ) = (0, 1, 0, 0) is a fixed point. Thus
β11(A
1
1 = 1|X1 = xL) = 0 β21(A21 = 1|X2 = xL) = 1
β11(A
1
1 = 1|X1 = xH) = 0 β21(A21 = 1|X2 = xH) = 0
with beliefs µ∗2[00] = (q, 1), µ
∗
2[01] = (q, 0), µ
∗
2[10] = (q, 1), µ
∗
2[11] = (q, 0) and
56
Figure 3.2: θ2[pi2] described in (3.23 )
(βi2(·|a1, ·))i∈{1,2} = θ2[µ∗2[a1]] is an SPBE of the game. In this equilibrium, player 2
at time t = 1, contributes according to her type whereas player 1 never contributes,
thus player 2 reveals her private information through her action whereas player 1 does
not. Since θ2 is symmetric, there also exists an (antisymmetric) equilibrium where at
time t = 1, players’ strategies reverse i.e. player 2 never contributes and player 1 con-
tributes according to her type. We also obtain a symmetric equilibrium where θ1[Q2] =
( 1−x
L
(1−q)(1+xL) ,
1−xL
(1−q)(1+xL) , 0, 0) as a fixed point when x
L > q
2−q , resulting in beliefs µ
∗
2[00] =
(p, p), µ∗2[01] = (p, 0), µ
∗
2[10] = (0, p), µ
∗
2[11] = (0, 0) where p =
q(1+xL)
q(1+xL)+(1−xL) .
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where
player i observes its true private type xit and together with other players, observe past ac-
tions of everybody else. The types of the players evolve as conditionally independent,
controlled Markov processes, conditioned on players current actions. We present a two-
step backward-forward recursive algorithm to find SPBE of this game, where equilibrium
strategies are function of a Markov belief state pit, which depends on the common informa-
tion, and current private types of the players. The backward recursive part of this algorithm
defines an equilibrium generating function. Each period in backward recursion involves
solving a fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible
belief on types. Then using this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are defined
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through a forward recursion.
In this chapter we consider perfectly observable, independent dynamic types of the
players. In chapter 5, we consider the case where players do not perfectly observe their
types, rather they make independent, noisy observations. In general, this methodology
opens the door for finding PBEs for many applications, analytically or numerically, which
was not feasible before. One such case would be dynamic LQG games where types evolve
linearly with Gaussian noise and players incur quadratic cost, which we discuss in next
chapter.
3.7 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 3.1)
We prove this lemma in the following steps.
(a) In Claim 3.1, we prove that for any policy profile g and ∀t ∈ T , xi1:t for i ∈ N are
conditionally independent given the common information a1:t.
(b) In Claim 3.2, using Claim 3.1, we prove that for every fixed strategy g−i of the players
−i, ((a1:t−1, xit), ait)t∈T is a controlled Markov process for player i.
(c) For a given policy g, we define a policy si of player i from g as sit(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xit) 4=
P g(ait|a1:t−1, xit).
(d) In Claim 3.3, we prove that the dynamics of this controlled Markov process ((xit, a1:t−1),
ait)t∈T under (s
ig−i) are same as under g i.e. P sig−i(xit, x
i
t+1, a1:t) =
P g(xit, x
i
t+1, a1:t).
(e) In Claim 3.4, we prove that w.r.t. random variables (xt, at), xit is sufficient for player
i’s private information history xi1:t i.e. P
g(xt, at|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait)
= P g
−i
(xt, at|a1:t−1, xit, ait).
(f) From (c), (d) and (e) we then prove the result of the lemma that P sig−i(xt, at) =
P g(xt, at).
Claim 3.1. For any policy profile g and ∀t,
P g(x1:t|a1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t|a1:t−1) (3.25)
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Proof.
P g(x1:t|a1:t−1)
=
P g(x1:t, a1:t−1)∑
x¯1:t
P g(x¯1:t, a1:t−1)
(3.26a)
=
∏N
i=1
(
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|xi1)
∏t
n=2 Q
i
n(x
i
n|xin−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, xi1:n)
)∑
x¯1:t
∏N
i=1
(
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯i1)
∏t
n=2 Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯in−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, x¯i1:n)
) (3.26b)
=
∏N
i=1
(
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|xi1)
∏t
n=2 Q
i
n(x
i
n|xin−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, xi1:n)
)∏N
i=1
(∑
x¯i1:t
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯i1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯in−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, x¯i1:n)
) (3.26c)
=
N∏
i=1
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|xi1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x
i
n|xin−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, xi1:n)∑
x¯i1:t
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯i1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯in−1, an−1)gin(ain|a1:n−1, x¯i1:n)
(3.26d)
=
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t|a1:t−1) (3.26e)
Claim 3.2. For a fixed g−i, {(a1:t−1, xit), ait}t is a controlled Markov process with state
(a1:t−1, xit) and control action a
i
t.
Proof.
P g(a˜1:t, x
i
t+1|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ai1:t)
=
∑
x−i1:t
P g(a˜1:t, x
i
t+1, x
−i
1:t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) (3.27a)
=
∑
x−i1:t
P g(a˜−it , x
i
t+1, x
−i
1:t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait)I(a1:t−1,ait)(a˜1:t−1, a˜it) (3.27b)
=
∑
x−i1:t
P g
−i
(x−i1:t|a1:t−1)
(∏
j 6=i
gjt (a˜
j
t |a1:t−1, xj1:t)
)
Qit(x
i
t+1|xit, ait, a˜−it )I(a1:t−1,ait)(a˜1:t−1, a˜it)
(3.27c)
= P g
−i
(a˜1:t, x
i
t+1|a1:t−1, xit, ait), (3.27d)
where (3.27c) follows from Claim 3.1 since x−i1:t is conditionally independent of x
i
1:t given
a1:t−1 and the corresponding probability is only a function of g−i.
For any given policy profile g, we construct a policy si in the following way,
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sit(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xit) 4= P g(ait|a1:t−1, xit) (3.28)
=
∑
xi1:t−1
P g(ait, x
i
1:t|a1:t−1)∑
a˜it
∑
x˜i1:t−1
P g(a˜it, x˜
i
1:t−1x
i
t|a1:t−1)
(3.29)
=
∑
xi1:t−1
P g
i
(xi1:t|a1:t−1)git(ait|a1:t−1, xi1:t)∑
a˜it
∑
x˜i1:t−1
P gi(x˜i1:t−1x
i
t|a1:t−1)git(a˜it|a1:t−1, x˜i1:t−1xit)
(3.30)
= P g
i
(ait|a1:t−1, xit), (3.31)
where dependence of (3.30) on only gi is due to Claim 3.1.
Claim 3.3. The dynamics of the Markov process {(xit, a1:t−1), ait}t under (sig−i) are the
same as under g i.e.
P s
ig−i(xit, x
i
t+1, a1:t) = P
g(xit, x
i
t+1, a1:t) ∀t (3.32)
Proof. We prove this by induction. Clearly,
P g(xi1) = P
sig−i(xi1) = Q
i
1(x
i
1) (3.33)
Now suppose (3.32) is true for t− 1 which also implies that the marginals P g(xit, a1:t−1) =
P s
ig−i(xit, a1:t−1). Then
P g(xit, a1:t−1, x
i
t+1, at) = P
g(xit, a1:t−1)P
g(ait|a1:t−1, xit)P g(xit+1, a1:t|xit, a1:t−1, ait)
(3.34a)
= P s
ig−i(xit, a1:t−1)s
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xit)P g
−i
(xit+1, a1:t|xit, a1:t−1, ait)
(3.34b)
= P s
ig−i(xit, a1:t−1, x
i
t+1, at) (3.34c)
where (3.34b) is true from induction hypothesis, definition of si in (3.31) and since
{(a1:t−1, xit), ait}t is a controlled Markov process as proved in Claim 3.2 and its update
kernel does not depend on policy gi.This completes the induction step.
Claim 3.4. For any policy g,
P g(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) = P g
−i
(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xit, ait) (3.35)
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Proof.
P g(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) = Ixit,ait(x˜it, a˜it)P g(x˜−it , a˜−it |a1:t−1, xi1:t) (3.36)
Now
P g(x˜−it , a˜
−i
t |a1:t−1, xi1:t) =
∑
x˜−i1:t−1
P g(x˜−i1:t, a˜
−i
t |a1:t−1, xi1:t) (3.37a)
=
∑
x˜−i1:t−1
P g(x˜−i1:t|a1:t−1, xi1:t)
(∏
j 6=i
gjt (a˜
j
t |a1:t−1, x˜j1:t)
)
(3.37b)
=
∑
x˜−i1:t
P g
−i
(x˜−i1:t|a1:t−1)
(∏
j 6=i
gjt (a˜
j
t |a1:t−1, x˜j1:t)
)
(3.37c)
= P g
−i
(x˜−it , a˜
−i
t |a1:t−1) (3.37d)
where (3.37c) follows from Claim 3.1.
Hence
P g(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) = Ixit,ait(x˜it, a˜it)P g
−i
(x˜−it , a˜
−i
t |a1:t−1) (3.38a)
= P g
−i
(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xit, ait) (3.38b)
Finally,
P g(x˜t, a˜t) =
∑
a1:t−1xi1:ta
i
t
P g(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait)P g(a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) (3.39a)
=
∑
a1:t−1xi1:t,a
i
t
P g
−i
(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xit, ait)P g(a1:t−1, xi1:t, ait) (3.39b)
=
∑
a1:t−1xit,ait
P g
−i
(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xit, ait)P g(a1:t−1, xit, ait) (3.39c)
=
∑
a1:t−1xit,ait
P g
−i
(x˜t, a˜t|a1:t−1, xit, ait)P s
ig−i(a1:t−1, xit, a
i
t) (3.39d)
= P s
ig−i(x˜t, a˜t). (3.39e)
where (3.39b) follows from (3.35) in Claim 3.4 and (3.39d) from (3.32) in Claim 3.3.
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3.8 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 3.2)
For this proof we will assume the common agents strategies to be probabilistic as opposed
to being deterministic, as was the case in Section 3.3. This means actions of the common
agent, γit’s are generated probabilistically from ψ
i as Γit · ψit(·|a1:t−1), as opposed to being
deterministically generated as γit = ψ
i
t[a1:t−1], as before. These two are equivalent ways
of generating actions ait from a1:t−1 and x
i
t. We avoid using the probabilistic strategies of
common agent throughout the main text for ease of exposition, and because it conceptually
does not affect the results.
Proof. We prove this lemma in the following steps. We view this problem from the per-
spective of a common agent. Let ψ be the coordinator’s policy corresponding to policy
profile g. Let piit(x
i
t) = P
ψi(xit|a1:t−1).
(a) In Claim 3.5, we show that pit can be factorized as pit(xt) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(x
i
t) where
each piit can be updated through an update function pi
i
t+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, at) and F¯ is
independent of common agent’s policy ψ.
(b) In Claim 3.6, we prove that (Πt,Γt)t∈T is a controlled Markov process.
(c) We construct a policy profile θ from g such that θt(dγt|pit) 4= Pψ(dγt|pit).
(d) In Claim 3.7, we prove that dynamics of this Markov process (Πt,Γt)t∈T under θ is
same as under ψ i.e. P θ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1) = Pψ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1).
(e) In Claim 3.8, we prove that with respect to random variables (Xt, At), pit can sum-
marize common information a1:t−1 i.e. Pψ(xt, at|a1:t−1, γt) = P (xt, at|pit, γt).
(f) From (c), (d) and (e) we that prove the result of the lemma that Pψ(xt, at) = P θ(xt, at)
which is equivalent to P g(xt, at) = Pm(xt, at), wherem is the policy profile of play-
ers corresponding to θ .
Claim 3.5. pit can be factorized as pit(xt) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(x
i
t) where each pi
i
t can be updated
through an update function piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, at) and F¯ is independent of common agent’s
policy ψ. We also say pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at).
Proof. We prove this by induction. Since pi1(x1) =
∏N
i=1Q
i
t(x
i
1), the base case is verified.
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Now suppose pit =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t. Then,
pit+1(xt+1) = P
ψ(xt+1|a1:t, γ1:t+1) (3.40a)
= Pψ(xt+1|a1:t, γ1:t) (3.40b)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt, at, xt+1|a1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
x˜t+1x˜t
Pψ(x˜t, x˜t+1, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t) (3.40c)
=
∑
xt
pit(xt)
∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|xit)Qit(xit+1|xit, at)∑
x˜tx˜t+1
pit(x˜t)
∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|x˜it)Qit(x˜it+1|x˜it, at)
(3.40d)
=
N∏
i=1
∑
xit
piit(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|xit)Qit(xit+1|xit, at)∑
x˜it
piit(x˜
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|x˜it)
, (3.40e)
=
N∏
i=1
piit+1(x
i
t+1) (3.40f)
where (3.40e) follows from induction hypothesis. It is assumed in (3.40c)-(3.40e) that the
denominator is not 0. If denominator corresponding to any γit is zero, we define
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∑
xit
piit(x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|xit, at), (3.41)
where pit+1 still satisfies (3.40f). Thus piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, at) and pit+1 = F (pit, γt, a1) where
F¯ and F are appropriately defined from above.
Claim 3.6. (Πt,Γt)t∈T is a controlled Markov process with state Πt and control action Γt
Proof.
Pψ(dpit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
at,xt
Pψ(dpit+1, at, xt|pi1:t, γ1:t) (3.42a)
=
∑
at,xt
Pψ(xt|pi1:t, γ1:t)
{
N∏
i=1
γit(a
i
t|xit)
}
IF (pit,γt,at)(pit+1) (3.42b)
=
∑
at,xt
pit(xt)
{
N∏
i=1
γit(a
i
t|xit)
}
IF (pit,γt,at)(pit+1) (3.42c)
= P (dpit+1|pit, γt). (3.42d)
For any given policy profile ψ, we construct policy profile θ in the following way.
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θt(dγt|pit) 4= Pψ(dγt|pit). (3.43)
Claim 3.7.
Pψ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1) = P
θ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1) ∀t ∈ T . (3.44)
Proof. We prove this by induction. For t = 1,
Pψ(dpi1) = P
θ(dpi1) = IQ(pi1). (3.45)
Now suppose Pψ(dpit) = P θ(dpit) is true for t, then
Pψ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1) = P
ψ(dpit)P
ψ(dγt|pit)Pψ(dpit+1|pitγt) (3.46a)
= P θ(dpit)θt(dγt|pit)P (dpit+1|pit, γt) (3.46b)
= P θ(dpit, dγt, dpit+1). (3.46c)
where (3.46b) is true from induction hypothesis, definition of θ in (3.43) and since (Πt,Γt)t∈T
is a controlled Markov process as proved in Claim 3.6 and thus its update kernel does not
depend on policy ψ. This completes the induction step.
Claim 3.8. For any policy ψ,
Pψ(xt, at|a1:t−1, γt) = P (xt, at|pit, γt). (3.47)
Proof.
Pψ(xt, at|a1:t−1, γt) = Pψ(xt|a1:t−1, γt)
∏
i∈N
γit(a
i
t|xit) (3.48a)
= pit(xt)
∏
i∈N
γit(a
i
t|xit) (3.48b)
= P (xt, at|pit, γt). (3.48c)
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Finally,
Pψ(xt, at) =
∑
a1:t−1,γt
Pψ(xt, at|a1:t−1, γt)Pψ(a1:t−1, γt) (3.49a)
=
∑
a1:t−1γt
P (xt, at|pit, γt)Pψ(a1:t−1, γt) (3.49b)
=
∑
pit,γt
P (xt, at|pit, γt)Pψ(pit, γt) (3.49c)
=
∑
pit,γt
P (xt, at|pit, γt)P θ(pit, γt) (3.49d)
= P θ(xt, at). (3.49e)
where (3.49b) follows from (3.47), (3.49c) is change of variable and (3.49d) from (3.44).
3.9 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 3.1)
Proof. We prove (3.15) using induction and from results in Lemma 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 proved
in Appendix D. For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (a1:T−1, xi1:T ) ∈ HiT , βi
Eβ
∗,i
T β
∗,−i
T , µ
∗
T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xi1:T} = V iT (µ∗T [a1:T−1], xiT ) (3.50a)
≥ EβiT β∗,−iT , µ∗T [a1:T−1] {Ri(XT , AT )∣∣a1:T−1, xi1:T} .
(3.50b)
where (3.50a) follows from Lemma 3.6 and (3.50b) follows from Lemma 3.4 in Appendix
D.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+1, ∀i ∈ N , a1:t ∈ Hct+1, xi1:t+1 ∈ (X i)t+1, βi,
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1
}
(3.51a)
≥ Eβit+1:T β∗,−it+1:T , µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1
}
. (3.51b)
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Then ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, xi1:t) ∈ Hit, βi, we have
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], xit) (3.52a)
≥ Eβitβ∗,−it , µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At], X it+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t} (3.52b)
= Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.52c)
≥ Eβitβ∗,−it , µ∗t [a1:t−1] {Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:Tµ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.52d)
= Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)
+Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.52e)
= Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
, (3.52f)
where (3.52a) follows from Lemma 3.6, (3.52b) follows from Lemma 3.4, (3.52c) follows
from Lemma 3.6, (3.52d) follows from induction hypothesis in (3.51b) and (3.52e) follows
from Lemma 3.5. Moreover, construction of θ in (3.8), and consequently definition of β∗
in (3.13) are pivotal for (3.52e) to follow from (3.52d).
We note that µ∗ satisfies the consistency condition of [13, p. 331] from the fact that (a)
for all t and for every common history a1:t−1, all players use the same belief µ∗t [a1:t−1] on
xt and (b) the belief µ∗t can be factorized as µ
∗
t [a1:t−1] =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1] ∀a1:t−1 ∈ Hct
where µ∗,it is updated through Bayes’ rule (F¯ ) as in Claim 3.5 in Appendix B.
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3.10 Appendix D
Lemma 3.4. ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, xi1:t) ∈ Hit, βit
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], xit) ≥
Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], β∗t (·|a1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t} .
(3.53)
Proof. We prove this Lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, βˆit , aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t such that
Eβˆitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t}
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], xˆit). (3.54)
We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Construct γˆit(a
i
t|xit) =
{
βˆit(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t) xit = xˆit
arbitrary otherwise.
Then for aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t, we have
V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], xˆit) (3.55a)
= max
γit(·|xˆit)
Eγit(·|xˆit)β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(xˆitx
−i
t , at)
+V it+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣xˆit} , (3.55b)
≥ Eγˆit(·|xˆit)β∗,−it , µ∗t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣xˆit}
=
∑
x−it ,at,xt+1
{
Ri(xˆitx
−i
t , at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), xit+1)
}
×
µ∗,−it [aˆ1:t−1](x
−i
t )γˆ
i
t(a
i
t|xˆit)β∗,−it (a−it |aˆ1:t−1, x−it )Qit(xit+1|xˆit, at) (3.55c)
=
∑
x−it ,at,xt+1
{
Ri(xˆitx
−i
t , at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), xit+1)
}
×
µ∗,−it [aˆ1:t−1](x
−i
t )βˆ
i
t(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |aˆ1:t−1, x−it )Qit(xit+1|xˆit, at)
(3.55d)
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= Eβˆitβ
∗,−i
t ,µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(xˆitx
−i
t , at)
+V it+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆi1:t} (3.55e)
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], xˆit) (3.55f)
where (3.55b) follows from definition of V it in (3.9), (3.55d) follows from definition of γˆ
i
t
and (3.55f) follows from (3.54). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 3.5. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, xi1:t+1) ∈ Hit+1 and βit
Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1
}
= Eβit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1
}
. (3.56)
Thus the above quantities do not depend on βit .
Proof. Essentially this claim stands on the fact that µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t] can be updated from
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t and at, as µ
∗,−i
t+1 [a1:t] =
∏
j 6=i F¯ (µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t , at) as in Claim 3.5.
Since the above expectations involve random variables X−it+1, At+1:T , Xt+2:T , we consider
the probability
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](x−it+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1).
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](x−it+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1)
=
∑
x−it
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](x−it , at, xt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t)∑
x˜−it
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](x˜−it , at, xit+1
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t) (3.57a)
We consider the numerator and the denominator separately. The numerator in (3.57a) is
given by
Nr =
∑
x−it
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](x−it
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t)βit(ait|a1:t−1, xi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, x−it )
Q(xt+1|xt, at)P βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, xi1:t−1, xt:t+1) (3.57b)
=
∑
x−it
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1](x
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, x−it )Qi(xit+1|xit, at)
Q−i(x−it+1|x−it , at)P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, xi1:t, xt+1) (3.57c)
where (3.57c) follows from the conditional independence of types given common informa-
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tion, as shown in Claim 3.1, and the fact that probability on (at+1:T , x2+t:T ) given
a1:t, x
i
1:t−1, xt:t+1, µ
∗
t [a1:t−1] depends on a1:t, x
i
1:t, xt+1, µ
∗
t+1[a1:t] through β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T . Sim-
ilarly, the denominator in (3.57a) is given by
Dr =∑
x˜−it
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t (x˜−it |a1:t−1, xi1:t)βit(ait|a1:t−1, xi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, x˜−it )Qi(xit+1|xit, at)
(3.57d)
=
∑
x˜−it
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1](x˜
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, x˜−it )Qi(xit+1|xit, at) (3.57e)
By canceling the terms βit(·) and Qi(·) in the numerator and the denominator, (3.57a)
is given by
∑
x−it
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1](x
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x−it )Q−it+1(x−it+1|x−it , at)∑
x˜−it
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1](x˜
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x˜−it )
×
P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, xi1:t, xt+1) (3.57f)
=µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t](x
−i
t+1)P
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, xi1:t, xt+1) (3.57g)
=P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](x−it+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, xi1:t+1), (3.57h)
where (3.57g) follows from using the definition of µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t](x
−i
t ) in the forward recursive
step in (3.14) and the definition of the belief update in (3.40).
Lemma 3.6. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, xi1:t) ∈ Hit,
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], xit) = Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T ,µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
. (3.58)
Proof. We prove the Lemma by induction. For t = T ,
Eβ
∗,i
T β
∗,−i
T , µ
∗
T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xi1:T}
=
∑
x−iT aT
Ri(xT , aT )µ
∗
T [a1:T−1](x
−i
T )β
∗,i
T (a
i
T |a1:T−1, xiT )β∗,−iT (a−iT |a1:T−1, x−iT ) (3.59a)
= V iT (µ
∗
T
[a1:T−1], xiT ), (3.59b)
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where (3.59b) follows from the definition of V it in (3.9) and the definition of β
∗
T in the
forward recursion in (3.13).
Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, xi1:t+1) ∈ Hit+1
V it+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t], x
i
t+1) = Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xi1:t+1
}
. (3.60)
Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, xi1:t) ∈ Hit, we have
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.61a)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.61b)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At], X it+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t} (3.61c)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At], X it+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t} (3.61d)
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], xit), (3.61e)
where (3.61b) follows from Lemma 3.5 in Appendix D, (3.61c) follows from the induction
hypothesis in (3.60), (3.61d) follows because the random variables involved in expectation,
X−it , At, X
i
t+1 do not depend on β
∗,i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T and (3.61e) follows from the definition of β
∗
t
in the forward recursion in (3.13), the definition of µ∗t+1 in (3.14) and the definition of V
i
t
in (3.9).
3.11 Appendix E (Proof of Lemma 3.3)
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose for any equilibrium generating function φ
that generates (β∗, µ∗) through forward recursion, there exists t ∈ T , i ∈ N , a1:t−1 ∈
Hct , such that for pit = µt[a1:t−1], (3.8) is not satisfied for φ i.e. for γ˜it = φi[pit] =
70
β∗,it (·|µt[a1:t−1], xit),
γ˜it 6∈ arg max
γit
Eγit(·|xi)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} . (3.62)
Let t be the first instance in the backward recursion when this happens. This implies ∃ γˆit
such that
Eγˆit(·|xi)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit}
> Eγ˜it(·|xi)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} (3.63)
This implies for βˆt(·|µt[a1:t−1], ·) = γˆit ,
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.64)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.65)
= Eγ˜it(·|xit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} (3.66)
< Eβˆit(·|µt[a1:t−1],xit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣xit} (3.67)
= Eβˆitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)
+Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:Tµ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.68)
= Eβˆit ,β
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
(3.69)
where (3.65) follows from Lemma 3.5, (3.66) follows from the definitions of γ˜it and
µt+1[a1:t−1, At] and Lemma 3.6, (3.67) follows from (3.63) and the definition of βˆit , (3.68)
follows from Lemma 3.4, (3.69) follows from Lemma 3.5. However, this leads to a contra-
diction since (β∗, µ∗) is a PBE of the game.
71
CHAPTER 4
Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games
with asymmetric information
4.1 Introduction
Linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) team problems have been studied extensively under the
framework of classical stochastic control with single controller and perfect recall [31,
Ch.7]. In such a system, the state evolves linearly and the controller makes a noisy ob-
servation of the state which is also linear in the state and noise. The controller incurs a
quadratic instantaneous cost. With all basic random variables being independent and Gaus-
sian, the problem is modeled as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP).
The belief state process under any control law happens to be Gaussian and thus can be
sufficiently described by the corresponding mean and covariance processes, which can be
updated by the Kalman filter equations. Moreover, the covariance can be computed offline
and thus the mean (state estimate) is a sufficient statistic for control. Finally, due to the
quadratic nature of the costs, the optimal control strategy is linear in the state. Thus, unlike
most POMDP problems, the LQG stochastic control problem can be solved analytically
and admits an easy-to-implement optimal strategy.
LQG team problems have also been studied under non-classical information structure
such as in multi-agent decentralized team problems where 2 controllers with different in-
formation sets minimize the same objective. Such systems with asymmetric information
structure are of special interest today because of the emergence of large scale networks such
as social or power networks, where there are multiple decision makers with local or partial
information about the system. It is well known that for decentralized LQG team problems,
linear control policies are not optimal in general [59]. However there exist special infor-
mation structures, such as partially nested [19] and stochastically nested [62], where linear
control is shown to be optimal. Furthermore, due to their strong appeal for ease of imple-
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mentation, linear strategies have been studied on their own for decentralized teams even at
the possibility of being suboptimal (see [34] and references therein).
Authors in [3] studied a discrete-time dynamic LQG game with one step delayed shar-
ing of observations. Authors in [41] studied a class of dynamic games with asymmetric
information under the assumption that player’s posterior beliefs about the system state
conditioned on their common information are independent of the strategies used by the
players in the past. Due to this independence of beliefs and past strategies, the authors
were able to provide a backward recursive algorithm similar to dynamic programming to
find Markov perfect equilibria [38] of a transformed game which are equivalently a class
of Nash equilibria of the original game. The same authors specialized their results in [16]
to find non-signaling equilibria of dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information.
We considered a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information and
independent private types in chapter 3 and provided a sequential decomposition method-
ology to find a class of PBE of the game considered. In our model, beliefs depend on the
players’ strategies, so it allows the possibility of signaling equilibria. In this chapter, we
build on this methodology to find signaling equilibria for two-player dynamic LQG games
with asymmetric information. We show that players’ strategies that are linear in their pri-
vate types in conjunction with consistent Gaussian beliefs form a PBE of the game. Our
contributions are:
(a) Under strategies that are linear in players’ private types, we show that the belief up-
dates are Gaussian and the corresponding mean and covariance are updated through
Kalman filtering equations which depend on the players’ strategies, unlike the case
in classical stochastic control and the model considered in [16]. Thus there is signal-
ing [18, 30].
(b) We sequentially decompose the problem by specializing the forward-backward algo-
rithm presented in chapter 3 for the dynamic LQG model. The backward algorithm
requires, at each step, solving a fixed point equation in ‘partial’ strategies of the
players for all possible beliefs. We show that in this setting, solving this fixed point
equation reduces to solving a matrix algebraic equation for each realization of the
state estimate covariance matrices.
(c) The cost-to-go value functions are shown to be quadratic in the private type and state
estimates, which together with quadratic instantaneous costs and mean updates being
linear in the control action, implies that at every time t player i faces an optimization
problem which is quadratic in her control. Thus linear control strategies are shown
to satisfy the optimality conditions in chapter 3.
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(d) For the special case of scalar actions, we provide sufficient algorithmic conditions
for existence of a solution of the algebraic matrix equation. Finally, we present nu-
merical results on the steady state solution for specific parameters of the problem.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we define the model. In Section 4.3,
we summarize the general methodology in chapter 3. In Section 4.4, we present our main
results where we construct equilibrium strategies and belief through a forward-backward
recursion. In Section 4.5 we discuss existence issues and present numerical steady state
solutions. We conclude in Section 4.6.
4.1.1 Notation
We use δ(·) for the Dirac delta function. We use the notation X ∼ F to denote that the
random variable X has distribution F . For any Euclidean set S, P(S) represents the space
of probability measures on S with respect to the Borel sigma algebra. We denote by P g (or
Eg) the probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g.
For any random vectorX and event A, we use the notation sm(·|·) to denote the conditional
second moment, sm(X|A) := E[XX†|A]. For any matrices A and B, we will also use the
notation quad(·; ·) to denote the quadratic function, quad(A; B) := B†AB. We denote
trace of a matrix A by tr(A). N(xˆ,Σ) represents the vector Gaussian distribution with
mean vector xˆ and covariance matrix Σ. All inequalities in matrices are to be interpreted in
the sense of positive definitedness. All matrix inverses are interpreted as pseudo-inverses.
4.2 Model
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with 2 strategic players over a finite time
horizon T := {1, 2, . . . T} and with perfect recall. There is a dynamic state of the system
xt := (x
1
t , x
2
t ), where x
i
t ∈ X i := Rni is private type of player i at time t which is perfectly
observed by her. Player i at time t takes action uit ∈ U i := Rmi after observing u1:t−1,
which is common information between the players, and xi1:t, which it observes privately.
Thus at any time t ∈ T , player i’s information is u1:t−1, xi1:t. Players’ types evolve linearly
as
xit+1 = A
i
tx
i
t + B
i
tut + w
i
t, (4.1)
where Ait,B
i
t are known matrices. (X
1
1 , X
2
1 , (W
i
t )t∈T ) are basic random variables of the
system which are assumed to be independent and Gaussian such that X i1 ∼ N(0,Σi1) and
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W it ∼ N(0,Qi). As a consequence, types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled
Markov processes,
P (xt+1|u1:t, x1:t) = P (xt+1|ut, xt) =
2∏
i=1
Qi(xit+1|ut, xit). (4.2)
where Qi(xit+1|ut, xit) := P (wit = xit+1 −Aitxit − Bitut). At the end of interval t, player i
incurs an instantaneous cost Ri(xt, ut),
Ri(xt, ut) = u
†
tT
iut + x
†
tP
ixt + 2u
†
tS
ixt
=
[
u†t x
†
t
] [Ti Si
Si† Pi
][
ut
xt
]
, (4.3)
where Ti,Pi,Si are real matrices of appropriate dimensions and Ti,Pi are symmetric. We
define the instantaneous cost matrix Ri as Ri :=
[
Ti Si
Si† Pi
]
. Let gi = (git)t∈T be a prob-
abilistic strategy of player i, where git : (U i)t−1 × (X i)t → P(U i) such that player i plays
action uit according to distribution g
i
t(·|u1:t−1, xi1:t). Let g := (gi)i=1,2 be a strategy pro-
file of both players. The distribution of the basic random variables and their independence
structure together with the system evolution in (4.1) and players strategy profile g define a
joint distribution on all random variables involved in the dynamical process. The objective
of player i is to maximize her total expected cost
J i,g := Eg
{
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, Ut)
}
. (4.4)
With both players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic LQG game with
asymmetric information and with simultaneous moves.
4.3 Structured perfect Bayesian equilibria
In Chapter 3, we considered a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric infor-
mation, where players’ types evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov pro-
cesses. We introduced the notion of equilibria for such games in Section 3.4.1 and subse-
quently, a backward-forward algorithm was provided to find a class of PBE of the game
called structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE). In these equilibria, player i’s strat-
egy is of the form U it ∼ mit(·|pi1t , pi2t , xit) where mit : P(X 1) × P(X 2) × X i → P(U i).
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Specifically, player i’s action at time t depends on her private history xi1:t only through x
i
t.
Furthermore, it depends on the common information u1:t−1 through a common belief vec-
tor pit := (pi
1
t , pi
2
t ) where pi
i
t ∈ P(X i) is belief on player i’s current type xit conditioned on
common information u1:t−1, i.e. piit(x
i
t) := P
g(X it = x
i
t|u1:t−1).
The common information u1:t−1 was summarized into the belief vector (pi1t , pi
2
t ) fol-
lowing the common agent approach used for dynamic decentralized team problems [43].
Using this approach, player i’s strategy can be equivalently described as follows: player i at
time t observes u1:t−1 and takes action γit , where γ
i
t : X i → P(U i) is a partial (stochastic)
function from her private information xit to u
i
t of the form U
i
t ∼ γit(·|xit). These actions
are generated through some policy ψi = (ψit)t∈T , ψ
i
t : (U i)t−1 → {X i → P(U i)}, that
operates on the common information u1:t−1 so that γit = ψ
i
t[u1:t−1]. Then any policy of the
player i of the form U it ∼ git(·|u1:t−1, xit) is equivalent to U it ∼ ψit[u1:t−1](·|xit) [43].
The common belief piit is shown in Claim 3.5 of chapter 3 to be updated as
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∫
xit
piit(x
i
t)γ
i
t(u
i
t|xit)Qit(xit+1|xit, ut)dxit∫
x˜it
piit(x˜
i
t)γ
i
t(u
i
t|x˜it)dx˜it
, (4.5a)
if the denominator is not 0, and as
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∫
xit
piit(x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|xit, ut)dxit, (4.5b)
if the denominator is 0. The belief update can be summarized as,
piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, ut), (4.6)
where F¯ is independent of players’ strategy profile g. The SPBE of the game can be
found through a two-step backward-forward algorithm. In the backward recursive part, an
equilibrium generating function θ is defined based on which a strategy and belief profile
(β∗, µ∗) are defined through a forward recursion.
4.4 SPBE of the dynamic LQG game
In this section, we apply the general methodology for finding SPBE described in chapter 3,
on the specific dynamic LQG game model described in Section 4.2. We show that players’
strategies that are linear in their private types in conjunction with Gaussian beliefs, form an
SPBE of the game. We prove this result by constructing an equilibrium generating function
θ using backward recursion such that for all Gaussian belief vectors pit, γ˜t = θt[pit], γ˜
i
t is
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of the form γ˜it(u
i
t|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxi − m˜it) and satisfies (3.8). Based on θ, we construct an
equilibrium belief and strategy profile.
The following lemma shows that common beliefs remain Gaussian under linear deter-
ministic γt of the form γit(u
i
t|xit) = δ(uit − Litxit −mit).
Lemma 4.1. If piit is a Gaussian distribution with mean xˆit and covariance Σit, and γit(uit|xit) =
δ(uit − Litxit −mit) then piit+1, given by (4.5), is also Gaussian distribution with mean xˆit+1
and covariance Σit+1, where
xˆit+1 = A
i
txˆ
i
t + B
i
tut + A
i
tG
i
t(u
i
t − Litxˆit −mit) (4.7a)
Σit+1 = A
i
t(I−GitLit)†Σit(I−GitLit)Ai†t + Qi. (4.7b)
where
Git = Σ
i
tL
i†
t (L
i
tΣ
i
tL
i†
t )
−1. (4.8)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Based on previous lemma, we define φix, φ
i
s as update functions of mean and covariance
matrix, respectively, as defined in (4.7), such that
xˆit+1 = φ
i
x(xˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,L
i
t,m
i
t, ut) (4.9a)
Σit+1 = φ
i
s(Σ
i
t,L
i
t). (4.9b)
We also say,
xˆt+1 = φx(xˆt,Σt,Lt,mt, ut) (4.10)
Σt+1 = φs(Σt,Lt). (4.11)
The previous lemma shows that with linear deterministic γit , the next update of the mean
of the common belief, xˆit+1 is linear in xˆ
i
t and the control action u
i
t. Furthermore, these
updates are given by appropriate Kalman filter equations. It should be noted however that
the covariance update in (4.7b) depends on the strategy through γit and specifically through
the matrix Lit. This specifically shows how belief updates depend on strategies on the
players which leads to signaling, unlike the case in classical stochastic control and the
model considered in [16].
Now we will construct an equilibrium generating function θ using the backward re-
cursion in (3.7)–(3.9). The θ function generates linear deterministic partial functions γt,
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which, from Lemma 4.1 and the fact that initial beliefs (or priors) are Gaussian, generates
only Gaussian belief vectors (pi1t , pi
2
t )t∈T for the whole time horizon. These beliefs can be
sufficiently described by their mean and covariance processes (xˆ1t ,Σ
1
t )t∈T and (xˆ
2
t ,Σ
2
t )t∈T
which are updated using (4.7).
For t = T + 1, T, . . . , 1, we define the vectors
eit :=
x
i
t
xˆ1t
xˆ2t
 zit :=

uit
xit
xˆ1t
xˆ2t
 yit :=

u1t
u2t
x1t
x2t
xit+1
xˆ1t+1
xˆ2t+1

. (4.12)
Theorem 4.1. The backward recursion (3.7)–(3.9) admits1 a solution of the form θt[pit] =
θt[xˆt,Σt] = γ˜t where γ˜it(u
i
t|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxit − m˜it) and L˜it, m˜it are appropriately defined
matrices and vectors, respectively. Furthermore, the value function reduces to
V it (pit, x
i
t) = V
i
t (xˆt,Σt, x
i
t) (4.13a)
= quad(Vit(Σt); e
i
t) + ρ
i
t(Σt). (4.13b)
with Vit(Σt) and ρ
i
t(Σt) as appropriately defined matrix and scalar quantities, respectively.
Proof. We construct such a θ function through the backward recursive construction and
prove the properties of the corresponding value functions inductively.
(a) For i = 1, 2,∀ ΣT+1, let ViT+1(ΣT+1) := 0, ρiT+1(ΣT+1) := 0. Then ∀ xˆ1T+1, xˆ2T+1,
Σ1T+1,Σ
2
T+1, x
i
T+1 and for pit = (pi
1
t , pi
2
t ), where pi
i
t is N(xˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t),
V iT+1(piT+1, x
i
T+1) := 0 (4.14a)
= V iT+1(xˆT+1,ΣT+1, x
i
T+1) (4.14b)
= quad(ViT+1(ΣT+1), e
i
T+1) + ρ
i
T+1(ΣT+1). (4.14c)
(b) For all t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . , 1}, i = 1, 2,
Suppose V it+1(pit+1, x
i
t+1) = quad(V
i
t+1(Σt+1), e
i
t+1) + ρ
i
t+1(Σt+1) (from induction
1Under certain conditions, stated in the proof.
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hypothesis) where Vit+1 is a symmetric matrix defined recursively. Define V¯
i
t as
V¯it(Σt,Lt) :=
T
i Si 0
Si† Pi 0
0 0 Vit+1(φs(Σt,Lt))
 . (4.15)
Since Ti,Pi are symmetric by assumption, V¯it is also symmetric.
For ease of exposition, we will assume i = 1 and for player 2, a similar argument
holds. At time t, the quantity that is minimized for player i = 1 in (3.8) can be
written as
Eγ1t (·|x1t )
[
Eγ˜2t
[
R1(Xt, Ut) + V
1
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, Ut), X
1
t+1)
∣∣pit, x1t , u1t ] ∣∣pit, x1t] . (4.16)
The inner expectation can be written as follows, where γ˜2t (u
2
t |x2t ) = δ(u2t − L˜2tx2t −
m˜2t ),
Eγ˜2t
[
quad
([
T1 S1
S1† P1
]
; zit
)
+quad
(
V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t)); e
i
t+1
)
+ ρ1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))
∣∣pit, x1t , uit]
(4.17a)
= Eγ˜2t
[
quad
(
V¯1t (Σt, L˜t); y
1
t
)
+ ρ1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))
∣∣pit, x1t , u1t] (4.17b)
= quad
(
V¯1t (Σt, L˜t); D
1
t z
1
t + C
1
t
[
m1t
m˜2t
])
+ ρ1t (Σt), (4.17c)
where V¯it is defined in (4.15) and function φs is defined in (4.11); y
i
t, z
i
t are defined
in (4.12); ρit is given by
ρit(Σt) = tr
(
Σ−it quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t); J
i
t
))
+ tr(QiV i11,t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))) + ρ
i
t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t)), (4.18)
where V i11,t+1 is the matrix corresponding to x
i
t+1 in V
i
t+1 i.e. in the first row and first
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column of the matrix V it+1; and matrices D
i
t,C
i
t,J
i
t are as follows,
D1t :=

I 0 0 0
0 0 0 L˜2t
0 I 0 0
0 0 0 I
B11,t A
1
t 0 B
1
2,tL˜
2
t
A1tG
1
t + B
1
1,t 0 A
1
t (I−G1tL1t ) B12,tL˜2t
B21,t 0 0 A
2
t + B
2
2,tL˜
2
t

(4.19a)
D2t :=

0 0 L˜1t 0
I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 I 0 0
B22,t A
2
t B
2
1,tL˜
1
t 0
B12,t 0 A
1
t + B
1
1,tL˜
1
t 0
A2tG
2
t + B
2
2,t 0 B
2
1,tL˜
1
t A
2
t (I−G2tL2t )

(4.19b)
C1t :=

0 0
0 I
0 0
0 0
0 B12,t
−A1tG1t B12,t
0 B22,t

C2t :=

I 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
B21,t 0
B11,t 0
B21,t −A2tG2t

(4.20)
J1†t :=
[
0 L2t 0 I B
1
2,tL
2
t B
1
2,tL
2
t (B
2
2,t + A
2
tG
2
t )L
2
t
]†
J2†t :=
[
L1t 0 I 0 B
2
1,tL
1
t (B
1
1,t + A
1
tG
1
t )L
1
t B
2
1,tL
1
t
]†
(4.21)
where Bit =:
[
Bi1,t B
i
2,t
]
, Bi1,t,B
i
2,t are the parts of the matrix B
i
t that corresponds
to u1t , u
2
t respectively. Let D
1
t =:
[
Du1t D
e1
t
]
where Du1t is the first column matrix
of D1t corresponding to u
1
t and D
e1
t is the matrix composed of remaining three column
matrices of D1t corresponding to e
1
t . The expression in (4.17c) is averaged with
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respect to u1t using the measure γ
1
t (·|x1t ) and minimized in (3.8) over γ1t (·|x1t ). This
minimization can be performed component wise leading to a deterministic policy
γ˜1t (u
1
t |x1t ) = δ(u1t−L˜1tx1t−m˜1t ) = δ(u1t−u1∗t ), assuming that the matrix D˜u1†t V¯1t D˜u1t
is positive definite2. In that case, the unique minimizer u1∗t = L˜
1
tx
1
t+m˜
1
t can be found
by differentiating (4.17c) w.r.t. u1†t and equating it to 0, resulting in the equation,
0 = 2
[
I 0 0 0
]
D˜1†t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜1t z
1
t + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
(4.22a)
0 = D˜u1†t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜u1t u
1∗
t + D˜
e1
t e
1
t + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
(4.22b)
0 = D˜u1†t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜u1t (L˜
1
tx
1
t + m˜
1
t ) + [D˜
e1
t ]1x
1
t + [D˜
e1
t ]23xˆt + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
,
(4.22c)
where [Dei]1 is the first matrix column of Dei, [Dei]23 is the matrix composed of the
second and third column matrices of Dei. Matrices D˜it, C˜
i
t are obtained by substitut-
ing L˜it, G˜
i
t in place of L
i
t,G
i
t in the definition of D˜
i
t, C˜
i
t in (4.20), respectively, and
G˜it is the matrix obtained by substituting L˜
i
t in place of L
i
t in (4.8).
Thus (4.22c) is equivalent to (3.8) and with a similar analysis for player 2, it implies
that L˜it is solution of the following algebraic fixed point equation,(
D˜ui†t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)D˜
ui
t
)
L˜it = −D˜ui†t V¯it(Σt, L˜t)[D˜eit ]1. (4.23a)
For player 1, it reduces to,T111 +
 B
1
1,t
A1tG
1
t + B
1
1,t
B21,t

†
V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))
 B
1
1,t
A1tG
1
t + B
1
1,t
B21,t

 L˜1t
= −
S1†11 +
 B
1
1,t
A1tG
1
t + B
1
1,t
B21,t

†
V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))
A
1
t
0
0

 , (4.23b)
and a similar expression holds for player 2.
2This condition is true if the instantaneous cost matrix Ri =
[
Ti Si
Si† Pi
]
is positive definite and can be
proved inductively in the proof by showing thatVit and V¯
i
t are positive definite.
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In addition, m˜t can be found from (4.22c) as[
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t D˜
u1
t 0
0 D˜u2†t V¯
2
t D˜
u2
t
]
m˜t = −
[
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t [D˜
e1
t ]23
D˜u2†t V¯
2
t [D˜
e2
t ]23
]
xˆt −
[
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t C˜
1
t
D˜u2†t V¯
2
t C˜
2
t
]
m˜t
(4.24a)
m˜t = −
[[
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t D˜
u1
t 0
0 D˜u2†t V¯
2
t D˜
u2
t
]
+
[
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t C˜
1
t
D˜u2†t V¯
2
t C˜
2
t
]]−1 [
D˜u1†t V¯
1
t [D˜
e1
t ]23
D˜u2†t V¯
2
t [D˜
e2
t ]23
]
xˆt
(4.24b)
=: M˜txˆt =:
[
M˜1t
M˜2t
]
xˆt, (4.24c)
Finally, the resulting cost for player i is,
V it (pit, x
i
t) = V
i
t (xˆt,Σt, x
i
t) (4.25a)
:= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t);
[
D˜uit D˜
ei
t
] [L˜itxit + M˜itxˆt
eit
]
+ C˜itM˜txˆt
)
+ ρit(Σt)
(4.25b)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t); D˜
ui
t (L˜
i
tx
i
t + M˜
i
txˆt) + D˜
e1
t e
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜txˆt
)
+ ρit(Σt)
(4.25c)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t);
([
D˜uit L˜
i
t D˜
ui
t M˜
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜t
]
+ D˜eit
)
eit
)
+ ρit(Σt)
(4.25d)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t); F˜
i
te
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt) (4.25e)
= quad
(
F˜i†t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)F˜
i
t; e
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt) (4.25f)
= quad
(
Vit(Σt); e
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt), (4.25g)
where,
F˜it :=
[
D˜uit L˜
i
t D˜
ui
t M˜
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜t
]
+ D˜eit (4.26a)
Vit(Σt) := F˜
i†
t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)F˜
i
t. (4.26b)
Since V¯it is symmetric, so is V
i
t. Thus the induction step is completed.
Taking motivation from the previous theorem and with slight abuse of notation, we
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define
γ˜t = θt[pit] = θt[xˆt,Σt] (4.27)
and since γ˜it(u
i
t|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxit − m˜it), we define a reduced mapping (θL, θm) as
θLit [xˆt,Σt] = θ
Li
t [Σt] := L˜
i
t and θ
mi
t [xˆt,Σt] := m˜
i
t, (4.28)
where L˜it does not depend on xˆt and m˜
i
t is linear in xˆt and is of the form m˜
i
t = M˜
i
txˆt.
Now we construct the equilibrium strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) through the for-
ward recursion in (3.12)–(3.14), using the equilibrium generating function θ ≡ (θL, θm).
(a) Let µ∗,i1 [φ](x
i
1) = N(0,Σ
i
1).
For t = 1, 2 . . . T − 1,∀u1:t ∈ Hct+1, if µ∗,it [u1:t−1] = N(xˆit,Σit), let L˜it = θLit [Σt], m˜it =
θmit [xˆt,Σt] = M˜
i
txˆ, then
(b) For ∀xi1:t ∈ (X i)t
β∗,it (u
i
t|u1:t−1xi1:t) := δ(uit − L˜itxit − M˜itxˆt) (4.29a)
µ∗,it+1[u1:t] := N(xˆ
i
t+1,Σ
i
t+1) (4.29b)
µ∗t+1[u1:t](x
1
t , x
2
t ) :=
2∏
i=1
µ∗,it+1[u1:t](x
i
t), (4.29c)
where xˆit+1 = φ
i
x(xˆ
i
t, L˜
i
t, m˜
i
t, ut) and Σ
i
t+1 = φ
i
s(Σ
i
t, L˜
i
t).
Theorem 4.2. (β∗, µ∗) constructed above is a PBE of the dynamic LQG game.
Proof. The strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) is constructed using the forward recursion
steps (3.12)–(3.14) on equilibrium generating function θ, which is defined through back-
ward recursion steps (3.7)–(3.9) implemented in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Thus the result
is directly implied by Theorem 3.1 in Chapter 3.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Existence
In the proof of Theorem 4.1, D˜u1†t V¯1t D˜
u1
t was assumed to be positive definite. This can be
achieved if Ri is positive definite, through which it can be easily shown inductively in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 that the matrices V1t , V¯
1
t are also positive definite.
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Constructing the equilibrium generating function θ involves solving the algebraic fixed
point equation in (4.23) for L˜t for all Σt. In general, the existence is not guaranteed,
as is the case for existence of γ˜t in (3.8) for general dynamic games with asymmetric
information. At this point, we don’t have a general proof for existence. However, in the
following lemma, we provide sufficient conditions on the matrices Ait,B
i
t,T
i,Si,Pi,Vit+1
and for the case mi = 1, for a solution to exist.
Lemma 4.2. For m1 = m2 = 1, there exists a solution to (4.23) if and only if for i = 1, 2,
∃ li ∈ Rni such that li†∆i(l1, l2)li ≥ 0, or sufficiently ∆i(l1, l2) + ∆i,†(l1, l2) is positive
definite, where ∆i, i = 1, 2 are defined in Appendix B.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.5.2 Steady state
In Chapter 3, we presented the backward/forward methodology to find SPBE for finite time-
horizon dynamic games, and specialized that methodology in this chapter, in Section 4.4,
to find SPBE for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information, where equilibrium
strategies are linear in players’ types. It requires further investigation to find the conditions
for which the backward-forward methodology could be extended to infinite time-horizon
dynamic games, with either expected discounted or time-average, cost or reward crite-
ria. Such a methodology for infinite time-horizon could be useful to characterize steady
state behavior of the games. Specifically, for time homogenous dynamic LQG games with
asymmetric information (where matrices Ai,Bi are time independent), under the required
technical conditions for which such a methodology is applicable, the steady state behav-
ior can be characterized by the fixed point equation in matrices (Li,Σi,Vi)i=1,2 through
(4.11), (4.23b) and (4.26), where the time index is dropped in these equations, i.e.
1. Σ = φs(Σ, L˜)
2.
(
D˜ui†V¯i(Σ, L˜)D˜ui
)
L˜i = −D˜ui†V¯i(Σ, L˜)[D˜ei]1
3. Vi(Σ) := F˜i†V¯i(Σ, L˜)F˜i,
where V¯i(Σ, L˜) :=
T
i Si 0
Si† Pi 0
0 0 Vi(φs(Σ, L˜))
.
It is important to note that the steady state behavior for a general dynamic game with
asymmetric information and independent types, if it exists, would involve functional fixed
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point equations in value functions (V i(·))i, on domain as space of pit. However, for the
LQG case, it reduces to a fixed point equation in (V i(Σ))i, i.e. value functions evaluated
at specific Σ, as shown in the above mentioned algebraic fixed point equation in matrices,
which represents a significant reduction in complexity.
4.5.2.1 Numerical examples
We take a leap by assuming that methodology extends for infinite horizon problem for the
model considered in this section, and present numerically found solutions for steady state
as follows. We assume Bi = 0 which implies that the state process (X it)t∈T is uncontrolled.
1. For i = 1, 2, mi = 1, ni = 2,Ai = 0.9I,Bi = 0,Qi = I,
T1 =
[
I 1
4
I
1
4
I 0
]
, T2 =
[
0 1
4
I
1
4
I I
]
, P1 =
[
I 0
0 0
]
,
P2 =
[
0 0
0 I
]
, S1 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, S2 =
[
0 0
0 1
]
. (4.30)
This gives a symmetric solution, for i = 1, 2,
L˜i = −
[
1.062 1.062
]
,Σi =
[
3.132 −2.132
−2.132 3.132
]
. (4.31)
2. For i = 1, 2, mi = 2, ni = 2,A1 =
[
0.9 0
0 0.8
]
,A2 = 0.9I, and Bi,Ti,Pi,Si used
as before with appropriate dimensions, then,
L˜1 = −
[
1.680 1.600
0.191 0.286
]
, L˜2 = −
[
1.363 1.363
1.363 1.363
]
Σ1 = I, Σ2 =
[
3.132 −2.132
−2.132 3.132
]
. (4.32)
It is interesting to note that for player 1, where A1 does not weigh the two com-
ponents equally, the corresponding L˜1 is full rank, and thus reveals her complete
private information. Whereas for player 2, where A2 has equal weight components,
the corresponding L˜2 is rank deficient, which implies, at equilibrium player 2 does
not completely reveal her private information. Also it is easy to check from (4.7b)
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that with full rank L˜i matrices, steady state Σi = Qi.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a two-player dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information
and perfect recall where players’ private types evolve as independent controlled Markov
processes. We show that under certain conditions, there exist strategies that are linear in
players’ private types which, together with Gaussian beliefs, form a PBE of the game. We
show this by specializing the general methodology developed in chapter 3 to our model.
Specifically, we prove that (a) the common beliefs remain Gaussian under the strategies
that are linear in players’ types where we find update equations for the corresponding mean
and covariance processes; (b) using the backward recursive approach of chapter 3, we com-
pute an equilibrium generating function θ by solving a fixed point equation in linear deter-
ministic partial strategies γt for all possible common beliefs and all time epochs. Solving
this fixed point equation reduces to solving a matrix algebraic equation for each realization
of the state estimate covariance matrices. Also, the cost-to-go value functions are shown to
be quadratic in private type and state estimates. This result is one of the very few results
available on finding signaling perfect Bayesian equilibria of a truly dynamic game with
asymmetric information .
4.7 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 4.1)
This lemma could be interpreted as Theorem 2.30 in [31, Ch. 7] with appropriate matrix
substitution where specifically, their observation matrix Ck should be substituted by our
Lk. We provide an alternate proof here for convenience.
piit+1 is updated from pi
i
t through (4.5). Since pi
i
t is Gaussian, γ
i
t(u
i
t|xit) = δ(uit −Litxit −
mit) is a linear deterministic constraint and kernel Q
i is Gaussian, thus piit+1 is also Gaus-
sian. We find its mean and covariance as follows.
We know that X it+1 = A
i
tX
i
t + B
i
tUt +W
i
t . Then,
E[X it+1|piit, γit, ut] = E[AitX it + BitUt +W it |piit, γit, ut] (4.33a)
= AitE[X it |piit, γit, ut] + Bitut (4.33b)
= AitE[X it |LitX it = uit −mit] + Bitut (4.33c)
where (4.33b) follows because W it is zero mean. Suppose there exists a matrix G
i
t such
86
that X it −GitLitX it and LitX it are independent. Then
E[X it
∣∣LitX it = uit −mit] = E[X it −GitLitX it + GitLitX it ∣∣LitX it = uit −mit] (4.34a)
= E[X it −GitLitX it ] + Git(uit −mit) (4.34b)
= xˆit + G
i
t(u
i
t − Litxˆit −mit), (4.34c)
where Git satisfies
E[(X it −GitLitX it)(LitX it)†] = E[(X it −GitLitX it)]E[(LitX it)†] (4.35a)
(I−GitLit)E[X itX i†t ]Li†t = (I−GitLit)E[X it ]E[X i†t ]Li†t (4.35b)
(I−GitLit)(Σit + xˆitxˆi†t )Li†t = (I−GitLit)xˆitxˆi†t Li†t (4.35c)
Git = Σ
i
tL
i†
t (L
i
tΣ
i
tL
i†
t )
−1. (4.35d)
Σit+1 =sm
(
AitX
i
t − E[AitX it |LitX it = uit −mit]|LitX it = uit −mit
)
+ Qi (4.36a)
Now
sm
(
X it − E[X it |LitX it = uit −mit]|LitX it = uit −mit
)
(4.37a)
= sm
(
(X it −GitLitX it)
−(E[X it −GitLitX it |LitX it = uit −mit])|LitX it = uit −mit
)
(4.37b)
= sm
(
(X it −GitLitX it)− (E[X it −GitLitX it ])
)
(4.37c)
= sm
(
(I−GitLit)(X it − E[X it ])
)
(4.37d)
= (I−GitLit)Σit(I−GitLit)† (4.37e)
4.8 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 4.2)
We prove the lemma for player 1 and the result follows for player 2 by similar arguments.
For the scope of this appendix, we define B¯1t =
B
1
1,t
B11,t
B21,t
 and for any matrix V, we define
V∗i,Vi∗ as the ith column and the ith row of V, respectively. Then the fixed point equation
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(4.23) can be written as,
0 =
[
T111 + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V122,t+1(A
1
tG
1
t )+
B¯1†t V
1
∗2,t+1A
1
tG
1
t + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V12∗,t+1B¯
1
t + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t
]
L1t
+
[
S1†11 + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V121,t+1A
1
t + B¯
1†
t V
1
∗1,t+1A
1
t
]
. (4.38)
It should be noted that Vit+1 is a function of Σt+1 which is update through Σt and Lt.
Substituting G1t = Σ
1
tL
1†
t (L
1
tΣ
1
tL
1†
t )
−1 and multiplying (4.38) by (L1tΣ
1
tL
1†
t ) from left and
(Σ1tL
1†
t ) from right, we get
0 = L1tΣ
1
t
[
L1†t (T
1
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t )L
1
t + A
1†
t V
1
22,t+1A
1
t
+ L1†t (B¯
1†
t V
1
∗2,t+1A
1
t + S
1†
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
∗1,t+1A
1
t )
+(A1†t V
1
2∗,t+1B¯
1
t + A
1†
t V
1
21,t+1A
1
t )L
1
t
]
Σ1tL
1†
t (4.39)
Let L¯it = L
i
t(Σ
i
t)
1/2, A¯it = A
i
t(Σ
i
t)
1/2,
Λ1a(Lt) := T
1
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t (4.40a)
Λ1b(Lt) := A¯
1†
t V
1
22,t+1A¯
1
t (4.40b)
Λ1c(Lt) := B¯
1†
t V
1
∗2,t+1A¯
1
t + S
1†
11(Σ
1
t )
1/2 + B¯1†t V
1
∗1,t+1A¯
1
t (4.40c)
Λ1d(Lt) := A¯
1†
t V
1
2∗,t+1B¯
1
t + A¯
1†
t V
1
21,t+1A¯
1
t . (4.40d)
Then,
0 = L¯1t L¯
1†
t Λ
1
a(Lt)L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
tΛ
1
b(Lt)L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t Λ
1
c(Lt)L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
tΛ
1
d(Lt)L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t (4.41)
Since m=1, Λ1a is a scalar. Let L¯
i
t = λ
ili†, where λi = ||L¯it||2 and li is a normalized vector
and t1 = T11. Moreover, since the update of Σt in (4.7b), is scaling invariant, V1t+1 only
depends on the directions l = (l1, l2). Then, (4.41) reduces to the following quadratic
equation in λ1
(λ1)2Λ1a(l) + λ
1(Λ1c(l)l
1 + l1†Λ1d(l)) + l
1†Λ1b(l)l
1 = 0. (4.42)
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There exists a real-valued solution3 of this quadratic equation in λ1 if and only if
(Λc(l)l
1 + l1†Λ1d(l))
2 ≥ 4Λ1a(l)l1†Λ1b(l)l1 (4.43a)
l1†(Λ1†c (l)Λ
1
c(l) + Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1†
d (l) + 2Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1
c(l)− 4Λ1a(l)Λ1b(l))l1 ≥ 0. (4.43b)
Let ∆1(l) := (Λ1†c (l)Λ
1
c(l) + Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1†
d (l) + 2Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1
c(l)− 4Λ1a(l)Λ1b(l)). (4.44)
There exists a solution to the fixed point equation (4.23) if and only if ∃l1, l2 ∈ Rn such
that l1†∆1(l)l1 ≥ 0, or sufficiently ∆1(l) + ∆1†(l) is positive definite.
3Note that a negative sign of λ1 can be absorbed in l1.
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CHAPTER 5
Decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic
games
5.1 Introduction
In a classical Bayesian learning problem, there is a single decision maker who makes noisy
observations of the state of nature and based on these observations eventually learns the
true state. It is well known that through the likelihood ratio test, the probability of error
converges exponentially fast to zero as the number of observations increases, and the true
state is learnt asymptotically. With the advent of the Internet, in today’s world, there are
many scenarios, where strategic agents with different observations (i.e. information sets)
interact with each other to learn the state of the system that in turn affects the spread of
information in the system. One such scenario was studied in the seminal paper [8], where
authors studied the occurrence of fads in a social network, which was later generalized
in [52]. The authors in [8] and [52] study the problem of learning over a social network,
where observations are made sequentially by different decision makers (users) who act
strategically based on their own private information and actions of previous users. It is
shown that herding (information cascade) can occur in such a case where a user discards its
own private information and follows the majority action of its predecessors (fads in social
networks). As a result, all future users repeat this behavior and a cascade occurs. While a
good cascade is desirable, there’s a positive probability of a bad cascade that hurts all the
users in the community. Thus from a social (i.e. team) perspective, it is highly desirable to
avoid such situations. Avoiding such bad cascades is an active area of research, for example
[1] and [32] propose alternative learning models that aim at avoiding such bad cascades.
There are however more general scenarios, such as cases where players participate (take
actions and receive rewards) in the game more than once, deterministically or randomly
through an exogenous or even an endogenous process. Furthermore there are practical
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scenarios where players may be adversarial to each others’ learning (e.g. dynamic zero-
sum games). Studying such scenarios may reveal more interesting and richer equilibrium
behaviors such as cascading phenomena, not manifested in the models considered in the
current literature.
In this chapter, we study this problem from two different perspectives. Our first goal is
to study this problem to design incentives to align social or team objective with strategic
players’ objectives, which implicitly promotes learning to continue in the game. In the
second part, we seek to study learning dynamics of the system in a more general set up
where players participate in the game throughout the duration of the game and not just
once, as is the case for the models considered in the current literature. Since this requires
studying PBE of the game, we also generalize the methodology described in chapter 3 to
find perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) for the case where players’ do not observe their
types perfectly, but instead make noisy observations. This methodology then serves as a
framework for studying information cascades in a more general setting.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we study the problem of incentive
design. Specifically, in Section 5.2.1, we present the model. In Section 5.2.2, we formu-
late the team problem as an instance of decentralized stochastic control and characterize
its optimal policies. In Section 5.2.3, we consider the case with strategic users and design
incentives for the users to align their objective with team objective. In Section 5.3, we con-
sider a more general dynamic model. In Section 5.3.1, we provide a methodology to find
a class of PBEs for such games. In Section 5.3.4, we specialize that methodology to study
a specific Bayesian learning game with partially controlled observations. We characterize
information cascades for this problem. While this example, limited as it is, provide analy-
sis and intuition on the learning dynamics in decentralized games, it serves as motivation
for exploring a vast landscape of the scenarios that can be studied through the proposed
methodology. We conclude in Section 5.4.
5.1.1 Notation
For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (βit)i∈N , where probability of action a
i
t con-
ditioned on a1:t−1, xi1:t is given by β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, xi1:t), we use the short hand notation
β−it (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x−i1:t) to represent
∏
j 6=i β
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, xj1:t). We use the terms users and buy-
ers interchangeably.
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5.2 Incentive design
In this section we first consider the problem of designing incentives so that the players’
objectives can be aligned to the team objective. Most of the models of this problem consid-
ered in the literature assume time-invariant state of the nature. However, there are situations
where the state of the nature, for e.g. popularity of a product, could change over time, as
a consequence of endogenous or exogenous factors (for e.g., owing to the entering of a
new competitor product or improvement/drop in quality of the product). In this section,
we consider a simple scenario where users want to buy a product online. The product is
either good or bad (popular or unpopular) and the value of the product (state of the system)
is represented by Xt, which is changing exogenously via a Markov chain. The state is
not directly observed by the users but each user receives a private noisy observation of the
current state. Each user makes a decision to either buy or not buy the product, based on its
private observation and action profile of all the users before its.
The strategic user wants to maximize its expected value of the product. However, its
optimal action could be misaligned with the team objective of maximizing the expected
average reward of the users. Thus the question we seek to address is whether it is possible
to incentivize the users to align them with the team objective. To incentivize users to con-
tribute in the learning, we assume that users can also send reports (at some cost) about their
private observations after deciding to buy or to not buy the product. The idea is similar
to leaving a review of the product. Thus users could be paid to report their observations
to enrich the information of the future participants. Our objective is to use principles of
mechanism design to construct the appropriate payment transfers (taxes/subsidies). Al-
though, our approach deviates from general principles of mechanism design for solution of
the game problem to exactly coincide with the team problem. However, this analysis could
provide the bounds on the gap and an acceptable practical design.
5.2.1 Model
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system over infinite horizon. There is a product
whose value varies over time as (a slowly varying) discrete time Markov process (Xt)t,
where Xt takes value in the set {0, 1}; 0 represents that product was bad (has low intrinsic
value) and 1 represents and product is good (has high intrinsic value).
P (x1) = Qˆ(x1) (5.1a)
P (xt|x1:t−1) = Qx(xt|xt−1), (5.1b)
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such that Qx(xt|xt−1) =  if xt 6= xt−1, for 0 <  < 1.
There are countably infinite number of exogenously selected, selfish buyers that act
sequentially and exactly once in the process. Buyer t makes a noisy observation of the
value of the product at time t, vt ∈ V 4= {0, 1}, through a binary symmetric channel with
crossover probability p such that these observations are conditionally independent across
users given the system state (i.e. noise is i.i.d.) i.e. P (vt|x1:t, v1:t−1) = Qv(vt|xt) = p
if vt 6= xt. Based on actions of previous buyers and its private observation buyer t takes
two actions: at ∈ A 4= {0, 1}, which correspond to either buying or not buying the good,
and bt ∈ B 4= {∗, 1} where * represents not reporting its observation and 1 represent
reporting truthfully. Based on these actions and the state of the system, the buyer gets
reward R(xt, at, bt) where
R(xt, at, bt) = −c · I(bt = 1) +

1/2, xt = 1, at = 1
−1/2, xt = 0, at = 1
0, at = 0
, (5.2)
where c is cost of reporting its observation truthfully. The actions are publicly observed by
future buyers whereas the observations (vt)t are private information of the buyers.
5.2.2 Team problem
In this section, we study the team problem where the buyers are cooperative and want
to maximize the expected average reward per unit time for the team. At time t, buyer
t’s information consists of its private information vt and publicly available information
a1:t−1, b1:t−1. It takes action at, bt though a (deterministic) policy gt : At−1 × Bt−1 × V →
A× B as
(at, bt) = gt(a1:t−1, b1:t−1, vt). (5.3)
The objective as a team (or for a social planner) is to maximize the expected average reward
per unit time for all the users i.e.
J
4
= sup
g
lim sup
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
Eg{R(Xt, At, Bt)}. (5.4)
Since the decision makers (i.e. the buyers) have different information sets, this is an
instance of a decentralized stochastic control problem. We use techniques developed in [42]
to find structural properties of the optimal policies. Specifically, we equivalently view the
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system through the perspective of a common agent that observes at time t, the common
information a1:t−1, b1:t−1 and takes action γt : V → A × B, which is a partial function
that, when acted upon buyer’s private information vt, generates its action (at, bt). The
common agent’s actions (γt)t are taken through common agent’s strategy ψ = (ψ)t as
γt = ψt[a1:t−1, b1:t−1] where ψt : At−1 × Bt−1 → (V → A× B). The corresponding
common agent’s problem is
J c
4
= sup
ψ
lim sup
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
Eψ{R(Xt, At, Bt)}. (5.5)
This procedure transforms the original decentralized stochastic control problem of buy-
ers to a centralized stochastic control problem of the common agent, which is a POMDP.
Then, an optimal policy of the common agent can be translated to optimal policies for
the buyers. In order to characterize common agent’s optimal policy, we find an infor-
mation state for the common agent’s problem. We define a belief state pit at time t as
a probability measure on current state of the system given the common information i.e.
pit(xt)
4
= Pψ(xt|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t). The following lemma shows that the common agent
faces a Markov decision problem (MDP).
Lemma 5.1. (Πt,Γt)t is a controlled Markov process with state Πt and action Γt such that
Pψ(pit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) =P (pit+1|pit, γt) (5.6a)
Eψ{R(Xt, At, Bt)|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t} =E{R(Xt, At, Bt)|pit, γt} (5.6b)
= : Rˆ(pit, γt) (5.6c)
and there exists an update function F , independent of ψ such that pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at, bt).
Proof. See Appendix A
Lemma 5.1 implies that for common agent’s problem, it can summarize the common
information a1:t−1, b1:t−1 in the belief state pit. Furthermore there exists an optimal policy
for the common agent of the form θt : P(X ) → (V → A× B) that can be found as
solution of the following dynamic programming equation in the space of public beliefs pit
as, ∀pi, γ∗ = θ[pi] is the maximizer in the following equation
ρ+ V (pi) = max
γ
Rˆ(pi, γ) + E{V (Π′)|pi, γ}, (5.7)
where the distribution of pi′ is given through the kernel P (·|pi, γ) in (5.6a) and ρ ∈ R, V :
P(X ) → R are solutions of the above fixed point equation. Based on this public belief pit
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and its private information xt, each user t takes actions as
(at, bt) = mt(pit, vt) = θt[pit](vt). (5.8)
We note that since states, actions and observations belong to a binary set, there are six-
teen partial functions γ possible that are shown in Table 5.1 below where γ =
[
γ(vt = 0)
γ(vt = 1)
]
=[
at, bt(vt = 0)
at, bt(vt = 1)
]
. Since the common belief is updated as pit+1 = F (pit, γ, γ(vt)) and vt is
binary valued, there exist two types of γ functions: learning (γL) and non-learning (γNL).
γL leads to update of belief through F (·) in (5.6a) that is informative of the private observa-
tion vt, whereas γNL leads to uninformative update of belief. Eight of them are dominated
in reward, for example vt need not be reported if it is revealed through at, or if it can be
revealed indirectly by absence of reporting.
Table 5.1: Learning vs. Non-learning γ
γL
[
0, ∗
1, ∗
] [
1, ∗
0, ∗
] [
1, 1
1, ∗
] [
1, ∗
1, 1
] [
0, 1
0, ∗
] [
0, ∗
0, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
0, 1
1, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
1, 1
0, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
0, 1
1, ∗
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
1, 1
0, ∗
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
0, ∗
1, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
1, ∗
0, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
0, 1
0, 1
]
 
 
 @
@
@
[
1, 1
1, 1
]
γNL
[
0, ∗
0, ∗
] [
1, ∗
1, ∗
]
5.2.3 Game problem
We now consider the case when the buyers are strategic. As before, buyer t observes public
history a1:t−1, b1:t−1 and its private observation vt and thus takes its actions as (at, bt) =
gt(a1:t−1, b1:t−1, vt). Its objective is to maximize its expected reward
Jt = max
gt
Eg{R(Xt, At, Bt)}. (5.9)
Since all buyers have different information, this defines a dynamic game with asymmetric
information. An appropriate solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) [45]
that requires specification of an assessment (g∗t , µ
∗
t )t of strategy and belief profile where
g∗t is the strategy of buyer t, g
∗
t : At−1 × Bt−1 × V → P(A × B), and µ∗t is a belief
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as a function of buyer t’s history on the random variables not observed by it till time t
i.e. µ∗t : At−1 × Bt−1 × V → P(X t × V t). In general, finding a PBE is hard [45]
since it involves solving a fixed point equation in strategies and beliefs that are function of
histories, although there are few cases where there exists an algorithm to find them [41,57].
For this problem, since users act exactly once in the game and are thus myopic, it can be
found easily in a forward inductive way, as in [8, 52]. Moreover, a belief on Xt, µ∗t (x)
4
=
P g
∗
(Xt = x|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, vt), x ∈ {0, 1} is sufficient and any joint belief consistent with
µ∗t (x) along with equilibrium strategy profile g
∗ constitute a PBE. For any history, users
compute a belief equilibrium strategy depending on vt and pit as
γ∗t = φ[pit] = arg max
γt
Rˆ(pit, γt). (5.10)
With φ[·] defined through (5.10), for every history (a1:t−1, b1:t−1, vt), pit is updated using
forward recursion through pit+1 = F (pit, φ(pit), at, bt) and equilibrium strategies are gener-
ated as g∗t (a1:t−1, b1:t−1, vt) = φ[pit](vt). Finally the beliefs µ
∗
t can be easily derived from
pit and private information vt through Bayes rule.
In order to compare the team optimal and game equilibrium policies, we numerically
solve (5.7) using value iteration to find team optimal policy, shown in Figure 5.1, for pa-
rameters p = 0.2,  = 0.001 and c = 0.05. For the same parameters, Figure 5.2 shows
equilibrium policy for a strategic user that solves (5.10).
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Figure 5.1: Decentralized team optimal policy
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Figure 5.2: Strategic optimal policy
5.2.3.1 Incentive design for strategic users
Our goal is to align each buyers’ objective with the team objective. In order to do so, we
introduce incentives (tax or subsidy) for user t, t : P(X ) × A × B → R such that its
effective reward is given by Rˆ(pit, γt)− t(pit, at, bt).
We first note that a user can not internalize social reward through incentives as is done
in a pivot mechanism [5, 11, 14, 58], i.e. there does not exist an incentive mechanism such
that the following equation could be true
Rˆ(pi, γ)− t(pi, a, b) = Rˆ(pi, γ) + E{V (Π′)|pi, γ} (5.11)
i.e. t(pi, a, b) = −E{V (Π′)|pi, γ} (5.12)
for V (·) defined in (5.7) and the distribution of pi′ is given through the kernel P (·|pi, γ)
in (5.6a). The left side of (5.11) is buyers’ effective reward and right side is the objective of
the team problem as in (5.7). Such a design is not feasible because while t(·) can depend
only on public observations (pi, a, b), the second term in the RHS of (5.11) depends on γ as
well, which is not observed by the designer.
We observe in Figures 5.1, 5.2 that team optimal policy coincides with the strategic
optimal policy for a significant range of pi(1). Let S be the set consisting of pi(1) where the
team optimal policy coincides with the strategic optimal policy and Sc be the complement
set. In order to align the two policies, we consider the following incentive design such that
a user is paid c units by the system planner whenever the public belief pi(1) belongs to the
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set Sc, and user reports its observation,
t(pi, at, bt) = −c · I(pi(1) ∈ Sc)I(bt = 1). (5.13)
These payments are made after any report for enforcement purposes. This is agreed upon,
i.e., system planner commits to this. With these incentives, the optimal policy of the strate-
gic user is shown in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4 compares the time average reward achieved
through these policies, found through numerical results. This shows that the gap between
the team objective and the one with incentives is small. Intuitively, this occurs because the
buyers learn the true state of the system relatively quickly (exponentially fast) compared to
the expected time spent by the Markov processXt in any state. Equivalently, the time spent
by the process (Πt(1))t in the set Sc is small. Yet it is crucial for the social objective that
learning occurs in this region. Also in Figure 5.4, the gap between the mechanism (includ-
ing incentives) and the mechanism where incentives are subtracted signifies the expected
average payment made by the designer, which is relatively small.
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Figure 5.3: Strategic optimal policy with incentives
5.3 General framework for decentralized Bayesian learn-
ing
An indispensable tool for studying cascades is a framework for finding equilibria for these
dynamical systems involving strategic players with different information sets, which are
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Figure 5.4: Expected time average cost comparison for different policies
modeled as dynamic games with asymmetric information. Appropriate equilibrium con-
cepts for such games include perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium,
trembling hand equilibrium [13, 45]. Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a
strategy and a belief profile of all players where the equilibrium strategies are optimal
given the beliefs and the beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy profile using
Bayes’ rule (whenever possible). For the games considered in the current literature includ-
ing [1, 8, 32, 52], since every buyer participates only for one time period and it does not
have any future individually, finding PBE reduces to solving a straightforward, one-shot
optimization problem. However, for general dynamic games with asymmetric information,
finding PBE is hard, since it requires solving a fixed point equation in the space of strat-
egy and belief profiles across all users and all time periods. There is no known sequential
decomposition methodology for finding PBE for such games.
In chapter 3 we presented a methodology for finding PBE for a general class of dynamic
games where players types’ evolve as conditionally independent Markov processes and are
observed perfectly by the corresponding players. In this section, we first generalize that
model to the case when players’ do not perfectly observe their types; rather they make in-
dependent, noisy observations. Specifically, we consider a dynamical system where a finite
number of players have different types, that evolve as conditionally independent Markov
processes. Players do not observe their own types, rather make observations about them
and their instantaneous rewards are a function of their current action and everyone’s types.
Unlike other scenarios discussed before, the proposed general framework can incorporate,
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as special cases, scenarios where players participate in the game more than once, determin-
istically or randomly through an exogenous or endogenous process, and/or scenarios where
players may be adversarial to each others’ learning.
5.3.1 Model
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N strategic players in the set N :=
{1, 2, . . . N}, over a finite time horizon T := {1, 2, . . . T} and with perfect recall. The
system state is xt := (x1t , x
2
t , . . . x
N
t ), where x
i
t ∈ X i is the type of player i at time t.
Players’ types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes such that
P (xt|x1:t−1, a1:t−1) = P (xt|xt−1, at−1) (5.14a)
=
N∏
i=1
Qix(x
i
t|xit−1, at−1), (5.14b)
where at = (a1t , . . . , a
N
t ) and a
i
t is the action taken by player i at time t. Player i does not
observe its type perfectly, rather it makes a private observation wit ∈ W i at time t, where
all observations are conditionally independent across time and across players given xt and
at−1, in the following way, ∀t ∈ 1, . . . T ,
P (w1:t|x1:t, a1:t−1) =
t∏
n=1
N∏
i=1
Qiw(w
i
n|xin, an−1). (5.15)
Player i takes action ait ∈ Ai at time t upon observing a1:t−1, which is common information
among players, and wi1:t, which is player i’s private information. The sets Ai,X i,W i
are assumed to be finite. Let gi = (git)t be a probabilistic strategy of player i where
git : (×Nj=1Aj)t−1 × (W i)t → P(Ai) such that player i plays action ait according to Ait ∼
git(·|a1:t−1, wi1:t). Let g := (gi)i∈N be a strategy profile of all players. At the end of interval
t, player i gets an instantaneous reward Ri(xt, at). The objective of player i is to maximize
its total expected reward
J i,g := Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, At)
]
. (5.16)
With all players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic game D with im-
perfect and asymmetric information, and with simultaneous moves. Although this model
considers all N players acting at all times, it can accommodate cases where at each time t,
players are chosen through an endogenously defined (controlled) Markov process. This can
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be done by introducing a nature player 0, who perfectly observes its type process (X0t )t,
has reward function zero, and plays actions a0t = w
0
t = x
0
t . Equivalently, all players pub-
licly observe a controlled Markov process (X0t−1)t, and a player selection process could
be defined through this process. For instance, let X 0 = A0 = N , ∀i, Rit(xt, at) = 0 if
xit 6= a0t , and Q(xit+1|xit, at) = Q(xit+1|xit, aa
0
t
t ). Here, in each period only one player acts
in the game who is selected through an internal, controlled Markov process.
5.3.2 PBE of the game D
In this section, we provide a methodology to find PBE of the game D in the domain of
strategies that is time-invariant. Specifically, we seek equilibrium strategies that are struc-
tured in the sense that they depend on players’ common and private information through
belief states. In order to achieve this, at any time t, we summarize player i’s private infor-
mation, wi1:t, in the belief ξ
i
t , and its common information, a1:t−1, in the belief pit, where ξ
i
t
and pit are defined as follows. For a strategy profile g, let ξit(x
i
t) := P
g(xit|a1:t−1, wi1:t) be
the belief of player i on its current type conditioned on its information, where ξit ∈ P(X i).
Also we define piit(ξ
i
t) := P
g(ξit|a1:t−1) as common belief on ξit based on the common in-
formation of the players, a1:t−1, where piit ∈ P(P(X i)). As it will be shown later, due to
the independence of types and their evolution as independent controlled Markov processes,
for any strategy profile of the players, joint beliefs on types can be factorized as product of
their marginals i.e. pit(ξt) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t). To accentuate this independence structure, we
define pit ∈ ×i∈NP(X i) as vector of marginal beliefs where pit := (piit)i∈N .
We now generate a player’s strategy in a canonical way, as is done in decentralized team
problems [43]. Using this approach, the player i’s actions are generated as follows: player
i at time t observes a common belief vector pit and takes action γ
i
t , where γ
i
t : P(X i) →
P(Ai) is a partial (stochastic) function from its private belief ξit to ait of the form γit(ait|ξit).
These actions are generated through some policy θi = (θit)t∈T , θ
i
t : ×i∈NP(P(X i)) →
{P(X i)→ P(Ai)}, that operates on the common belief vector pit so that γit = θit[pit].
Then, the generated policy of the form Ait ∼ θit[pit](·|ξit) is also a policy of the form Ait ∼
git(·|a1:t−1, wi1:t) for an appropriately defined g. Although this is not relevant to our proofs,
similar to facts 3.1 and 3.2, it can be shown that these structured policies form a sufficiently
large set, which provides a good motivation for restricting attention to such equilibria.
Indeed, it can be shown that policies g are outcome equivalent to policies of type θ, i.e.,
any expected total reward profile of the players that can be generated through a general
policy profile g can also be generated through some policy profile θ. In the following
Lemma, we present the update functions of the private belief ξit and the public belief pi
i
t.
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Lemma 5.2. There exist update functions F i, independent of players’ strategies g, such
that
ξit+1 = F
i(ξit, w
i
t+1, at), (5.17)
and update functions F¯ i, independent of θ, such that
piit+1 = F¯
i(piit, γ
i
t, at). (5.18)
Thus pit+1 = F¯ (pit, γt, at) where F¯ is appropriately defined through (5.18).
Proof. The proofs are straightforward using Bayes’ rule and the fact that players’ type
and observation histories, X i1:t,W
i
1:t, are conditionally independent across players given
the action history a1:t−1, and are provided in Appendix B.
Based on (5.17), we define an update kernel of ξit in (5.56) as Q
i(ξit+1|ξit, at) :=
P (ξit+1|ξit, at). We now present the backward-forward algorithm to find PBE of the game
D, where strategies of the players are of type θ. The algorithm resembles the one presented
in chapter 3 for perfectly observable types.
5.3.2.1 Backward recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈N ,t∈T and a se-
quence of functions
(V it )i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where V
i
t : ×i∈NP(P(X i)) × P(X i) → R, in a backward recursive
way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ ×i∈NP(P(X i)), ξiT+1 ∈ P(X i),
V iT+1(piT+1, ξ
i
T+1) := 0. (5.19)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ ×i∈NP(P(X i)), let θt[pit] be generated as follows.
Set γ˜t = θt[pit], where γ˜t is the solution, if it exists
1, of the following fixed point
1Similar to the existence results shown in [46], it can be shown that in the special case where agent i’s
instantaneous reward does not depend on its private type xit, and for uncontrolled types and observations,
the fixed point equation always has a type-independent, myopic solution γ˜it(·), since it degenerates to a best-
response-like equation.
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equation, ∀i ∈ N , ξit ∈ P(X i),
γ˜it(·|ξit) ∈ arg max
γit(·|ξit)
Eγit(·|ξit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F¯ (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣ξit} ,
(5.20)
where expectation in (5.20) is with respect to random variables (Xt, At,Ξit+1) through
the measure
ξt(xt)pi
−i
t (ξ
−i
t )γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)γ˜−it (a−it |ξ−it )Qi(ξit+1|ξit, at), F is defined in Lemma 5.5 and
Qi is defined in (5.56). Furthermore, set
V it (pit, ξ
i
t) := Eγ˜
i
t(·|ξit)γ˜−it , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F¯ (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣ξit} . (5.21)
It should be noted that (5.20) is a fixed point equation where the maximizer γ˜it appears
in both, the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation. However, it is not the
outcome of the maximization operation as in a best response equation similar to that of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
5.3.2.2 Forward recursion
Based on θ defined above in (5.19)–(5.21), we now construct a set of strategies β∗ and
beliefs µ∗ for the game D in a forward recursive way, as follows. As before, we will use
the notation µ∗
t
[a1:t−1] := (µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1])i∈N and µ∗t [a1:t−1] can be constructed from µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]
as µ∗t [a1:t−1](ξt) =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
i
t) where µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1] is a belief on ξit .
1. Initialize at time t = 0,
µ∗0[φ](ξ0) :=
N∏
i=1
δQix(ξ
i
0). (5.22)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, i ∈ N , ∀a1:t, wi1:t
β∗,it (a
i
t|a1:t−1, wi1:t) := θit[µ∗t [a1:t−1]](ait|ξit) (5.23a)
µ∗,it+1[a1:t] := F¯ (µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1], θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]], at) (5.23b)
where F¯ is defined in Lemma 5.5.
Theorem 5.1. A strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗), constructed through backward/forward
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recursive algorithm is a PBE of the game, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, wi1:t), βi,
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
≥ Eβit:T β∗,−it:T , µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
. (5.24)
Proof. The proof relies crucially on the specific fixed point construction in (5.20) and the
conditional independence structure of types and observations, and is provided in Appendix
C.
5.3.3 Informational cascades
In the following definition, we define informational cascades for a dynamic game with
asymmetric information, and for a given PBE of that game, as those public histories of the
game for which the future actions of the players are predictable.
Definition 5.1. For a given2 strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) that constitute a PBE of the
game, and for any time t and a sequence of action profile at:T , informational cascades can
be defined as set of public histories hct of the game such that at h
c
t and under (β
∗, µ∗), actions
at:T are played almost surely, irrespective of players’ future private history realizations, i.e.
for a PBE (β∗, µ∗) and time t and actions at:T , cascades are defined by
Cat:Tt := {hct ∈ Hct | ∀i,∀n ≥ t,∀hin that are consistent with hct ,
that occur with non-zero probability, β∗,in (a
i
n|hin) = 1}. (5.25)
We also call an informational cascade a constant informational cascade if action profiles in
the cascade are constant across time, i.e. for time t and action profile a, constant cascades
are defined by
Cat := {hct ∈ Hct | ∀i, ∀n ≥ t,∀hin that are consistent with hct ,
that occur with non-zero probability, β∗,in (a
i|hin) = 1}. (5.26)
For the general games considered in this section, which are dynamic game with asym-
metric information and independent types, a more useful definition of cascades is the fol-
lowing.
2A stronger notion of informational cascade could be defined for all PBE of the game.
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Definition 5.2. For a given equilibrium generating function θ, and for time t and actions
at:T , informational cascades are defined by the sets {C˜at:Tt }t=1,...T+1, which are defined as
follows. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1,
C˜T+1 :=
{
All possible common beliefs piT+1
}
(5.27)
C˜at:Tt :=
{
pit | ∀i, ∀ξit ∈ supp(piit), θit[pit](ait|ξit) = 1 and F¯ (pit, θt[pit], at) ∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1
}
(5.28)
A constant informational cascade for time t and actions profile a is defined as,
C˜T+1 :=
{
All possible common beliefs piT+1
}
(5.29)
C˜at :=
{
pit | ∀i, ∀ξit ∈ supp(piit), θit[pit](ai|ξit) = 1 and F¯ (pit, θt[pit], a) ∈ C˜at+1
}
(5.30)
In the following lemma, we show the connection between the two definitions.
Lemma 5.3. Let (β∗, µ∗) be an SPBE of a dynamic game with asymmetric information
and independent types, generated by an equilibrium generating function θ. Then ∀t, at:T ,
(µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) = Cat:Tt (5.31)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 5.1. Let (β∗, µ∗) be an SPBE of a dynamic game with asymmetric information
and independent types, generated by an equilibrium generating function θ. Then ∀t, a,
(µ∗t )
−1(C˜at ) = Cat (5.32)
5.3.4 Specific learning model
We now consider a specific model that captures the learning aspect in a dynamic setting
with strategic agents and decentralized information. The model is similar in spirit to the
model considered in [8, 52] except we consider a finite number of players who take action
in every epoch and stay in the game throughout the entire duration of the game. We assume
that players’ types are uncontrollable and static i.e. Qix(x
i
t+1|xit, at) = δxit(xit+1), where
X i = {−1, 1}. Since the set of types, X i is has cardinality 2, the measure ξit can be suf-
ficiently described by ξit(1). Henceforth, in this section and in Appendix 5.10, with slight
abuse of notation, we denote ξit(1) by ξ
i
t ∈ [0, 1]. In each epoch t, player i makes inde-
pendent observation wit about its type whereW i = {−1, 1}, through an observation kernel
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of the form Qiw(w
i
t|xit, ait−1), which does not depend on a−it−1. Based on its information, it
takes action ait, where Ai = {0, 1}, and earns an instantaneous reward given by
Ri(x, ait) = a
i
t
(
λxi + λ¯
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
)
, (5.33)
where λ ∈ [0, 1], λ¯ = 1 − λ. This scenario can thought of the case when players’ types
represent their talent, capabilities or popularity, and a player makes a decision to either
choose (action = 1) or not choose (action = 0) these players, where its instantaneous re-
ward depends on some combination of the capabilities of all the players. We note that the
instantaneous reward does not depend on other players’ actions but on their types, and thus
learning players’ types is an important aspect of the problem.
5.3.4.1 Partially controlled observations
We consider the case where observations of the player i do depend on other players’ actions,
i.e. the observation kernel is of the form Qiw(w
i
t|xit, ait−1). These observations are made
through a binary symmetric channel such that Qiw(1|1, ai) = Qiw(−1| − 1, ai) = 1 − pai
and Qiw(−1|1, ai) = Qiw(1| − 1, ai) = pai , where p1 ≤ p0 < 1/2. This model implies that
taking action 1 can improve the quality of a player’s future private belief. In this case, the
update functions of ξit and pi
i
t in (5.17), (5.18) reduce to
ξit+1 = F
i(ξit, w
i
t+1, a
i
t), (5.34a)
piit+1 = F¯
i(piit, γ
i
t, a
i
t), (5.34b)
and (5.20) in the backward recursion reduces to
γ˜it(·|ξit) ∈ arg max
γit(·|ξit)
∑
ait
aitγ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)(λ(2ξit − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−it − 1))
+ Eγit(·|ξit)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
V it+1(F¯ (pit, γ˜t, A
−i
t ),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣ξit} , (5.35)
For the learning model considered in Section 5.3.4, we characterize constant informa-
tional cascades through a time invariant set Cˆa of common beliefs pi, defined as follows.
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Let
Cˆa :=
{
pi | ∀i, 1
2
− λ¯
λ
(ξˆ−i − 1
2
) ≥ 1 if ai = 0,
1
2
− λ¯
λ
(ξˆ−i − 1
2
) ≤ 0 if ai = 1
}
(5.36)
where
ξˆ−i :=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Epij [Ξj]. (5.37)
In the following theorem we show that the set Cˆa defined in (5.36) characterizes a set of
constant informational cascades for this problem. Specifically, we show that Cˆa ⊂ C˜a.
Theorem 5.2. If, for some time t0 and action profile a, pit0 ∈ Cˆa, then ∀t ≥ t0, pit ∈ Cˆa and
solutions of (5.35) satisfy γ˜it(a
i|ξit) = 1 ∀ξit ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for t0 ≤ t ≤ T , V it is given
by
V it (pi
−i
t , ξ
i
t) = (T − t+ 1)(λ(2ξit − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−it − 1))ai ∀pit ∈ Cˆa. (5.38)
Proof. See Appendix F.
5.3.5 Discussion
We characterize informational cascades by those histories of the game where learning stops
for the players as a whole. Conceptually, they could be thought of as absorbing states of
the system. It begets questions regarding the dynamics of the process that could lead to
those states, for example hitting times of such sets and absorption probabilities. For the
simplified problem considered in [8], cascades can be characterized as the fixed points of
common belief update function, so that the common belief gets “stuck” once it reaches that
state. It was shown that cascades eventually occur with probability 1 for that model. For the
learning model considered in this section, common beliefs pit still evolve in a cascade, al-
though uninformatively, i.e., their evolution is directed by the primitives of the process and
not on the new random variables being generated, namely, players’ private observations.
Also, if players’ observations are informative, they asymptotically learn their true types,
i.e., their private beliefs converge to their true types. One trivial case when cascades could
occur for this model is if the system was born in a cascade, i.e., the initial common belief,
based on the prior distributions, is in cascades, pi1 ∈ Cˆa. In general, a cascade could occur
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as follows. Suppose all players have low types (i.e. xi = −1), but they get atypical ob-
servations initially, which lead them into believing that their types are high (xi = 1). This
information is conveyed through their actions, which leads the public belief into a cascade.
Interestingly, even though players eventually learn their true types, yet they remain in a
(bad) cascade, each player believing that others have high types on average.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied Bayesian learning dynamics of specific dynamic games with
asymmetric information. We first considered an ergodic sequential buyers’ game where a
countable number of strategic buyers buy a product exactly once in the game. We model the
team problem as an instance of decentralized stochastic control problem and characterize
structure of optimum policies. When users are strategic, it is modeled as a dynamic game
with asymmetric information. We show that for some set pit ∈ S that occurs with high
probability, the strategic optimal policy coincides with the team optimal policy. Thus only
outside this set, i.e., when pit ∈ Sc, buyers need to be incentivized to report their observa-
tions so that higher average rewards can be achieved for the whole team. Since numerically
Sc occurs with low probability, the expected incentive payments are low. However, even
though infrequent, these incentives help in the learning for the team as a whole, specifically
for the future users. This suggests that using such a mechanism for the more general case
could be a useful way to bridge the gap between strategic and team objectives.
In second part, we considered a more general scenario where players could participate
in the game throughout the duration of the game. Players’ types evolved as conditionally
independent controlled Markov processes and players made noisy observations of their
types. We first presented a sequential decomposition methodology to find SPBE of the
game. We then studied a specific learning model and characterized information cascades
using the general methodology described before. In general, the methodology presented
serves as a framework for studying learning dynamics of decentralized systems with strate-
gic agents. Some important research directions include characterization of cascades for
specific classes of models, studying convergent learning behavior in such games including
the probability and the rate of “falling” into a cascade, and incentive or mechanism design
to avoid bad cascades.
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5.5 Appendix A (Proof of Lemma 5.1)
Claim 5.1. There exists an update function F , independent of ψ such that
pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at, bt).
Proof. Fix ψ
pit+1(xt+1) =P
ψ(xt+1|a1:t, b1:t, γ1:t) (5.39a)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt+1, xt|a1:t, b1:t, γ1:t) (5.39b)
=
∑
xt
Pψ(xt|a1:t, b1:t, γ1:t)Qˆ(xt+1|xt) (5.39c)
Now,
Pψ(xt|a1:t, b1:t, γ1:t) = P
ψ(xt, at, bt|a1:t−1b1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt, at, bt|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t) (5.40a)
= Pψ(xt|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t)×∑
vt
Pψ(at, bt, vt|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t, xt)∑
xˆt
P (xˆt, at, bt|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t) (5.40b)
=
Pψ(xt|a1:t−1b1:t−1, γ1:t−1)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)∑
xˆt
Pψ(xˆt|a1:t−1b1:t−1, γ1:t−1)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xˆt)
(5.40c)
where first part in numerator in (5.40c) is true since given policy ψ, γt can be computed as
γt = ψt(a1:t−1, b1:t−1).
We conclude that
P (xt|a1:t, γ1:t) =
pit(xt)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)∑
xˆt
pit(xˆt)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xˆt)
, (5.41)
thus,
pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at, bt) (5.42)
where F is independent of policy ψ.
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Claim 5.2. (Πt,Γt)t is a controlled Markov process with state Πt and action Γt such that
Pψ(pit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) = P (pit+1|pit, γt) (5.43)
Eψ{R(Xt, At, Bt)|a1:t−1, b1:t−1, γ1:t} = E{R(Xt, At, Bt)|pit, γt} (5.44)
=: Rˆ(pit, γt) (5.45)
Proof.
Pψ(pit+1|pi1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
at,bt
Pψ(pit+1, at, bt|pi1:t, γ1:t) (5.46a)
=
∑
at,bt
1{F (pit,γt,at,bt)}(pit+1)
∑
vt
Pψ(at, bt, vt|pi1:t, γ1:t) (5.46b)
=
∑
at,bt,xt
1{F (pit,γt,at,bt)}(pit+1)P
ψ(xt|pi1:t, γ1:t)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)
(5.46c)
=
∑
at,bt,xt
pit(xt)1{F (pit,γt,at,bt)}(pit+1)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)
(5.46d)
= P (pit+1|pit, γt) (5.46e)
E(R(Xt, At, Bt)|pi1:t, γ1:t) =
∑
xt,at,btvt
R(xt, at, bt)P (xt, at, bt, vt|pi1:t, γ1:t) (5.47a)
=
∑
xt,at,bt
R(xt, at, bt)P (xt|pi1:t, γ1:t)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)
(5.47b)
=
∑
xt,at,bt
R(xt, at, bt)pit(xt)
∑
vt
I{γt(vt)}(at, bt)Qv(vt|xt)
(5.47c)
= Rˆ(pit, γt) (5.47d)
5.6 Appendix B (Proof of Lemma 5.2)
Lemma 5.4. There exists an update function F i, independent of g, such that
ξit+1 = F
i(ξit, w
i
t+1, at). (5.48)
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Proof. We first prove the following Claim on conditional independence of x1:t, w1:t given
a1:t−1.
Claim 5.3. For any policy profile g and ∀t,
P g(x1:t, w1:t|a1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t, w
i
1:t|a1:t−1) (5.49)
Proof.
P g(x1:t, w1:t|a1:t−1)
=
P g(x1:t, w1:t, a1:t−1)∑
x1:t,w1:t
P g(x1:t, w1:t, a1:t−1)
(5.50a)
=
∏N
i=1Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)∑
x1:t,w1:t
∏N
i=1 Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)
(5.50b)
=
∏N
i=1Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)∏N
i=1
∑
xi1:t,w
i
1:t
Qix(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)
(5.50c)
=
N∏
i=1
Qix(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)∑
xi1:t,w
i
1:t
Qix(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|xi1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, wi1:n−1)Qix(xin+1|an, xin)
Qiw(w
i
n+1|xin+1, an)
(5.50d)
=
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t, w
i
1:t|a1:t−1) (5.50e)
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Now for any g we have,
ξit+1(x
i
t+1)
4
= P g(xit+1|a1:t, wi1:t+1) (5.51a)
=
∑
xit
P g(xit, at, x
i
t+1, w
i
t+1|a1:t−1, wi1:t)∑
x˜it+1x˜
i
t
P g(x˜it, at, w
i
t+1, x˜
i
t+1|a1:t−1, wi1:t)
(5.51b)
=
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)P
g(a−it |a1:t−1, wi1:t, xit)Qix(xit+1|at, xit)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)∑
x˜it+1x˜
i
t
ξit(x˜
i
t)P
g(a−it |a1:t−1, wi1:t, x˜it)Qix(x˜it+1|at, x˜it)Qiw(wit+1|x˜it+1, at)
,
(5.51c)
where (5.51c) is true because ait is a function of (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) and thus term involving
can be cancelled in numerator and denominator. We now consider the quantity
P g(a−it |a1:t−1wi1:txit)
P g(a−it |a1:t−1, wi1:t, xit) =
∑
w−i1:t
P g(a−it , w
−i
1:t|a1:t−1, wi1:t, xit) (5.52a)
=
∑
w−i1:t
P g(w−i1:t|a1:t−1, wi1:t, xit)
∏
j 6=i
gjt (a
j
t |a1:t−1, wj1:t) (5.52b)
=
∑
w−i1:t
P g
−i
(w−i1:t|a1:t−1)
∏
j 6=i
gjt (a
j
t |a1:t−1, wj1:t) (5.52c)
= P g
−i
(a−it |a1:t−1) (5.52d)
where (5.52c) follows from Claim 5.3 in Appendix A since w−i1:t is conditionally indepen-
dent of (wi1:t, x
i
t) given a1:t−1 and is only a function of g
−i. Since this term does not depend
on xit, it gets cancelled in the final expression of ξ
i
t+1
ξit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|xit, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)∑
x˜it+1
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|xit, at)Qiw(wit+1|x˜it+1, at)
. (5.53)
Thus the claim of the Lemma follows. Based on this claim, we can conclude that
ξit(x
i
t) = P
g(xit|a1:t−1, wi1:t) = P (xit|a1:t−1, wi1:t). (5.54)
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Also, based on the update of ξit in (5.48), we define an update kernel
Qi(ξit+1|ξit, at) := P (ξit+1|ξit, at) (5.55)
=
∑
xit,x
i
t+1,w
i
t+1
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|xit, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)IF (ξit,wit+1,ait)(ξit+1)
(5.56)
Lemma 5.5. There exists an update function F¯ of pit, independent of ψ
piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, at) (5.57)
Proof.
pit+1(ξt+1)
= Pψ(ξt+1|a1:t, γ1:t+1) (5.58a)
= Pψ(ξt+1|a1:t, γ1:t) (5.58b)
=
∑
ξt,xt,xt+1,wt+1
Pψ(ξt, xt, at, xt+1, wt+1, ξt+1|a1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
ξt
Pψ(ξt, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t) (5.58c)
=
∑
ξt,xt,xt+1,wt+1
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)Qix(xit+1|xit, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)
IF i(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1)∑
ξt
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)
(5.58d)
=
N∏
i=1
∑
ξit,x
i
t,x
i
t+1,w
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)Qix(xit+1|xit, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)
IF i(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1)∑
ξit
piit(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξit)
(5.58e)
Thus we have,
pit+1 =
N∏
i=1
F¯ (piit, γ
i
t, at) (5.58f)
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5.7 Appendix C (Proof of Theorem 5.1)
Proof. We prove (5.24) using induction and from results in Lemma 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 proved
in Appendix D. For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (a1:T−1, wi1:T ) ∈ HiT , βi
Eβ
∗,i
T β
∗,−i
T , µ
∗
T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T} = V iT (µ∗T [a1:T−1], ξiT ) (5.59a)
≥ EβiT β∗,−iT , µ∗T [a1:T−1] {Ri(XT , AT )∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T}
(5.59b)
where (5.59a) follows from Lemma 5.8 and (5.59b) follows from Lemma 5.6 in Appendix
D.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ Hit+1, βi,
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
≥ Eβit+1:T β∗,−it+1:T , µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (5.60a)
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Then ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, wi1:t) ∈ Hit, βi, we have
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξit) (5.61a)
≥ Eβitβ∗,−it , µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) +W
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξit+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (5.61b)
= Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:tW it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(5.61c)
≥ Eβitβ∗,−it , µ∗t [a1:t−1] {Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:Tµ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(5.61d)
= Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(5.61e)
= Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
, (5.61f)
where (5.61a) follows from Lemma 5.8, (5.61b) follows from Lemma 5.6, (5.61c) follows
from Lemma 5.8, (5.61d) follows from induction hypothesis in (5.60a) and (5.61e) follows
from Lemma 5.7. Moreover, construction of θ in (5.20), and consequently definition of β∗
in (5.23a) are pivotal for (5.61e) to follow from (5.61d).
We note that µ∗ satisfies the consistency condition of [13, p. 331] from the fact that (a)
for all t and for every common history a1:t−1, all players use the same belief µ∗t [a1:t−1] on
xt and (b) the belief µ∗t can be factorized as µ
∗
t [a1:t−1] =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1] ∀a1:t−1 ∈ Hct
where µ∗,it is updated through Bayes’ rule (F¯ ) as in Lemma 5.5 in Appendix A.
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5.8 Appendix D
Lemma 5.6. ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, wi1:t) ∈ Hit, βit
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξit) ≥
Eβitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], β∗t (·|a1:t−1, ·), At),Ξit+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} .
(5.62)
Proof. We prove this Lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, βˆit , aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t such that
Eβˆitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξit+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t}
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆit). (5.63)
We will show that this contradicts the definition of W it in (5.21).
Construct γˆit(a
i
t|ξit) =
{
βˆit(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t) ξit = ξˆit
arbitrary otherwise.
Then for aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t, we have
V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆit) =
max
γit(·|ξˆit)
Eγit(·|ξˆit)β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξit+1)
∣∣ξˆit}
(5.64a)
≥ Eγˆit(·|ξˆit)β∗,−it , µ∗t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξit+1)
∣∣ξˆit}
(5.64b)
=
∑
ξ−it ,at,ξt+1
{
Ri(xt, at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), ξit+1)
}
×
ξˆit(x
i
t)ξ
−i
t (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [aˆ1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )γˆ
i
t(a
i
t|ξˆit)β∗,−it (a−it |aˆ1:t−1, ξ−it )Qi(ξit+1|ξˆit, at) (5.64c)
=
∑
ξ−it ,at,ξt+1
{
Ri(xt, at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), ξit+1)
}
×
ξˆit(x
i
t)ξ
−i
t (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [aˆ1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )βˆ
i
t(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |aˆ1:t−1, ξ−it )Qi(ξit+1|ξˆit, at)
(5.64d)
= Eβˆitβ
∗,−i
t ,µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) (5.64e)
+V it+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β∗t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X it+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t} (5.64f)
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆit) (5.64g)
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where (5.64a) follows from the definition of V it in (5.21), (5.64d) follows from definition
of γˆit and (5.64g) follows from (5.63). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 5.7. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ Hit+1 and βit
Eβit:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
= Eβit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (5.65)
Thus the above quantities do not depend on βit .
Proof. Essentially this claim stands on the fact that µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t] can be updated from
µ∗,−it [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t and at, as µ
∗,−i
t+1 [a1:t] =
∏
j 6=i F¯ (µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t , at) as in Lemma 5.5.
Since the above expectations involve random variables Xt+1:T , At+1:T ,, we consider
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](xt+1:T , at+1:T
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1).
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](xt+1:T , at+1:T
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1)
=
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](at, xt+1, w
i
t+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](at, wit+1
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t) (5.66a)
=
Nr1
Dr1
(5.66b)
We consider the numerator and the denominator separately. The numerator in (5.66a) is
given by
Nr1 =
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](xt, ξ
−i
t
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)βit(ait|a1:t−1, wi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, ξ−it )
Qx(xt+1|xt, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t+1, xt:t+1)
(5.66c)
=
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t
ξt(xt)µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, wi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, ξ−it )Qx(xt+1|xt, at)
Qiw(w
i
t+1|xit+1, at)P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t+1, xt+1)
(5.66d)
where (5.66d) follows from the fact that probability on (at+1:T , x2+t:T ) given a1:t, wi1:t+1,
xt:t+1, µ∗t [a1:t−1] depends on a1:t, w
i
1:t+1, xt+1, µ
∗
t+1[a1:t] through β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T . Similarly,
the denominator in (5.66a) is given by
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Dr1 =
∑
x˜t,ξ˜
−i
t ,x˜
i
t+1
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t (x˜t, ξ
−i
t |a1:t−1, wi1:t)βit(ait|a1:t−1, wi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, ξ˜−it )
Qix(x˜
i
t+1|x˜it, at)Qiw(wit+1|x˜it+1, at) (5.66e)
=
∑
x˜t,ξ˜
−i
t ,x˜
i
t+1
ξit(x˜
i
t)ξ˜
−i
t (x˜
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ˜
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, wi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, ξ˜−it )
Qix(x˜
i
t+1|x˜it, at)Qiw(wit+1|x˜it+1, at) (5.66f)
By canceling the terms βit(·) in the numerator and the denominator, (5.66a) is given by
Nr2
Dr2
× P βit+1:T β∗,−it+1:T , µ∗t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t+1, xt+1) (5.66g)
where
Nr2 =
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t
ξt(xt)µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ−it )Qx(xt+1|xt, at)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)
(5.66h)
Dr2 =
∑
x˜t,ξ˜
−i
t ,x˜
i
t+1
ξit(x˜
i
t)ξ˜
−i
t (x˜
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ˜
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ˜−it )Qix(x˜it+1|x˜it, at)
Qw(w
i
t+1|x˜it+1, at) (5.66i)
which can be written as
Nr3
Dr3
× P βit+1:T β∗,−it+1:T , µ∗t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t+1, xt+1) (5.66j)
where
Nr3 =
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|xit, ait)Qiw(wit+1|xit+1, at)×∑
x−it ,ξ
−i
t
ξ−it (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ−it )Q−ix (x−it+1|x−it , at)
Dr3 =
∑
x˜it,x˜
i
t+1
ξit(x˜
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|x˜it, at)Qw(wit+1|x˜it+1, at)×∑
x˜−it ,ξ˜
−i
t
ξ˜−it (x˜
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ˜
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ˜−it ) (5.66k)
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which is equal to
= ξt+1(xt+1)µ
∗,−i
t+1 [a1:t](ξ
−i
t+1)P
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t, xt+1) (5.66l)
= P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t](xt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, wi1:t+1), (5.66m)
Lemma 5.8. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , a1:t−1 ∈ Hct , wi1:t ∈ (W i)t
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξit) = Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T ,µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
. (5.67)
Proof. We prove the Lemma by induction. For t = T ,
Eβ
∗,i
T β
∗,−i
T , µ
∗
T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T}
=
∑
x−iT aT
Ri(xT , aT )ξT (xT )µ
∗
T [a1:T−1](ξ
−i
T )β
∗,i
T (a
i
T |a1:T−1, ξiT )β∗,−iT (a−iT |a1:T−1, ξ−iT )
(5.68a)
= V iT (µ
∗
T
[a1:T−1], ξiT ), (5.68b)
where (5.68b) follows from the definition of V it in (5.21) and the definition of β
∗
T in the
forward recursion in (5.23a).
Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ Hit+1
V it+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t], ξ
i
t+1) = Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (5.69)
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Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, wi1:t) ∈ Hit, we have
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(5.70a)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T , µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(5.70b)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξit+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (5.70c)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξit+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (5.70d)
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξit), (5.70e)
where (5.70b) follows from Lemma 5.7 in Appendix D, (5.70c) follows from the induction
hypothesis in (5.69), (5.70d) follows because the random variables involved in expectation,
X−it , At, X
i
t+1 do not depend on β
∗,i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T and (5.70e) follows from the definition of β
∗
t
in the forward recursion in (5.23a), the definition of µ∗t+1 in (5.23b) and the definition of
V it in (5.21).
5.9 Appendix E (Proof of Lemma 5.3)
Proof. We will prove the result by induction on t. The result is vacuously true for T + 1.
Suppose it is also true for t+ 1, i.e.
(µ∗t+1)
−1(C˜at+1:Tt+1 ) = Cat+1:Tt+1 . (5.71)
We show that the result holds true for t. In the following two cases, we show that if there
exists an element in one set, it also belongs to the other. From the contrapositive of the
statement, if one is empty, so is the other.
Case 1. We prove (µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) ⊂ Cat:Tt
Let hct ∈ (µ∗t )−1(C˜at:Tt ). We will show that hct ∈ Cat:Tt .
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Since hct ∈ (µ∗t )−1(C˜at:Tt ), this implies µ∗t [hct ] ∈ C˜at:Tt . Then by the definition of
C˜at:Tt , ∀i, ∀ξit ∈ supp(µ∗,it [hct ]), θit[µ∗t [hct ]](ait|ξit) = 1. Since ξit(xit) = P (xit|hit) ∀xit,
µ∗,it [h
c
t ](ξ
i
t) = P
θ(ξit|hct) ∀ξit and β∗,it (ait|hit) = θit[µ∗t [hct ]](ait|ξit) by the definition
of β∗, this implies ∀i, β∗,it (ait|hit) = 1, ∀hit that are consistent with hct and occur
with non-zero probability.
Also since µ∗t [h
c
t ] ∈ C˜at:Tt , this implies F¯ ([µ∗t [hct ], θt[µ∗t [hct ]], at) ∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1 by defi-
nition of C˜at:Tt . Thus µ∗t+1[hct , at] ∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1 , since µ∗t+1[hct , at] =
F¯ ([µ∗t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t [h
c
t ]], at) by definition. Using the induction hypothesis, (h
c
t , at) ∈
Cat+1:Tt+1 , which implies ∀i, β∗,in (ain|hin) = 1, ∀n ≥ t + 1,∀hin that are consistent
with (hct , at) and occur with non-zero probability.
The above two facts conclude that ∀i, β∗,in (ain|hin) = 1, ∀n ≥ t,∀hin that are
consistent with hct and occur with non-zero probability, which implies h
c
t ∈ Cat:Tt
by the definition of Cat:Tt .
Case 2. We prove (µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) ⊃ Cat:Tt .
Let hct ∈ Cat:Tt . We will show that µ∗t [hct ] ∈ C˜at:Tt .
Since hct ∈ Cat:Tt , this implies ∀i, β∗,it (ait|hit) = 1, ∀hit that are consistent with hct
and occur with non-zero probability. Since β∗,it (ait|hit) = θit[µ∗t [hct ]](ait|ξit), by the
definition of β∗, where ξit(x
i
t) = P (x
i
t|hit) ∀xit, this implies ∀i, θit[µ∗t [hct ]](ait|ξit) =
1,∀ξit ∈ supp(µ∗,it [hct ]), where µ∗,it [hct ](ξit) = P θ(ξit|hct) ∀ξit .
Also, since hct ∈ Cat:Tt , it is implied by the definition of Cat:Tt that (hct , at) ∈ Cat+1:Tt+1 .
This implies µ∗t+1[h
c
t , at] ∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1 by the induction hypothesis. Since, by defini-
tion, µ∗t+1[h
c
t , at] = F¯ ([µ
∗
t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t [h
c
t ]], at), this implies F¯ ([µ
∗
t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t [h
c
t ]], at)
∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1 .
Since we have shown that ∀i, θit[µ∗t [hct ]](ait|ξit) = 1,∀ξit ∈ supp(µ∗t [hct ]) and
F¯ ([µ∗t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t [h
c
t ]], at) ∈ C˜at+1:Tt+1 , this implies µ∗t [hct ] ∈ C˜at:Tt by the definition of
C˜at:Tt .
The above two cases complete the induction step.
5.10 Appendix F (Proof of Theorem 5.2)
Proof. We prove this by induction on t0. For t0 = T , (5.35) reduces to
γ˜iT (·|ξiT ) ∈ arg max
γiT (·|ξiT )
∑
aiT
aiTγ
i
T (a
i
T |ξiT )(λ(2ξiT − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iT − 1)), (5.72)
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and since piT ∈ Cˆa, it is easy to verify that γ˜iT (ai|ξiT ) = 1, ∀ξiT ∈ [0, 1] and thus V iT (pi−iT , ξiT )
= (λ(2ξiT − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iT − 1))ai. This establishes the base case.
Now, suppose the claim is true for t0 = τ+1 i.e. if piτ+1 ∈ Cˆa, then ∀t ≥ τ+1, pit ∈ Cˆa
and γ˜it(a
i|ξit) = 1 ∀ξit ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for τ + 1 ≤ t ≤ T , V it is given by
V it (pi
−i
t , ξ
i
t) = (T − t+ 1)(λ(2ξit − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−it − 1))ai ∀pit ∈ Cˆa. (5.73)
Then if piτ ∈ Cˆa, then γ˜iτ (ai|ξiτ ) = 1 ∀ξiτ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies (5.35) since,
γ˜iτ (·|ξiτ ) ∈ arg max
γiτ (·|ξiτ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξiτ )(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1))
+ Eγiτ (·|ξiτ )γ˜
−i
τ , piτ
{
V iτ+1(F (pi
−i
τ , γ˜
−i
τ , A
−i
τ ),Ξ
i
τ+1)
∣∣ξiτ} (5.74)
∈ arg max
γiτ (·|ξiτ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξiτ )(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1))
+ Eγiτ (·|ξiτ )γ˜
−i
τ , piτ
{
(T − τ)(λ(2Ξiτ+1 − 1) + λ¯(2Ξˆ−iτ+1 − 1))ai|ξiτ
}
(5.75)
∈ arg max
γiτ (·|ξiτ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξiτ )(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1))
+ (T − τ)(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1))ai (5.76)
∈ arg max
γiτ (·|ξiτ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξiτ )(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1)), (5.77)
where (5.75) follows from the fact that F (piτ , γ˜τ , aτ ) ∈ Ca ∀aτ , as shown in Claim 5.4,
and induction hypothesis, (5.76) follows from Claim 5.4 and Claim 5.5 and (5.77) follows
from the fact that the second term does not depend on γiτ (·|ξiτ ). This also shows that
V iτ (pi
−i
τ , ξ
i
τ ) = (T − τ + 1)(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ−iτ − 1))ai, (5.78)
which completes the induction step.
Claim 5.4. Expectation of piit+1 under non-informative γ˜it of the form γ˜it(ai|ξit) = 1 ∀ξit ∈
[0, 1], remains the same as expectation of piit, i.e.,
E{Ξit+1(1)|piit, γ˜it, ai} = E{Ξit(1)|piit} (5.79)
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Proof.
E{Ξit+1(1)|piit, γ˜it, ai}
=
∑
ξit+1(1)
ξit+1(1)F¯
i(piit, γ˜
i
t, a
i)(ξit+1(1)) (5.80)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,ξit+1(1)
ξit+1(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)γ˜it(a
i
t|ξit)Qiw(wit+1|xi, at)IF i(ξit,wit+1,at)(1)(ξit+1(1))∑
ξit,x
i,wit+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)γ˜it(a
i
t|ξit)
(5.81)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,wit+1,ξ
i
t+1(1)
ξit+1(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ai)IF i(ξit,wit+1,ai)(1)(ξit+1(1))∑
ξit,x
i piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)
(5.82)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,wit+1
F i(ξit, w
i
t+1, a
i)(1)piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ai) (5.83)
=
∑
ξit,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, ai)∑
x˜i ξ
i
t(x˜
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x˜i, ai)
piit(ξ
i
t)
∑
xi
ξit(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ai) (5.84)
=
∑
ξit
ξit(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t(1)) (5.85)
= E{Ξit(1)|piit} (5.86)
Claim 5.5. For any γit ,
E{Ξit+1(1)|ξit, γit} = ξit(1) (5.87)
Proof.
E{Ξit+1(1)|ξit, γit}
=
∑
xi,wit+1,a
i
t,ξ
i
t+1(1)
ξit+1(1)IF¯ i(ξit,wit+1,ait)(1)(ξ
i
t+1(1))ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ait)γit(ait|ξit) (5.88)
=
∑
xi,wit+1,a
i
t
F¯ i(ξit, w
i
t+1, a
i
t)(1)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ait)γit(ait|ξit) (5.89)
=
∑
ait,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, ait)∑
x˜i ξ
i
t(x˜
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x˜i, ait)
γit(a
i
t|ξit)
∑
xi
ξit(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|xi, ait) (5.90)
=
∑
ait,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, ait)γit(ait|ξit) (5.91)
= ξit(1) (5.92)
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